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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of military culture and its government. It seeks to place 
in an historical perspective two recent official engagements with the problems of 
military culture in Australia. The first of these is a report seeking to improve the 
relationship between the Australian Defence Force and its host community. The 
second is the report of an inquiry into sexual harassment and the integration of 
women in the Australian Defence Force. The thesis argues against viewing military 
culture as a unified set of attitudes, and focuses instead on the architectures, 
conducts and habits of living which have shaped British and Australian military 
forces since the eighteenth century. 
The thesis details changes in the management of the rank and file of the British 
military forces of the eighteenth century, the formation of a professional officer corps 
in the nineteenth century and the relationship between military forces and 
government in Australia since the eighteenth century. These historical investigations 
demonstrate the influence of changing governmental strategies in the shaping of 
military forces over the last two hundred years, and the practical implications of this 
engagement. 
The study then draws upon this genealogy of the Australian Defence Force to 
consider the recent governmental concerns over greater community involvement and 
the integration of women. The thesis argues that these issues need to be considered 
in the light of the formation of modem military forces, in order to look again at what 
is so readily taken for granted about military culture. The thesis argues that these 
most recent concerns should take greater account of the adaptability of military 
forces, while recognising that further change will be negotiated within the 
boundaries historically formed by earlier governmental reforms targeting military 
culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'A closed society of warriors' 
Since the Australian colonies took responsibility for their defence forces in 
1870 there has been a steady industry of concern around the problems of 
recruiting, training and improving these forces. The last ten years have 
proved no exception, with the publication of five major reviews considering 
different facets of the management of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 1 
Two of the most important and interesting of these reviews concern us here. 
The first of these reviews addressed the relationship between the broader 
community and the ADF, particularly in relation to the use of part-time forces 
and the greater use of civilian support for defence activities. The second 
review examined the problem of sexual harassment in the AD.F and the 
integration of women. These reviews are important because they have set in 
train a comprehensive range of activities within the Department of Defence 
and the ADF to address the problems they identified. They are also 
important because they have stimulated the latent interest of the public in 
military culture, in what one newspaper headline called 'a closed society of 
warriors', and in the question of the relationship between this 'closed society' 
and the rest of the community.2 
The first of these reviews, entitled The Defence Force and the Community was 
undertaken at the request of the Minister for Defence, who wanted an 
examination of the relationship between the defence forces and the wider 
community, with a view to examining ways in which the community could 
1Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, The Management of Australia's Defence, 
Canberra, 1987; Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Personnel Wastage in the 
Australian Defence Force, Canberra, 1988; Report to the Minister for Defence The Defence Force 
and the Community: A partnership in Australia's defence, (hereafter The Defence Force and the 
Community), Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990; Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence 
Force: Facing the Future Together (hereafter Sexual Harassment), Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 
1994; Personnel Policy Strategy Review Team, Serving Australia: the Australian Defence Force in 
the Twenty First Century, Canberra: Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, 1995. 
2 'A closed society of warriors', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 September 1993. 
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play a greater role in 'strengthening Australia's security' .3 The stated 
motivation for the review was: 
to seek ways of having the Australian comrnunity ... become more 
involved in protection of the nation [and] ... to identify opportunities 
for greater efficiency or economy in countering military threats to 
Australia's security, through use of capabilities and capacities that 
exist or might be developed in the Australian community4 
This interest in greater community involvement was founded in large part on 
a concern to reduce the cost of defence by identifying areas in which military 
personnel were doing jobs that could be done by civilian personnel at lesser 
cost, preferably by identifying whole functions that could be performed by 
civilian contractors in support of defence personnel. 
The review began its examination of these issues by outlining recent opinion 
polling on attitudes towards questions of defence and national security which 
demonstrated that the Australian community supported the existence of a 
defence force, but had a 'low valuation of defence as a national issue and a 
consistently shallow awareness of defence matters'.5 This was due in part, 
according to the review, to 'lacklustre' debate on defence issues and to 
excessive secrecy about the bases for defence planning, which tended to 
diminish the community's interest in defence matters. For the review, it was 
also partly due to the way in which the culture of the ADF had limited the 
wider community's involvement and interest in defence matters. 
In order to overcome the increasing gap that the Review identified between 
the ADF and the community it recommended both an increased opportunity 
for community involvement in Defence through contracted support for 
defence functions and greater use of reserve forces to replace expensive full-
time personnel. In these two areas, the Review estimated that considerable 
efficiencies could be obtained, as well as producing the added benefit of 
3 The Defence Force and the Community, p.539. 
4 
The Defence Force and the Community, p.539. 
5 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 6. 
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better integrating the ADF with the community. The Review also very 
strongiy advocated a change in the culture of the permanent members of the 
ADF to enable this community support to be successful: 'if the military 
institution is to avoid becoming regarded as a costly irrelevance it needs to let 
go of the rigid institutional separateness into which it is inclined to lapse in 
frustration at the lack of discipline in wider society' .6 
The Review's characterisation of the ADF as a closed society of warriors who 
by design or omission limited community involvement in matters of national 
signifi,:ance was very effective for starkly setting out the issues the Review 
was intended to examine, but it had the effect of antagonising those members 
of the ADF it was intended to reform. Public debate about the findings of the 
Review was limited, since both the Minister for Defence and senior 
representatives of the ADF chose to distance themselves from ~e Review's 
premises about the problems with military culture. 7 However, the Review's 
proposals for examining the scope for contracting out functions currently 
undertaken by uniformed personnel was taken up, and since 1991 has meant 
a considerable number of functions being tested for commercial support and 
contracted out to the private sector.8 
Despite the relatively limited public debate about The Defence Force and the 
Community the report initiated a practical reexamination of the boundaries 
around what constituted the' core' work of the military. As well, the Defence 
Organisation began a number of initiatives to increase the public appeal of 
reserve service with the ADF, which were only moderately successful - the 
short-lived Ready Reserve Scheme in which people served full-time for one 
year and then part-time for a further four in return for assistance with the 
costs of attending university has been abandoned as a costly and unsuccessful 
6 The Defence Force and the Community, p. 212. 
7 See Financial Review, 2 November 1990. 
8By the end of the financial year 1995-96 the Commercial Support Program and other efficiency 
initiatives had generated ~460m of ongoing efficiency gains - Department of Defence, Defence 
Annual Report 1995-96, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996, p. 26. 
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means of developing a more integrated and better prepared reserve force. 
However, though it sharply defined the issues at stake, the report's desire to 
generate widespread examination of military culture would have to await the 
challenge posed by the integration of women into the ADF. 
In September 1993, Australian newspapers reported on two cases of sustained 
sexual harassment of women naval personnel on board a Royal Australian 
Navy vessel, HMAS SWAN. A woman medical officer had been subjected to 
'continual and deliberately offensive and derogatory discussions of 
masturbation, sexual encounters, "sexual exploits and women's private 
parts"' in the wardroom, and four sailors working in the electronic warfare 
area of the ship had been called 'SWODS [Sailors without Dicks], sluts, 
bitches, half-wit sisters and other terms of abuse', including by their Chief 
Petty Officer supervisor.9 The harassment had occurred a yeatearlier, during 
a tour of duty to South East Asia. A naval board of inquiry had investigated 
the incidents and its findings were made public by the female medical officer. 
In the wake of widespread publicity about the incidents, the strong 
condemnation recorded by the naval board of inquiry and strong political 
pressure from the Opposition, the then Minister for Defence Science and 
Personnel announced a Senate Inquiry into the incidents and an examination 
of whether the Navy had adequately addressed the problem. 
While the harassment itself was severe - one of the women sailors told of how 
she had paid someone to try to break her leg so that she could be 
disembarked, and the medical doctor underwent psychiatric counselling for a 
long period afterwards - what captured the headlines, and the editorials, was 
the sense that the cases were an insight into a bigger problem of an 
'outmoded' naval culture. 'Outdated traditions' headlined an articled that 
then went on to ask whether the incidents on board HMAS SW AN 
'represented some kind of naval norm', and to suggest that 'there is also a 
broader issue which is of even more fundamental importance: how relevant 
9 'Women on.navy ship harassed', Canberra Times , 9 September 1993. 
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to the modern world are many of the military traditions which permeate and 
support permanent military forces' .10 Another article claimed that the 
problem to be addressed was wider than just the harassment of women, it 
was 'the battle between Navy traditions and culture, and that of the 
mainstream' .11 The theme of military culture was taken up quite widely, with 
most commentary arguing that it needed to change, even if change was likely 
to occur slowly. 12 
It was against this backdrop of the problematisation of military culture, that 
the Senate inquiry was widened to examine sexual harassment in the ADF as 
a whole. The Australian Senate's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade looked at the specific cases which occurred on board 
HMAS SW AN and sought submissions on any other instances of sexual 
harassment which witnesses wished to bring to the Committee's attention. 
The Committee developed its recommendations on the basis of a great deal of 
information about the particular circumstances of HMAS SW AN and the 
individuals involved, and a comparatively limited amount of information on 
the Navy, Army and Air Force more generally. 13 In fact, the Committee noted 
'the surprising thing to emerge in this inquiry is that there is little evidence to 
suggest that sexual harassment is any worse in the Defence Force than 
elsewhere'.14 The Committee did note that it was difficult to determine the 
extent to which the culture of the ADF may have contributed to the incidence 
of harassment, though it strongly disagreed with the view that harassment 
might be a necessary or inevitable consequence of training for war. 15 The 
Committee concentrated its attention on the attitudes of service personnel, 
10 ' Outdated traditions', Sun Herald, 12 September 1993. 
11 'Navy scandal merits judicial inquiry', Canberra Times, 15 September 1993. 
12See, for example, 'The Swan: all at sea after being female-free', Canberra Times, 11 September 
1993; 'Conduct unbecoming',Age, 11 September 1993. 
13The Inquiry received 85 submissions from individual service personnel discussing their experiences 
of and views on the incidence of harassment in the ADF. Both the Army and the Air Force also made 
detailed submissions to the Inquiry, but like the Navy, they had not been keeping reliable data on the 
incidence of harassment in the services, and unlike the Navy, had not instituted any specific programs 
to address the issue. See Sexual Harassment , especially chapter 12. 
14S l u .. exua .narassment, p. vu. 
15 Sexual Harassment, p. 306. 
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emphasizing the need for a widespread program of awareness-raising 
throughout the ADP, to address outdated attitudes. It recommended that all 
three services pursue the sort of program the Navy had already put into place 
to raise awareness and introduce attitudinal change. With better, or more 
informed attitudes, service personnel would be better equipped to work 
together in the demanding environments of warships, squadrons and army 
units, and they would be more in step with the rest of the community. 
In these two important policy-setting documents the problem of the culture of 
the ADP and its implications for its external relations with the community, 
and its internal relations, is central. Indeed, when the cases of sexual 
harassment which led to the senate inquiry first became public, the author of 
The Defence Force and the Community wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald that 
'the harassment of women members of the RAN needs to be seen essentially 
as a symptom of this far wider malaise in the institutional culture of the 
defence force'. 16 Yet in these two documents this military culture remains 
opaque - it is principally addressed as a set of attitudes which more or less 
acts as an impediment to greater community participation, and the 
integration of women military personnel. Does the culture of the ADP consist 
only in the attitudes of its members? How should Governments address 
military culture? 
The rise of the military profession 
The theme of cultural divergence and convergence pursued in these two 
documents owes a great deal to the theoriation of the military and society 
relationship formulated by writers such as Samuel Huntington and Morris 
Janowitz. This 1social research on the military' emerged in the late 1950s, and 
was focussed on describing the emergence of the United States military 
forces, and the professional officer corps in particular .17 Both the theoretical 
16 
Sydney 1'.-1orning Hera ld, 27 September 1993. 
17
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a social and political portrait, New York, 1971, p. vii . 
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structure of this work, and its descriptions of the military profession have 
been widely used in analysing the Australian military forces. 18 Examinations 
of the military profession in Australia take the work of Huntington, Janowitz 
and other military sociologists as the starting point of their analysis, noting in 
one case that 'the attributes of expertise, responsibility and corporateness 
which Huntington has long since adduced would be accepted, broadly, in 
any discussion of the subject' .19 
A central component of the Huntingtonian thesis of civil military relations is 
the historical development of the military profession, 'born' in Prussia in the 
early nineteenth century. Huntington traces the development of Prussian, 
American and British military forces as they acquire the characteristics of a 
profession, shaped by the illl.peratives of providing security against military 
threat while maintaining broad consistency with the dominant= social values 
and institutions. 20 In this history, 'the profession of officership ... was 
essentially a product of the nineteenth century. It was, indeed, one of the 
most significant institutional creations of that century' .21 The conditions for 
the emergence of a professional office~ corps were specific: there needed to be 
a 'stalemate' between progressive, liberal ideals which favoured a more 
representative military profession, and the aristocratic influence which 
argued for the retention of an elite body of officers maintaining aristocratic 
values. In these circumstances, as a compromise, an officer corps could 
develop independently of these influences, and be 'organized in accordance 
with interests and principles of its own' . 22 
18
See, for example, the collection in Hugh Smith, ( ed.) The Military Profession in Australia: 
proceedings of a conference held on I July 1988 by the Australian Defence Studies Centre and the 
Australian Study Group on Armed Forces and Society, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 
1988. 
19
J effrey Grey. 'The Historical Development of the Military Profession', in Smith, The Military 
Profession in Australia, p. 1. 
2O
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the theory and politics of civil-milirary relations, 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 2. 
11, 
21Huntington, p. 19. 
22Huntington, p. 34. 
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The debt to liberal or aristocratic interests in the formation of 'modern' 
military forces is never clear. Rather, as Huntington describes it, 
professionalism is seized upon as a 'device of social compromise'. 23 While 
this idea of the profession as a compromise is useful in emphasising that 
military professionalism is not to be understood as a simple translation or 
extension of either liberal or aristocratic ideals, it is problematic as an 
historical explanation because professionalisation appears ready-made as the 
answer to a pre-existing question which circumstances suddenly allow to be 
asked. For Huntington and others, professionalisation thus arrives with its 
own logic of development; outmoded forms of organisation and training are 
swept aside, and the reforms associated with recruitment and education of 
officers follow a particular developmental logic, faster or slower in different 
socio-political milieux. As a consequence of the inescapability of 
professionalisation, Huntington argues that the key characteri~tics of the 
professional officer - a distinct sphere of expertise, a sense of responsiblity to 
the state, and a corporate character - are more or less to be found in every 
western country by the end of the nineteenth century. 24 
Moreover, the culture that accompanies this professionalisation is also new, 
and reproducable. In place of the amateurish and elitist approach to the 
organisation of military forces, in which existing social regulations are 
extended to govern military life, the profession establishes a distinctive 
psychological basis for its corporate organisation and behaviours: 
professional military personnel are governed in their actions by the 
psychological and physical demands of 'the management of violence', and 
'the continuing objective performance of the professional function [which] 
gives rise to a continuing professional iveltanschauung or professional 
I • mind,'. 25 
23 Huntington, p. 34-5. 
24Huntington, p. 19. 
25Huntington, p. 61. 
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It is with this 'military mind' that subsequent social research, particularly in 
the United States, has been concerned. This sociological perspective has 
meshed well with the psychological investigations of the military and their 
emphasis on morale. 26 Together, these perspectives have provided the tools 
to shape a range of governmental concerns around the management of 
defence forces in Australia and elsewhere. 27 These concerns have been 
focussed on the psychological relations of individuals within their group, in 
their workplace or professional setting. As we see with the two reports we 
have been discussing, the focus is on the attitudes of military personnel as a 
key fac~or to be managed in any governmental reform. Military culture is an 
expression of these attitudes. Given the birth of professional military forces 
in a vacuum created by competing value systems, the professional military 
culture is formed anew and shaped by the rational requirements of the 
conduct of war and the formation of purpose-built social relations, forms of 
training and institutional settings. 
The Thesis 
In contrast to this sociological and psychological emphasis on the military 
mind, this thesis sets out the partial, contingent factors which together give 
shape to military culture. The focus here is not on the formation of a military 
culture as a unified set of attitudes, but on the architectures, conducts, and 
habits of living which have developed in a piecemeal fashion within the 
British and Australian military forces, shaped largely by governmental 
imperatives. This thesis describes some of the key features of military forces 
when they are looked at as a 'technology for living': an improvised habitus 
26See, for example, Nicholas Jans , 'The Military Profession: the view from within', in Smith, The 
lvfili taJy Profession in Australia, p. 41. 
27Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: the shaping of the private self, London: Routledge, 1990, 
chapters 3 and 4. For examples of this expertise 'at work' see Samuel. A. Stouffer, et al., The 
American Soldier: adjustment during Army life, New York: Princeton University Press , 1949, and 
~easurement and Prediction, New York: Princeton University Press, 1950; for a contemporary 
example, see Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Personnel Wastage in the 
Australian Defence Force. 
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that combines a variety of technologies for enabling, in this case, the training 
and maintenance of a disciplined, predominantly military population. 28 
These forms of training and arts of living were not the inevitable products of 
a process of social development, technological progress, or particular mind 
set. Instead, they are the particular products of historical circumstances and 
adaptations. Far from being formed as the pure expression of professional 
interests and principles, the factors that have shaped 'modern' defence forces 
are drawn from a wide variety of sources, including new forms of 
reformatory architecture, 'aristocratic ethics', bureaucratic reforms, and 
advances in psychology. 
In engaging with the concrete details of military culture, this thesis takes its 
bearings from a field of work within historical sociology, anthropology and 
cultural history, which, from the work of Bourdieu, Mauss and-Elias, points 
us towards the variability and contingency in the formation of bodily, mental 
and moral abilities. 29 In particular, these studies have pointed to the practical 
expression of cultural forms and the significant, but often small and ignoble 
points of development and contestation in the formation of cultural forms 
and the habitats within which they are maintained. This field of work alerts 
us to the way in which questions of culture are often practical problems, such 
as integrating groups of people with quite distinctive forms of behaviour, 
which require the development and modification of a range of techniques, 
rather than philosphical positions, for their resolution. 
To broaden the picture and look further at these techniques, this thesis draws 
upon the work of Michel Foucault, his collaborators and those who have 
taken up particularly the' governmentality' strand of Foucault's work. Such 
28Ian Hunter, Rethinking the school: subjectivity, bureaucracy, criticism, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1994, p. xviii. 
29Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; 
Marcel Mauss, 'Techniques of the Body', Economy and Society, Number 2, 1973, pp. 70-88; Norbert 
Elias, 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 1, 1950, The 
Civilising Process: The History of Manners, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, and The Court Society, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 
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work is sometimes called 'history of the present' because of the common 
interest in the way in which modern problems and certainties have become 
thinkable. In parallel with the curiosity about particular cultural practices, 
the work of Foucault and others questions the conditions for the emergence of 
various ways of thinking about these cultural practices, and of the ways in 
which these cultural practices are related to government, as both the object of 
government and a means through which government is exercised.30 In this 
study the approach that I have adopted pursues this interest in government, 
and in present-day problems of government. My method can be described as 
'genealogical', in that it seeks to understand the present circumstances of the 
military in terms of the often accidental or contingent development of those 
factors which give shape to military forces. Here, the key characteristics of 
genealogy are that it rejects a notion of unified social or institutional interests 
in order to focus on the technical, contingent and often piecemeal factors 
which shape the development of military forces. In doing so, this study looks 
to key turning points in the history of the present, rather than building up a 
comprehensive history. 
The study does not assume that military forces develop along any particular 
trajectory, shaped, for example, by the push and pull of the 'civil-military 
relationship'. The concept of civil-military relations necessitates the 
definition of two spheres of interests which are neither as easily defined nor 
as antagonistic to each other as some studies argue.31 The military as 
institution has permeable boundaries through which ideas and practices flow 
from and to the wider society. The categories of the civil and military are 
constructed categories. Their modern forms, and the question of their 
relation to one another, are recent and circumstantial. Thus, the study does 
30See in particular Colin Gordon, 'Governmental rationality: an introduction', in Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London 1991; 
Graham Burchell, 'Liberal government and techniques of the self', Economy and Society, vol. 22, no. 
3, August 1993, pp. 267-282, and Nikolas Rose, 'Government, authority and expertise in advanced 
liberalism' Economy and Society, vol. 22, no. 3, August 1993, pp. 283-299. 
31An example of such studies is: W.S. Hamer, The British Anny: Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. 
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not look to the shape that military forces take as more or less the reflection of 
something else, such as the community. Rather than beginning from the 
terms of current preoccupations - such as whether or not the military should 
be transformed by greater community participation - it treats such concerns 
as 'historical phenomena', outcomes of the historical emergence of the 
military as a distinctive domain. 
The study does not assume that the current form of military organisation is 
the necessary, modern form of organisation which earlier military forces more 
or less approximated. Instead, the focus is on the piecemeal, sometimes 
random and often incomplete manner in which old practices and ways of 
thinking altered. Rather than offering a sequential history of the emergence 
of the modem military, complete with autonomous professional status, I am 
concerned with the incidence of historically related 'problematisations': ways 
of posing the problem of the relation between the military and civilian life, 
and ways of framing recipes for reformations and the material effects that the 
formulation and solution to these questions might have. This includes paying 
attention to the routine and the mundane, as well as to the governmental 
rationales and arrangements that reshaped the everyday conduct of military 
life. It is in the light of details associated with the selection of soldiers, the 
design of barracks, the procedure of impressment and the examination of 
officers that answers to some contemporary questions about the military can 
be posed. 
The thesis is not a conventional history, in the sense of aiming at a full and 
detailed empirical description of a particular period which framed current 
conceptions of military ethos and its distinctiveness from civilian life. Its 
scope is both broader and more circumscribed. In tracing the path of a series 
of problematisations and programmatic reforms, it ranges across several 
centuries and very different historical territories. While attempting to give 
due attention to these national differences, it does not pretend to deliver a 
comprehensive comparative history of military culture across these countries. 
1•· 
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Rather, it seeks to illuminate key moments in the formation of British military 
forces and Australian military forces, in order to understand the scope and 
direction of contemporary governmental concerns, looking for the bases for 
disruptions or changes to the 'rationality' associated with certain practices, 
and what might influence or cause these disruptions. This method is 
described by Michel Foucault as 'eventalisation': 
making visible a singularity where there is a temptation to invoke a 
historical constant. .. to show that things 'weren't as necessary as all 
that' ... eventalisation [also] means rediscovering the connections, 
encounters, supports and blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so 
on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as 
being self-evident, universal and necessary.32 
The interests in singularity notwithstanding, the frame within which these 
singular events is examined is that of the historical relationship of the British 
military to the tasks of government in Great Britain (and her colonies), 
particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The key features 
associated with the formation and training of contemporary military forces -
the architecture of the barrack, the importance of the regiment, the military as 
a 'separate institution' - present separate problems for historical description. 
Nevertheless, they derive from a common historical territory, at the 
intersection of techniques and aspirations for governing both the general 
population and the military population since the eighteenth century. 
Government 
The way in which the term government is used here is drawn from the work 
of Michel Foucault, and others.33 Foucault's work on government was 
outlined in a lecture series he gave in 1978 and 1979 at the College de France, 
32Michel Foucault, 'Questions of Method', I&C, no. 8, Spring 1981 , pp. 3-14, p. 6. 
33Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', I&C, no. 6, 1979, pp. 5-21. See also Jeffrey Minson, Questions 
of Conduct, London: Macmillan, 1993; Rose, 'Government, authority and expertise in advanced 
liberalism'; Hunter, Rethinking the school; and Barry Hindess Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to 
Foucault, London: Blackwell, 1996. 
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and in several articles.34 Ranging across developments from the fifteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries, these lectures sketched a genealogical outline of the 
emergence of modern rationales for rule. Beginning with the moment when 
the rationalities and techniques of state-based administration were framed 
within early Absolutist states in Western Europe, he describes the shift away 
from feudal monarchic rule in states dominated by Christian pastoral forms 
of municipal governance and princely self-maintenance. The shift comes 
with the emergence of forms of state-based administration as prototypes of 
modern bureaucracy, that separate themselves both from the interests of the 
prince and from the influence of rival Christian confessional movements. 
Foucault's definition of government in general refers to what he termed the 
'conduct of conduct' - that is, he was concerned with means found to manage 
both the rulers and the ruled, and he was most interested in it-in terms of 
government as a problem, or set of problems around the art of government. 
As a broad definition, it directs analysis towards thinking about the exercise 
of rule and the means by which such thinking results in techniques for 
achieving the aspirations of government. For Foucault, the 'art of 
government' becomes a political preoccupation which emerged during the 
sixteenth century, at the intersection of the dismemberment of the structures 
of feudalism and the rise of 'state centralisation', and in the context of 
deconfessionalisation, where 'at the intersection of these two tendencies ... the 
problem [of government] comes to pose itself with this peculiar intensity, of 
how to be ruled, by whom, to what extent, with what methods, etc'.35 This 
intensity derives from the desire to make practical various reflections upon 
government, and it is with the various schema associated with achieving the 
aspirations of government, with managing 'the conduct of conduct' that we 
are interested here. 36 
34A short summary of the contents of these lectures in contained in Michel Foucault, Resumes des 
Cours, College de France, 1989; see also Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality'. 
35Foucault, 'Governmentality' p. 6. 
36Rose 'Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism', p. 288. 
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Foucault is principally concerned with three main approaches to the problem 
of government: pastoralism, discipline, and liberalism, which together form a 
triangular grid of reference, a' solid series, which even today is assuredly not 
dissolved' .37 These approaches to government were neither sequential, nor 
mutually exclusive. Instead, they are treated as historically overlapping 
forms of rule and rationalities of government that took different shaps in a 
variety of Western European territories from the sixteenth century onwards, 
converging by the mid nineteenth century in modern forms of 
: bureaucratically organised national economic and social administration into 
the now-£ amiliar forms of modern liberal government. 
Each of these three key terms - pastoralism, the disciplines and liberalism -
i requires a brief introduction, since each provides a co-ordinate for this 
,, 
I 
historical inquiry. The first term, pastoralism, denotes some key features of 
the eighteenth century governmental strategy known as police. Police is not 
used here in the contemporary sense of a constabulary force in the service of 
the State. Instead, it was the term used in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries to indicate a conglomeration of much older forms of local and 
municipal regulations, codes and customs. Existing within feudal and 
theocratic structures of authority, 'police' regulation involved the piecemeal 
codification of local custom and local government, occurring within local 
communities governed by a mixture of church law, feudal custom, household 
authority and municipal regulation. The forms of rule that fell within and 
between these forms of authority was frequently referred to by the term 
'policy'. 
Police developed as a response to the breakdown of the mechanisms for the 
maintenance of order available within estates; in place of the feudal lord and 
his deputies the local county had its magistracy and body of respected 
(propertied) persons who had responsibility for the good government of the 
parish. As a form of rule police was intended to form a web of authority 
37Foucault, 'Governmentality' p. 19. 
l· 
I 
I 
I" 
16 
within a designated area - usually the parish - to husband the population 
which by birth had a claim to live within the area, and to exclude those who 
had no such claim. In England in particular, Radzinowicz and others 
demonstrate that much of the responsibility for the maintenance of internal 
order was undertaken by private citizens and, towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, by philanthropic organisations and commercial 
• 38 enterprises. 
In England, police was a general term which described the minor, everyday 
form of social organisation which frequently reflected a set of social 
responsibilities that fell to the nobility and aristocracy to uphold. These 
responsibilities were largely designed to maintain the existing order in social 
/I and economic arrangements, and to care for those who could not care for 
themselves. As the jurist William Blackstone outlined in 1783, --'public police 
and oeconomy' means 
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the 
individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are 
bound to conform in their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, 
good neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be decent 
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.39 
Implicit in this form of social and economic government was the assumption 
that government was conducted according to the respective stations of 
individuals. This farm of pastoralism thus both places differing 
responsibilities upon the different stations within the society (some will lead 
and others will follow), and expects people to have or develop the capacities 
38Leon Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal Law and its administration from 1750, 5 
volumes, London: Stevens 1848-86, especially vol. 2, 1956; see also J.L. Hammond and Barbara 
Hammond, The Town Labourer 1760-1832: the new civilization, London: Longmans Green, 1925 and 
The Village Labourer 17 60-18 32: a study in the government of England before the reform Bill, 
London: Longmans Green, 1927. Numerous groups like the 'Bath Society for the Suppression of 
Vagrants, Street Beggars and Imposters, Relief of Occasional Distress and Encouragement of 
Industry' were established during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with a wide range of 
intended effects, as the name of the Bath society suggests. 
39Blackstone, W. [1783] Commentaries on the Laws of England, quoted in Hindess, Discourses of 
Power, p.120. 
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to make their behaviour conformable.40 In England, police regulation relied 
upon the extension of the customary relationships between landowners and 
labourers, and when used referred to a generalised form of pastoral 
management and ordering of society. The term police was not used widely in 
England, and it certainly never developed into a doctrine or science of 
government as it did in France and Prussia. Indeed, there was a suspicion of 
the term police in England in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
because of its association with the French system of intendants or court 
spies.41 However, as Dean has argued, there were a myriad of regulations 
and forms of local government in England that were consistent with the 
aspirations of police which had developed into a much more extensive art of 
government in European states.42 Police was ambitious in its scope, seeking 
to regulate the population, as an established social and economic order, in all 
its aspects, and this was no less so in England than in Europe. -
The general pastoral intentions of police were achievable through a 
combination of the vigilance of local landowners and lesser officials who 
utilised a whole series of techniques to monitor and regulate the activities of 
those who should, and should not, be within certain geographic areas. The 
aspirations of police to 'fix' the population and provide the State with the 
means of maximising that population's productivity generated a variety of 
mechanisms for gaining an intimate knowlege of the population and its 
various capacities. There was a vast need for record keeping, observation, 
and categorisation. This 'will to know' the population utilised the techniques 
of enclosed spaces and timetables; it divided up the population into various 
categories such as the able-bodied poor, imposters, and those in genuine 
distress. These techniques are described by Foucault as disciplinary, in that 
they are intended to render disciplined and docile their subject populations. 
In their association with police, the disciplines flourished; as Foucault 
40See the discussion in Hindess, Discourses of Power, p. 121-123. 
41 See Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal Law, vol. 3, 1956, introduction. 
42Mitchell Dean, The Constitution of Poverty: towards a genealogy of liberal governance, London: 
Routledge, 1991, p.60. 
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remarks, 'the organisation of the police apparatus in the eighteenth century 
sanctioned a generalisation of the disciplines that became coextensive with 
the state itself'. 43 In their relationship to the functioning of a pastoral mode of 
government such as police, disciplinary techniques were designed to perform 
'negative functions': to stop people moving about, separate and classify and 
monitor people, to open up as many things as possible to governmental 
scrutiny, and to act as a 'blockade' against an increasingly mobile and 
difficult to regulate society.44 
At the same time as the disciplines helped to achieve the aspirations of police, 
they worked to sow the seeds of its demise. The vast record-keeping 
necessary to a government which sought to control everything according to a 
view of the 'right order of things' was continually confronted by both the 
impossibility of a totalising knowledge, and the growing evidence that the 
population and economy had their own regularities and patterns which were 
not amenable to the pastoral form of control envisaged by police. 
Government was confronted by an economy which could not be made to 
perform according to the 'will' of the sovereign, and within that economy, by 
individual economic agents who were stifled, rather than encouraged, in their 
contribution to the economy, by the constant interference generated by 
police.45 
The way of thinking about government which attempted to encompass the 
complexity of governing in the face of both an autonomous economic base 
and a population made up of individuals with interests was liberalism. Part 
of the liberal argument rested on the demonstration that while the 
43Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, p. 
215. 
44Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.209. 
45 Albert Hirschman points to an interesting example of this given by Montesquieu, who argued that 
bills of exchange, which allowed the 'invisible' transfer of wealth, were developed as a means of 
avoiding the arbitrary and violent hand of police, and that 'through this means commerce could elude 
violence, and maintain itself everywhere ... owing to these events, the great and sudden arbitrary 
actions of the sovereign have been proven to be ineffective and ... only good government brings 
prosperity': Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passion and the Interests: political arguments for capitalism 
before its triumph, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 72. 
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government of police had as one of its principal objectives the security of the 
population, greater security had not been achieved by greater controls on the 
population, including through the use of military forces to maintain order. 
Liberalism shared with police a concern for security (in the more general 
sense of securing the economic and social conditions for the continuation and 
development of the society, rather than only, or even principally, in terms of 
military strength), but sought to achieve that security through allowing a 
greater degree of what Adam Smith would term 'natural' regulation - of the 
market, of the self-interest of economic agents, and of the society, than was 
possible with police. In these terms, liberalism was a doctrine of limited 
government, where police had sought to govern absolutely. 
However, it is in this identification of the 'natural' limits on government that 
liberalism constructs for itself a 'fertile problematic' as Colin Gordon notes: 
'the conundrum of how to establish a viable boundary between the objects of 
necessary state action and those of necessary state inaction' .46 This 
conundrum is all the more complex since liberalism relies on the 'natural' 
interests of individuals leading ultimately to outcomes which will be 
favourable to the common or collective good. Thus, while liberalism is 
critical of the degree of control that police seeks to exercise over the lives of 
individuals, it too must invent and reinforce direct and indirect ways of 
ensuring that when individuals act in their own 'interests', these interests will 
be consonant with certain standards of reasonableness and civility, and will 
work to reinforce, rather than undermine, civil society.47 
This emphasis on 'working with the grain of things' can be seen in proposals 
such as Adam Smith's regarding the formation of armed forces. Smith 
argued that well-trained, professional forces were much preferable to 
militias, particularly where they were led by 'the principal nobility and 
gentry of the country ... who have the greatest interest in the support of the 
46Colin Gordon, ' Governmental rationality ' . 
47Hindess, Discourses of Power, p. 130. 
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civil authority' .48 As a mode of goverment, liberalism enabled the 
development and extension of a number of approaches to the question of an 
'active' society.49 This included extending and invigorating the use of 
disciplinary techniques, as a means of both guaranteeing the capacities of 
individuals to exercise their social and economic independence, and 
maintaining a check on those agencies and institutions which exercised a 
governmental role on behalf of or instead of the state. In contrast to the use of 
disciplinary techniques to act as a 'blockade', the disciplines could also be 
used to 'improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more 
i/ effective' .50 One of the most fruitful areas for the extension of disciplinary 
techniques was the state itself: the bureaucracy, state schooling and the 
military were all subject to the reformatory possibilities of the disciplines.51 
! 
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This thesis charts the government of the military in relation to these changing 
modes of government and disciplinary techniques. Each of these terms -
pastoralism, liberalism and the disciplines - illuminates aspects of the 
historical relationship between military forces and what we now call the 
'community'. For example, the military forces of England intersected with 
police in several crucial ways. First, the Army and particularly the Navy 
were key aspects of the sovereign's ability to secure his or her wealth and 
territory. Men were pressed into the service of the sovereign whenever 
necessary, limiting the need for either the Army or the Navy to develop 
manpower policies of any but the most rudimentary kind. The arbitrary, and 
in theory temporary nature of impressment as a form of providing recruits to 
the Army and Navy served to perpetuate the political comfort that England 
had no standing Army.52 Second, the Army and Navy were used as an 
48Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, p. 405. 
49See Gordon 'Governmental rationality', and also Graham Burchell, 'Peculiar Interests: Civil Society 
and Governing 'The System of Natural Liberty", pp. 119-150, and Jacques Donzelot, 'The 
Mobilisation of Society', pp. 169-180 in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, Foucault Effect. 
5°Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.209. 
51 See Hunter, Rethinking the school, and Bruce Smith, Governing Classrooms: privatisation and 
discipline in Australian schooling, unpublished PhD thesis, Griffith University, 1991. 
52See the discussion of the standing army debates of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in 
chapter five, below. 
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adjunct to the police of poor and vagrant populations in local parishes. Men 
without work and charged with vagrancy and other minor crimes could have 
their penal sentences commuted to life service in the Army or Navy. Third, 
the Army was used throughout the eighteenth century as a means of 
enforcing law and order, particularly in the growing industrial sectors of 
England. Until the establishment of the constabulary police forces of the 
early nineteenth century, the Army was used to disperse unruly gatherings 
and to maintain a presence in areas of social unrest. 
Similarly, disciplinary techniques were important to the use of the military as 
an adjunct of the police of the population in general and to the internal 
management of military populations. In the Recruitment Act of 1796 there 
were both financial inducements and penalties for parish officers who were 
able, or unable, to assist in the identification of able-bodied men who might 
be recruited into the Army and Navy. To keep track of such debts and credits 
it was necessary to keep records of the local parish population, who had 
entitlements and who did not, where people belonged and what had been 
done about those who did not. Detailed records were also necessary to assist 
in catching deserters, and those who attempted to enlist more than once for 
the sake of the bounty. 
In the Army, disciplinary techniques informed the use of barracks as a means 
of managing the unruly and unreliable military population. Introduced as a 
standard form of housing troops at the end of the eighteenth century, the use 
of barracks resolved two problems simultaneously: the proper oversight, 
training and management of the military population and the pacification of 
industrial populations by the Army while maintaining the segregation of 
soldiers. Over time, disciplinary considerations informed the changing 
fortunes of barrack-like architecture and use of the military as a 
constabulatory force. In nineteenth century Australia the earlier enthusiasm 
for barrack-like accommodation, and the widespread use of soldiers in the 
policing of the population was replaced by a desire to separate the functions 
j•' 
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of the military from the wider government of the society, and in turn to use 
disciplinary techniques to reform the colonial defence forces into the 
twentieth century. 
In Britain, the greater autonomy of regiments, the introduction of a measure 
of commercial support in the areas of logistics and supply, the 
encouragement of responsibility and initiative on the part of officers, 
increasing standardisation of recruitment and promotion, and the eventual 
abolition of the system of purchasing commissions in the Army were all 
informed by a liberal mode of government.53 As well, the persistence of 
certain expectations of the ethical conduct of the officer in turn helped shape 
the internal government of regimental life. The military formation which 
arises, focussed on the regiment (in the case of the Army), but with internal 
concessions to the ethical sensibilities of the gentleman officer,~is thus a 
product of an accommodation beween the bureaucratic, disciplinary 
requirements associated with cost-effective, efficient military forces, and the 
governmental possibilities of the gentleman. 
We can see here the main characteristics of the modern military profession -
semi-autonomous, increasingly establishing standards of entry, etc -
emerging from the military forces' association with changing governmental 
rationalities. As an institutional hybrid, the British military profession is 
shaped by its associations in the eighteenth century with police, modified by 
a variety of disciplinary techniques. In the late nineteenth century the 
military profession emerges as a hybrid of aristocratic and bureaucratic 
tendencies, increasing its capacity for self-regulation at the same time as it 
develops the capacities for capturing and regularising the governmental 
possibilities of the gentleman officer. 
53 See the interesting discussion of whether the reforms of the military during this period were 
consistent with what has elsewhere been called the 'nineteenth century revolution', after the 
theoretical framework for explaining nineteenth century administrative reform developed by Oliver 
MacDonagh. See Hew Strachan, 'The early Victorian army and the nineteenth century revolution in 
government', English Historical Review, vol XCV, no CCCLXXVII, October 1980, pp. 782-809 . 
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The present study fills out the details and complexities of this rough historical 
chart. As noted above, it does so not in the mode of comprehensive historical 
description, but by outlining key moments in the formation of the modern 
way of looking at military culture and its relation to civilian life and to 
government. Taken together, these key moments build an historical sketch of 
overlapping tactics and continuous processes, marked by occasional sharp 
breaks and adaptations. In concentrating on these, I am seeking to suggest 
avenues for more fruitfully exploring the relationship of government to 
military culture. 
Chapter two begins the historical analysis of the thesis with an examination 
of the relationship of eighteenth and early nineteenth century British military 
forces to the governmental rationality of police. Out of this refationship, in 
which the Navy and Army acted as an adjunct to the pastoral forms of local 
government, developed the impetus for transforming the rank and file into 
manageable and accountable bodies of men. This was achieved by housing 
men in barracks from the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout the 
nineteeenth century barracks were modified and improved; from their early 
role in containing troops, the barracks became the vehicle for the 
improvement of the Army as a formed body and as individuals. As the 
chapter demonstrates, the adoption of barracks, so critical to the subsequent 
development of a 'modern' military force, was the contingent outcome of a 
number of factors, including the role of the Army in the pastoral mode of 
government of eighteenth century Britain, theories on the management of 
particular populations such as the criminal and the poor, as well as changing 
methods of training and exercising the rank and file. 
Chapter three complements this history of the rank and file with a genealogy 
of the 'modern' military officer. Arguing against mainstream sociological 
presentations of the transformation of the officer corps in the nineteenth 
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century, the chapter demonstrates the contingent development of the 
regiment as a means by which greater accountability, as well as greater 
autonomy for the Army in its recruitment and training of officers could be 
achieved. In tum the reinvigorated regiments acted as a basis for the 
refinement and inculcation of a military ethos that had previously been 
guaranteed only by wealth and position. 
Chapter four analyses the establishment of military forces in Australia and 
the changing fortunes of those military forces over the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The chapter charts the demise of the military 
forces' central role in governmental administration in the Australian colonies, 
and the way in which these forces developed in the early twentieth century. 
This development was guided by the range of measures of effectiveness being 
developed in Britain as a result of the history we traced in chapters two and 
three, and which increasingly served to distinguish military forces as a 
distinct 'technology for living'. 
Chapter five discusses the official review entitled The Defence Force and the 
Community, with which we began, in the context of the 'standing Army' 
debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The review's 
proposals for change are considered in the light of both the long-standing 
difficulty of achieving the benefits anticipated of the community and the 
governmental history of the military as we have set it out in the earlier 
chapters. This discussion indicates both the likely limitations on such a 
'principled' expression of the ambitions of a liberal governmentality for the 
shaping of military forces and the more mundane means by which the 
concerns addressed by the report are likely to be met. 
Chapter six addresses the problem of sexual harassment in the ADF and the 
broader implications of this problem for the integration of women into 
military life. The way in which the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade problematises the issue of sexual harassment, and 
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the solutions that it proposes are considered in the light of the governmental 
history of the military developed in the earlier chapters. The limitations of 
the analysis contained in the Senate report are outlined and the chapter goes 
on to consider some of the other ways in which, given the historical 
perspective, the integration of women, and the culture of the ADF, might be 
pursued as a practical problem for government to address. 
The thesis concludes with some observations on recent concerns about 
military culture, and suggests, given the history of military culture as a 
governmental concern, some of the more practical implications of this most 
recent governmental engagement with 'a closed society of warriors'. 
CHAPTER TWO 
'Inland Fortresses' 
The development of barracks and the reform of the rank and file 
Introduction 
In this and the following two chapters, we will look at the ways in which the 
military forces of Britain and Australia have developed since the eighteenth 
century. These chapters identify key events in this development, and the 
multiple, often accidental or tactical rather than strategic objectives of which 
they farmed a part. This chapter examines the problems associated with the 
rank and file of the British Army in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, and the circumstances under which the decision to ho~se troops in 
barracks became central to the reform of the rank and file, overturning a 
century or more of opposition to 'inland fortresses'. 
In the eighteenth century there were three main roles for the British Navy and 
Army. The first was in the conduct of warfare in support of both the balance 
of power in Europe and the extension of British imperialism. The second, 
domestic function was as an adjunct to the police of the poor, where the Navy 
and Army provided a ready 'receptacle' for those deemed idle and vagrant 
by local government authorities, and for those serving penal sentences for 
minor crimes in Britain's overcrowded gaols. The third function performed 
by the Army in particular was as an instrument for maintaining order against 
internal dissent throughout Britain. 
These numerous roles for the Navy and Army produced two consequences 
~vhich are significant in the context of t_he present discussion. The first of 
these related to the fact that both the Navy and the Army required large 
numbers of men. In addition to voluntary recruitment and the life-long 
service of those vvhose criminal sentences were commuted,, both the .1.'\J avy 
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and Army frequently resorted to the non-voluntary recruitment of men by 
press-gangs. The temporary impressment of men to serve aboard the Navy's 
ships and in Army regiments was justified as a long-standing customary right 
of the Crown; the use of impressment to supply forces to guarantee Britain's 
external security also per£ armed the secondary function of ridding local 
parishes of those who threatened internal security. As Radzinowicz notes, 
this was 'a striking example of penal economy'1 • Over time, this apparent 
economy came to be seen as extremely costly: critics of impressment argued 
that it diminished military service in the eyes of potential voluntary recruits 
who would make better soldiers and sailors, that it contributed to the 
barbaric practice of flogging as the principal form of maintaining discipline in 
both the Navy and Army, and most importantly, that it took men away from 
the productive fishing industry and the merchant Navy to the 'unproductive' 
military. Impressment was gradually abandoned in the early part of the 
nineteenth century, largely for reasons of political economy, but its use, 
consistent with the more generally indiscriminate recruitment of men, had 
created a lasting concern for the internal government of the military. 
The second significant consequence of the military's role in the governmental 
strategy of police was that it performed a second I double function' as both the 
enforcer of local law and order and as a receptacle for those deemed 
disorderly by such enforcement. This governmental I economy' ultimately 
provided the justification for an extensive and expensive program of barrack 
building throughout Great Britain, as the only practical means of addressing 
the difficulties of both the unruliness of the Army and the restlessness of local 
populations amongst whom the Army was intended to keep the peace. After 
a century of strong opposition to any plan to house troops in barracks, 
barracks suddenly became a I self-evident' solution to these two pressing 
governmental concerns. The building of barracks as a means of addressing 
both the problems of internal security and the discipline of the Army meant 
1Leon A. Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal Law and its administration from 1750, 5 
volumes,. London: Stevens, 1948-86, vol. 4, 1968, p. 79. 
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that in the space of a few years the arguments against barracks disappeared 
forever, and barracks became a locus for many of the governmental programs 
aimed at the reform of the rank and file. While the intimidatory role of 
barracks gradually diminished, their potential as a site for the reform and 
development of the rank and file ensured their continued use throughout the 
nineteenth century. ' 
The concerns of nineteenth century reform were built on the consequences of 
the Navy and Army's association with the eighteenth century pastoral mode 
of government. In the space of a few years, barracks went from being the 
epitome of the danger to liberty of a standing Army to the site of that Army's 
reformation and continuous improvement. In the course of the nineteenth 
century the Army in particular sought to transform itself from a receptacle for 
the desperate and criminal population to an employer who could compete for 
recruits with other, more respectable forms of work, and barracks were a 
crucial component of this transformation. Thus many features of a 'modern 
military' that were developed during the nineteenth century were in large 
part the contingent consequences of the military's association with the 
eighteenth century governmental strategy of police. 
Eighteenth Century Government 
Before exploring the ways in which the military forces were used in the 
eighteenth century, we need to set out the broader strategy of police which 
characterised the eighteenth century government of Great Britain. Police was 
a general term which was used to refer to a type of pastoral government 
which incorporated all the various legal and customary means of maintaining 
local order and encouraging productivity. In England in particular, Leon 
Radzinowicz and others demonstrate that much of the responsibility for the 
maintenance of internal order was undertaken by private citizens and, 
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towards the end of the eighteenth century, by commercial enterprises.2 The 
term police was not as widely used, nor was it so conspicuously theorised 
and advocated as an 'art of government' in Britain as it was in central Europe, 
but this was because the term police was associated with the system of 
intrigue and court spies of late eighteenth century France.3 Mitchell Dean has 
argued that the term may not have had much currency because eighteenth 
century England had clearly defined levels of central and local governrnent4• 
However, as he and others have demonstrated, there was much in the spirit 
and the practice of the government of populations such as the poor that w as 
consistent with European definitions of police: husbanding those who could 
contribute to the local economy, excising those who could not, and regarding 
all matters of social, economic and political life as legitimately within the 
scope of the sovereign to regulate and enhance. 
The recruitment and deployment of military forces were an adjunct to this 
government of police. The use of impressment as a means of manning the 
Navy and Army in times of war was a typical measure of police, and was 
upheld by jurists like Blackstone who argued that it must 'reside in the crown 
alone' .5 So too were the various statutes that encouraged local magistrates by 
way of financial commissions to provide men for the local recruiting parties, 
or to pardon criminals in return for lifetime service in the Navy or Army. As 
welt these magistrates could call upon locally stationed regiments to assist 
them in keeping the peace in the face of disorderly mobs. Thus the military 
forces were an integral part of a more general management of the population 
which was designed to maintain security, both externally and internally. This 
close linkage between the governmental strategies for the maintenance of 
internal order, and the capacity to wage war are characteristic of eighteenth 
~Radzinm.vicz, especially vol. 2; see also J.L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Town Labourer 
1760-1832: the new civilization, London: Longmans Green, 1925, and The Village Labourer 17 60-
1832: a study in the government of England before the Reform Bilt London: Longmans Green, 
1927; Mitchell Dean, The Constitution of Poverty: Towards a genealogy of liberal goven1ance, 
London: Routledge, 1991. 
3Radzinmvicz, vol. 3, 1956, Inuoduction 
4Dean, Consititution of Poverty, p. 60. 
5Quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 85. 
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century government, and these two objectives are the goal of the cameralist 
theorists of the 'absolutist' governments of Europe as they are for English 
proposals for the recruitment of the Army and Navy from the late 
seventeenth century until the early nineteenth. 
For example, Radzinowicz notes an English pamphlet written in 1706 which 
argued for the need to systematically absorb 'anti-social elements' of the 
population into the Army. This was already possible under statutes that 
sanctioned the forced enlistment of those who had been sentenced for crimes, 
but as Radzinowicz says, 'the project of 1706 went further by suggesting that 
such an expedient should be adopted as a permanent measure of preventative 
police'. 6 This proposal was intended to make the raising of men for the Army 
more systematic, and at the same time less harmful to the community by 
ensuring that the productive members of the community were exempted and 
that the idle were absorbed. Such a proposal was exemplary of the sorts of 
concerns more commonly associated with the absolutist states of Europe. The 
dual concerns of protecting the productive citizens whilst maintaining a 
strong Army are echoed later in the century in Prussian canton regulations 
which 'express pride in the organisation of the Prussian state in which 'beside 
the mightiest and most formidable Army, all the arts of peace bloom, ... and 
many classes of subjects are hardly disturbed". 7 Similarly Frederick the Great 
advised his son that 'Useful hardworking people should be guarded as the 
apple of one's eye , and in wartime recruits should be levied in one's own 
country only when the bitterest necessity compels'. 8 In Prussia, as in 
England, these two strategies operated alongside each other, and actions 
targeted at the 'disorderly' were the obverse of the eudaemonic practices 
directed at the productive. 
6Radzinowicz, vol. 2, 1956, p. 23 
7Quoted in Gordon. A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army. 1640-1945, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1955, p. 23. 
8Quoted in R.R.Palmer, 'Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War', in 
E.M.Earle, (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948.p. 54 
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The 1706 Discourse is remarkable for the way in which it indicates the 
workings of English government; it establishes the right of the magistrate to 
determine the fate of those who are 'unknown in the parish' It also 
demonstrates the relative (not absolute) importance placed on 'family life' 
and indicates the function that impressment with the Army was thought to 
serve: 
If the Recruits were managed in this manner, it would not only be no 
prejudice, but a great advantage to the Nation and have the same good 
effect upon it that Physick has upon the body, when it carries off its ill 
Humors.9 
Rather than husbanded, the disorderly are to be excised or redistributed 
according to the benefit they might provide to the productive sectors of the 
community. 
The way in which the military, poor and criminal populations were managed 
as adjuncts to one another was characteristic of this police, which Dean 
describes as establishing 'great strategies of formation of the population as 
one of the central preconditions of capitalist social and property relations, and 
a resource for the liberal revolution in government which sought to secure 
them' .10 In part this 'liberal revolution' would be fuelled by the haphazard 
and inefficient manner in which such a police operated, dependant as it was 
upon the wealthy and well-educated in the local population who carried out 
numbers of police functions, particularly those of the local magistrate and 
constable. In part, the demise of police would be hastened by the range of 
9Radzinowicz, vol. 2, 1956, p,25. There are a number of examples of the marginal role played by 'the 
family' for the pauper; the 1706 Discourse advocates that 'A married man or a widower with a family 
of children should never be chosen, ''unless it should so happen that they are such notorious 
incorrigible Rogues ... that the Parish had rather maintain their Wives and Children than be troubled 
any longer with them'". Radzinowicz, vol. 2, 1956, p. 24. See also his discussion of the treatment of 
vagrant women with children under the Vagrancy Act of 1744: 'whereas persons are often found 
offending against this Act, having children with them, whom they bring up to a dissolute Course of 
Life, ... prejudicial to the Kingdom, in which a race of disorderly persons will increase ... ' the Act 
empowers Justices of Quarter Sessions to place their children, if over the age of seven, as servants or 
apprentices to anyone who would take them. Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 19. After a certain age, 
these children could then be turned over to the recruiting sergeants, under provisions of the same act. 
10Dean, Consititution of Poverty, p. 66. 
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difficult and unintended effects it produced, which we can see in relation to 
the military forces of the period. 
The Military as Receptacle 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the locus of responsibility for 
managing the population was the parish. In the Vagrancy Act of 1744, which 
attempted to consolidate and clarify laws relating to both the criminal and the 
indigent, 'the responsibilities of the parishes which, despite their lack of real 
administrative resources, were still looked upon as the key to local 
enforcement, were laid down in great detail'. 11 Local magistrates were also 
responsible for regulating the productive population within their district, 
determining whom among the itinerant population should be encouraged to 
stay in the parish and who should not. For at the same time as regulating this 
productive population, the local parish also had to fund the various forms of 
relief that were offered to the sick and needy, and so had an interest in 
keeping the numbers of persons 'on relief' to a minimum as they were a drain 
on parish resources: 
The whole history of the administration of parish relief during this 
period of parish domination is the history of a long struggle between 
their moral and financial responsibility for the Poor-a struggle in 
which the desire to keep the rates low was the victor. 12 
The parish therefore devoted considerable attention to questions of eligibility 
for relief and assistance, for there was no obligation on the parish to assist 
anyone who did not have settlement in the parish; whilst an itinerant 
labourer would be welcome in a parish whilst working, he would be forced 
to return to his original parish when out of work. By the end of the 
eighteenth century various attempts to standardise the assistance to the poor 
11 Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 19. 
12Dorothy Marshall, The English Poor in the Eighteenth Century: a study in social and 
administrative history, London: Routledge, 1926, p. 13. See also Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 22: 
'Not only was the catching of a vagrant unpopular, troublesome and sometimes perilous undertaking, 
but many constables who kept public houses or shops and had vagrants amongst their best customers, 
found it in their interest rather to encourage than molest them'; and Dean, Consititution of Poverty, 
chapter 3. 
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meant that 'parish authorities kept a stricter watch than ever on 
immigrants ... Lawsuits between parishes were incessant, and in 1815 the 
money spent on litigation and the removal of paupers reached the gigantic 
figure of £287,000'. 13 · 
In this preventative police centred on the parish, magistrates, who 'would 
best know who are the troublesome and disorderly People in [the parish]', 
occupied a pivotal role in the distribution of the population between the 
workhouse, private employers, the prison and the Army or Navy. A 
proposal in 1782 suggested that magistrates 'all meet from time to time to co-
ordinate their actions in matters affecting public order, and should be given 
power to send "disorderly persons, rogues, vagabonds and persons charged 
with small offences into His Majesty's service by sea or land"' .14 Given the 
absence of a concern in most parishes for a husbanding of resourceful 
potential parishioners, the removal of persons from the parish into the Army 
or Navy was no more extreme than other measures to diminish the parish's 
responsibility for the poor. 15 Indeed, there were considerable incentives to 
incorporate service in the Army or Navy into local police activities. The 
Recruitment Act of 1796 was typical of those of the period, and established a 
table of financial incentives and fines for magistrates, constables, and parish 
officers who were to assist with the recruitment of able-bodied men and 
financial rewards for other persons providing information on possible 
• 16 recruits . 
In this calculus, decisions about the pauper population were made in terms of 
financial incentives and penalties. Parish government was organised in terms 
of how likely any person was to 'become chargeable' to the parish, for the Act 
of Settlement passed in 1662 gave overseers the right to remove persons who 
could not rent a tenement worth £10 a year if they were 'likely to be 
13Harnmond and Hammond The Village Labourer, pp. 154-155 
14Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 24. and vol. 3, 1956, p. 106 
15
See the discussion in Hammond and Hammond, The Village Labourer, p. 128-130. 
16Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 90 
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chargeable to the parish'. This form of preventative police had the effect of 
targeting 'persons who might be expected to breed a charge on the parish', 
and was particularly vicious in its treatment of pregnant but unmarried 
women. 17 It was also acknowledged to have the effect of discouraging the 
marriage of labourers, for fear that the consequence of these marriages would 
only be more charges upon the rates; this led, unsurprisingly, to an increase 
in illegitimate births and consequently created a large pool of children for 
whom the parish had responsibility. Here too, a careful calculation was 
made of the long term costs of maintaining the child against a once-off 
payment to a master in another parish where these children were placed as 
apprentices. The advantage in this scheme was that the child would, after 
forty days, become the responsibility of the master's parish. Marshall argues 
that the payment of a fee to the master acted as an incentive to insolvent 
masters to take on too many apprentices, thus 'pauperising' certain industries 
and limiting the likelihood that the apprentice would learn any useful skills. 18 
In addition it encouraged the calculation of the child as a saleable asset; for 
the master who had taken on the child for the premium, or the reluctant 
parishioner who had had to take the apprentice or pay the parish a fine of 
£10, the Army and Navy recruiting parties must have appeared very 
attractive, 'since all the boy's wages, and even his prize money, were legally 
the property of his master'. 19 
This aspect of government, the police of the parish, inf armed the organisation 
of the Army and Navy in three ways; the first was that it made the Army and 
Navy 'receptacles' for the disorderly of the parish, thus establishing certain 
preconditions for the maintenance of discipline within the services. The 
17Marshall, English Poor, pp. 166; 212. 
18Marshall, English Poor, pp. 186-200. 'The tendency was for parish children to be apprenticed only 
to such trades as were already semi-pauperised, or else to some blind alley occupation, such as milk 
selling or button moulding, which was carried on entirely by this legalised form of child labour, and 
where there was no possible opening for them when they became adults'. p. 197. This practice was 
still used when the Poor Law Commissioners presented their report in 1834; as one witness said: 'the 
practice of binding children at nine years of age compulsorily ... was very general, and still prevails in 
many parts of Cornwall, Somerset and Devon, so as to form a leading characteristic in the county.' p. 
187. 
19Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 82. 
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second was that, given the level of intervention into peoples' lives possible 
within this form of government (the forced repatriation to parishes of 
settlement, apprenticing of children, discouragement of marriage), there were 
no strong norms of 'family life' or 'freedom of action' against which service in 
the Army or Navy could be characterised as deprivations. The third was that 
consigning individuals to service in the Army or Navy on the basis that it was 
financially attractive to both individuals parishioners and to the parish 
officers, which was consistent with the calculus applied to those 'likely to 
become chargeable on the parish', focussed the issue of recruitment around 
the distribution of financial incentives and penalties. 
In the face of an increasingly difficult to manage population, and an active 
policing of the parish, the courts were overburdened with criminals and 
undersupplied with places to send them. The practice of pardoning criminals 
in return for service in the armed forces was a long standing one, with 
various acts and administrative orders used to commute prison sentences into 
service (for life or shorter periods) in the Army or Navy dating from the 
seventeenth century. The Mutiny Acts of 1701 and 1703 established that 
criminals sentenced to imprisonment, transportation or death could be 
pardoned on condition that they enter the Army or Navy 'for life or 
otherwise, as His Majesty shall think fit'. This practice was reaffirmed in a 
number of acts passed during the eighteenth century.20 The use of the 
services as part of the strategy of police was thus advocated by those 
responsible for sentencing offenders, as this practice performed two 
important functions for the management of the criminal population in Britain: 
it reduced the pressure on the gaols, which were severely overcrowded, and 
provided an acceptable mitigation of the death sentence, which was the 
statutory punishment for a vast range of crimes. This practice was to 
continue into the nineteenth century; a Parliamentary Committee 
investigating the practice in 1812 found that considerable numbers of 
20Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, pp. 94-100. 
/ 
' al 
f 
I 
36 
criminals were still being drafted into service. 21 Under the pressure created 
by an active policing of the population, the continuing need for recruits and 
the absence of penal colonies, Radzinowicz comments that this 
convenient interchangeability benveen the penalties of death, 
transportation or imprisonment and forcible enlistment in the Army 
or Navy became established by statutory authority and 
administrative precedent, with impressment emerging as a powerful 
measure of crime prevention and a de facto legal sanction. Like 
transportation, it provided protection and a sense of security by long 
term elimination of offenders from society, as well as satisfying a 
. 1 d 22 nationa nee . 
Impressment and the enlistment of convicted criminals formed one extreme 
of a continuum of coerced recruitment into the military - poverty could be 
said to be equally coercive for the large number of voluntary recruits who 
'took the king's shilling'. For the population from which soldiers and sailors 
were drawn, the fact that almost all recruitment into the military was coerced 
made it little different from one's experience as a recipient of Poor relief, as 
an apprentice or indentured labourer. Thus there was little concern that 
impressment interfered with the liberty of the individual being impressed, 
except in the cases of those individuals who might mistakenly be picked up 
by press-gangs or recruiting sergeants. Enlistment acts were framed with 
exclusions for certain classes of persons, with provisions to allow individuals 
to contest their enlistment in court and to find substitutes to go in their place. 
For example, the Act passed in 1795 to increase the number of persons in the 
Navy was entitled 'An Act for enabling the Magistrates, in the several 
Counties in Great Britain, to raise and levy ... such able-bodied and idle 
persons as shall be found within the said Counties to serve in His Majesty's 
Navy', and it exhorted the justices of the peace to 'use their utmost Care and 
Diligence that his Majesty's Service ... be not neglected or disappointed'. 23 This 
21 See Parliamentary debate on the ' Convicts Discharged upon Entering the Army or Navy', 
Parliamentary Debates (1812) Vol. 21 , cols 1253-1258. 
22Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 96. 
23Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 90. 
37 
statute and one passed the following year sought to recruit nearly ten 
thousand men from the counties and twenty thousand from the ports, yet 
there was little danger that this would result in a threat to liberty; the 
pressure to send those who would otherwise be a burden to the local area 
was considerable and 'the scheme soon degenerated into a sort of minor gaol-
delivery. The counties tended to select their 'bad boys', their vagrants, 
tramps and idlers ... The town and city authorities sent worse types still- their 
undesirables; beggars; minor thieves and pickpockets, or people who looked 
as though they might be pickpockets'. 24 
A further example. In 1850 Admiral Berkeley noted that 'he had 
endeavoured to trace the objections of the men to [impressment], and he had 
been able to find only one petition from them against it. That petition was 
presented in 1760, and he had no doubt that the same spirit animated them 
now which animated them then. That petition wound up by stating that if it 
could be shown that impressment was the only mode of manning the Navy, 
so anxious were they for the honour of the country, that they would submit to 
it without a murmur.' 25 The absence of petitions over impressment includes 
the period of the naval mutinies of 1797, and Gill observes that: 
it is surprising ... to find that the mutineers made no attempt to abolish 
impressment, and in their negotiations with the Admiralty, showed 
no sign that they regarded the system as unjust or undesirable. The 
only mention that appears in the official records is a demand of the 
Nore mutineers that two months' wages should be paid in advance to 
pressed men to provide themselves with an outfit. 26 
As well, there were objections to the quota system of recruiting introduced 
under the Acts of 1795 and 1796, not because it tended to act as way of 
rounding up undesirables, but because these 'quota-men' were reputed to 
have received considerable sums of money in the parishes' efforts to fill their 
quota: 'The seamen who voluntarily enlisted in 1793, and fought some of the 
24Michael Lewis,A Social History of the Nav_v 1793-1815, London: allen and Unwin, 1960, p. 118. 
25 ' Supply-Impressment of Seamen' , Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol 111 (1850), col.285 . 
26Conrad Gill, The Naval Mutinies of 1797, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 191 3, p. 280. 
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most glorious of our battles, received only the comparatively small bounty of 
£5. These brave fellows saw men, totally ignorant of the profession, the very 
refuse and outcasts of Society, fleeing from justice and the vengeance of the 
Law, come on board with bounty to the amount of £70'. 27 
Amongst the rank and file, impressment did not constitute the basis of any 
widespread revolt, although there were occasions on which sections of the 
Army were required to quell mutinies amongst newly-recruited regiments, 
some of whom may have been impressed. 28 Though there was undoubted 
hardship associated with service in the Army or Navy, and the severing of 
links with families, the 'disorderly' class recruited into the Army in 
particular, did not enjoy a great sense of liberty when roaming unemployed 
through towns and villages that considered them a danger. 
The preventative police of the eighteenth century was often characterised by 
the use of force, and the practices of the Army were little different from those 
of the charity school, the master towards his young apprentice, or parishes 
towards those who looked like they (or their offspring) were going to be 
chargeable on the rates. Glover discusses the enthusiasm for recruiting boys 
from 1797 and the incentives, as we have mentioned before, for adults to 
bring these boys to the recruiters' attention: 'the whole thing smells of an 
unpleasant and bibulous trade in children', but, he notes, 'this recruiting of 
boys antedates even the first Factory Act by twelve years ... These children 
taken into military life need not necessarily have been worse off than those 
employed in civil life'. 29 The sorts of deprivations that one might argue for 
the impressed pauper were not necessarily formulated as such: 'family life', 
27Lewis, p. 122. The issue of the quota system is usually raised in terms of its_ 'political' implications, 
in that historians of the Mutinies argue over whether these quota-men were the instigators of the 
mutinies, as they tended to be better educated, and in some cases were associated with political 
organisations such as the London Corresponding Society. See Roger Wells, Insurrection, the British 
Experience 1795-1803, Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1983, chapter 5. 
28John Houlding, Fit for Service: the training of the British Army, 1715-1 795 , Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981, p. 73 
29
Michael Glover, Peninsular Preparation: the reform of the British Army 1795-1809, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963 p. 227 and 227n. 
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'childhood', education, privacy, freedom of movement and regulated 
working hours were still to take on the forms that we would recognise in the 
twentieth century. A variety of campaigns would, over the next hundred 
years, establish these elements as critical to a well-governed society; at least 
until the mid-nineteenth century, these elements were marginal if not 
irrelevant in assessing service life. 30 
Impressment and coerced recruitment were more strongly objected to as 
interfering with the good government of the Army. Commanding officers 
disliked being sent recruits who had received pardons from gaol sentences, 
and Wellington is famous for his descriptions of the Army as 'the scum of the 
earth'. But here the problem is not with the capacity of these impressed men 
to fight, for Wellington could also say that 'I certainly have had every reason 
to be satisfied with the Army, and I should say that they are to be relied on in 
all cases', but with the difficulty of controlling the quality of recruit. 31 Sir 
Edward Codrington's 'objection to impressment was, that under the pretence 
of impressing, it gave an opportunity of sending all the rogues and 
vagabonds in the country that the Magistrates were anxious to get rid of on 
board the fleet. .. and on looking to the hands of these men, he found that they 
were as soft as those of young ladies' .32 These men were good fighters but 
they were difficult to control, and as a result the focus of 'managing' this 
population was the imposition of effective punishments, for 'who could 
wonder that, under such a system as this, severity of discipline was necessary 
to maintain anything like order or decorum?'.33 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, punishment for all but the 
most serious crimes was a variable number of lashes from the cat o' nine tails 
30See, for example, Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families: welfare versus the state, London, 
Hutchinson, 1980; see also the statement by Hew Strachan: 'The gradually improving position of the 
soldier's wife ... was due to the growing awareness of the correlation between marriage and good 
conduct': Wellington's Legacy: the reform of the British Army 1830-54, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press , 1984, p. 64. 
31 Quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 156. 
32Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 20 (1833), col.687. 
33 Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 20 (1833), cols 645-646. 
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before the assembled regirnent.34 In the mid 1800s, when the brutality and 
excessive use of flogging became the subject of public outrage and 
parliamentary debate, military authorities defended the continued use of 
flogging on the basis that it was appropriate given the class of men who made 
up the Army. The 'licentious and undisciplined' population justified the use 
of punishments as spectacles that were as much for the benefit of the potential 
offenders in the audience as the offender himself: flogging, hangings, 
branding all worked on the premise that the punishment could serve the two 
purposes of reminding the offender of his crime and deterring others by 
example. The difficulty with this form of punishment was not so much that it 
was 'inhumane', but that it was arbitrary, and open to abuse. The naval 
mutineers of 1797 made this point when they argued to the Admiralty: 'we 
do not wish you to understand that we have the least intention of encroaching 
on the punishments necessary for the preservation of good order and 
discipline necessary to be preserved in H.M. Navy, but to crush the spirit of 
tyranny and oppression so much practised and delighted in, contrary to the 
spirit or intent of any laws of our country'. 35 In this case, as in many others 
that were to come to light during the debates on flogging some fifty years 
later, the variability in the numbers of lashes that different officers would 
impose for different offences, coupled with the greater or lesser strength and 
experience of the man administering the lashes meant that the effect of 
punishments was entirely arbitrary, leading to a variety of results, including 
the unintended death of the person being punished.36 Despite the campaigns 
that were mounted with increasing success through the middle years of the 
nineteenth century, the Army did not finally abolish flogging until 1881. 
Those who wished to preserve it as a means of enforcing discipline continued 
34Alan Skelley describes the practice thus: ' The cat ususally had nine lashes of whipcord or rawhide 
sixteen to twenty-four inches long with three knots in each lash which together cut a man a total of 
twenty-seven times with each stroke. To receive a flogging soldiers were tied to halberds or to 
triangles on the parade square ... The entire regiment was normally paraded to witness the event and 
one of the soldier's comrades wielded the cat.' Alan Ramsey Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home: 
the recruitment and terms and conditions of the British Regular, 1859-1899, London: Croom Helm, 
1977, pp. 171-2, note 108. 
35 Quoted in Gill, p. 278 
36Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914, London: Longman, 1980, p. 88. 
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to argue with decreasing conviction that the quality of the recruits to the 
Army continued to justify maintaining flogging as a last resort.37 
Given that impressment registered as a problem for the internal management 
of the Army, the impressment of convicts complicated this management, 
partly because convicts were said to be harder to discipline and partly 
because 'it would further introduce great uneasiness and confusion into the 
service if these convicts should be put into H.M.' s regiments for a limited 
time, when the honest volunteer engages to serve for life'38• The practice of 
recruiting from prisons had the effect of bifurcating the populations of the 
Army and Navy into criminals and non-criminals, which as distinct classes 
could be mixed in varying proportions to varying effects. For the services, 
then, this practice produced two organisational problems. On the one hand, 
there was the issue of contamination: 'so that a ship of war, instead of being 
the home, as she ought to be, of a superior class of men ... was converted into a 
receptacle of the violators of the law, where criminals of every shade and hue 
were to mingle in one common mass, till each contaminated the other'.39 On 
the other hand, the problem was one of carefully managing the opportunities 
for reformation: 
It would be much better if [convicts] were placed at first in those 
particular corps, which had been set apart for them. In that case, if 
they behaved well, it might be allowed to them, as a great reward for 
their good conduct, to enter into some regular regiment of the line. 
This would be a great reward to them ... [also] it would not be 
considered nearly so degrading to the regular regiments, to have men 
come in among them recommended by their good conduct'. 40 
The existence of this criminal population within the Army meant that those 
who had enlisted voluntarily could be protected from service in the more 
unpleasant garrisons: 'the forces to be stationed on the unhealthy West Coast 
of Africa should be supplied rather "with such men as must look upon that 
37Skelley, p. 152. 
38Letter from the Secretary-at-War to the Earl of Rochford, 13 May 1769, in J.Redington, (ed) 
Calendar of Home Office Papers of the Reign of George III, 2 volumes, London, 1879. 
39Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 20 (1833), col. 645. 
40British Parliamentary Papers, vol. 21 (1812) , col. 1257. 
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duty as a mitigation of their sentences than with well-deserving 
volunteers'". 41 The New South Wales Corps sent to that Colony in the early 
1790s included 'prisoners from military penal establishments, and, in some 
cases ... convicts from English gaols'. 42 
Impressment and coercive recruitment constituted an problem of internal 
order, manifest in the legal framework regulating the conduct of members of 
the armed forces. The fear, or perhaps expectation that sections of the Army 
might at any time become uncontrollable, and that individuals would at all 
times attempt to desert was reflected in the death penalty for desertion (the 
consequence of such final measures, and their failure to deter, meant regular 
amnesties for deserters to rejoin their regiments which were always short of 
men), and transportation for those who assisted deserters. It was also 
manifest in the complex legal formulations surrounding the duties of soldiers 
deployed to keep the peace and in legal argument on the use of martial and 
miliary law. Soldiers were doubly constrained by the workings of civil and 
military law, and this manifests itself most clearly, and paradoxically, in 
circumstances where the Army is called in to keep the peace. In such cases 
the Army was assisting the local magistrate to keep the peace, and could only 
act to disperse the crowd at the magistrate's instigation. In certain cases, the 
magistrate would fail to be present after having summoned the soldiers; in 
that instance, there was a dilemma for the men and their commanding officer. 
If the officer, without a magistrate present, gave an order to disperse the 
crowd with force, 'it reduces the soldier to a choice between the hanging-
awarded to him by the Local Law-for obeying his Officer, and the shooting-
awarded him by the military law-for disobeying his Officer'. 43 The 
discomfort afforded the soldier by this dual standard arose as a consequence 
41 Calendar of Home Office Papers of the Reign of George IIL 1766-1769, (1879), vol.2. no. 1190, p. 
468. 
42 A.W.Jose and H.J.Carter ( eds) The Australian Encyclopedia, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1926, 
vol. 2, p. 200. 
43 Sir Charles Napier, quoted in Charles M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: their 
administration and government, 2 volumes, London: J. Murray, 1869, vol. 2, p. 152. See also the 
discussion in Tony Hayter, The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian England, London: Macmillan, 
1978, p.32-33. 
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of the need to indemnify the public, and commanding officers, against the 
unruliness of the soldier. 
Similarly, the sanctions appropriate to maintaining discipline within the 
Army were (and still are) considered entirely inappropriate to the non-
military community. The imposition of martial law, it was argued, was 
possible only in the gravest necessity, and 'the instant the necessity ceases, 
that instant the state of soldiership ought to cease, and the rights with the 
relations, of civil life, to be restored' .44 For soldiers, though, the state of 
soldiership did not cease, and military officers claimed the right to continue 
to use more summary methods in dealing with insubordination: 
if five or six regiments were to mutiny in the field, would anyone tell 
me you must apply to Parliament before you could reduce those 
persons to subjection? There must be somewhere, for public safety, a 
right to exercise such power in time of need.45 
As Dundas notes, martial law was also likely to be imposed in British 
colonies (as it was in New South Wales), where military governors sought to 
control a primarily military population. The right to apply a different 
standard of trial, evidence and punishment is usually considered to be 
justified by the strictures of war, and presumably the need to maintain the 
unquestioned authority of the superior officer. But as Clode suggests, these 
justifications are premised on maintaining order amongst a certain type of 
soldier: 
the continuance of [the supreme power of life and death] during [the 
reign of William III] and the succeeding reign may probably be 
accounted for by the fact that the Army during that period was 
recruited very largely with Foreign Soldiers and with lawless persons 
from our own gaols ... During the last century the political action of the 
Army had ceased, but the morale of the Recruits remained-as the 
source of supply did-the same. Nor had the character of those who 
joined the service very considerably improved in 1836, when the Duke 
of Wellington assured the Commissioners on Military Punishments 
44Clode, vol. 2, p. 161. 
45Sir Henry Dundas' Evidence, quoted in Clode, vol. 2, p. 161. 
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that British Soldiers were taken entirely from the lowest orders of 
• 46 society 
In the same vein, Lord Loughborough said in support of the military 
continuing to be governed by the Mutiny Acts: 'there is nothing so dangerous 
to the civil establishment of a state , as a licentious and undisciplined Army' .47 
That impressment was appropriate to police does not mean that it was 
indiscriminately applied or universally accepted, but rather that assessments 
of the practice would be made in terms of a variety of 'rationalities'. For 
example, individuals could protest against the illegal or unfair usage of 
impressment, a course pursued by men who could demonstrate that they 
were gentlemen, as 'gentlemen were expressly exempted'.48 One manner in 
which this ineligibility was demonstrated was by the appearance of the 
potential recruit. In justifying the impressment of an alleged gentleman 
before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1795, Admiral 
Markham said that the man 'looked like a Boatswain'; however he was 
overturned when the entire Committee had looked at the man and 'decided 
that they "cannot concur in describing his appearance to be at all like that of a 
Boatswain, or any such inferior officer", and accordingly pronounced in his 
favour' .49 
This manner of distinguishing between those for whom impressment was 
proper and those for whom it was not was consistent with a concept of 
government that could regulate on the basis of appearances and conduct. The 
capacitJ to make determinations about people on the basis of appearance was 
central to the laws which regulated the use of impressment as an adjunct of 
police, and attempts to control the pauper populations from which recruits 
were drawn regularly proposed the use of badges and distinguishing mar ks 
46Charles M. Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, London: J. 
Murray, 1872, p. 10. 
47 
Quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 125. 
48Lewis, p. 57. 
49Lewis, p. 57. 
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so as to discriminate between the deserving and undeserving poor.50 
Distinguishing marks were also used within the services. Until 1871 it was 
possible to brand soldiers with the letters BC for Bad Character or D for 
Deserter; this practice was justified 'as a means of identifying deserters and of 
preventing fraudulent enlistments'.51 Such marks were to assist in the cases 
where the local magistrates could not rely on their own capacities of 
'recognisance'; more generally this system of relying on the perceptions of 
magistrates and recruiting officers vvas considered so successful that 
impressment would only seize those 'with something of the vagabond in their 
character' .52 
The governmental strategy to which these modes of managing the military 
population belonged was to come under increasing scrutiny during the 
course of the nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth century the Army 
was regularly unable to recruit sufficient numbers of men to meet its needs. 
Having operated as a 'receptacle for the criminal and idle' throughout the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the Royal Commission on 
Recruitment argued in 1861 that the Army 
could only expect to get Recruits from among those few who may, 
naturally, have a predeliction for a Soldier's life, or those who may be 
induced to adopt it either for domestic reasons, or when, by 
fluctuations of trade, or the adverse influence of the seasons on 
agricultural operations, they are deprived of other employment53 
Before turning to the reforms which arose from the military' s long association 
with this aspect of police, we need to look at the other principal use of the 
Army in the eighteenth century as a force for maintaining internal order. 
This role, coupled with the 'disorderly soldiery' had important consequences 
for the reform programmes of the nineteenth century. 
50Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, pp. 26-28. 
51 Spiers, p. 62. This branding did in fact often involve the use of tattoos. 
52 George Haldane, quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 87. 
53 Quoted from the Report of the Commission on Recruiting (1861), p. iii, in Skelley, p. 247. 
46 
The Army and the problem of internal order 
The second role that the Army played in the mechanisms of police was as a 
peace keeping force in Britain and Ireland. Troop movements in England, 
and the distribution of garrisons in Ireland reflected the centres of actual and 
potential unrest. In England, rioting was a common political form 
throughout the eighteenth century, and 'Almost every account, from any part 
of the country, of serious disturbances ... contained a reference to the 
imposition of the military'.54 The Army was called in to restore order during 
riots over lack of food, the imposition of new taxes, and to deal with rising 
industrial unrest. The Army was also responsible for patrolling for 
smugglers. These various tasks meant that the Army was constantly on the 
move and always short of manpower: 
There has most frequently been so many applications for detachments 
from those regiments for the assisting of His Majesty's officers of the 
Customs in different parts of the coast and for the quelling of riots in 
the several manufacturing towns etc, that it has hitherto been found, 
that number has scarcely been sufficient to answer to these purposes, 
and at the same time to give alternately some regiments the necessary 
opportunities of being assembled for the preservation of their 
discipline.55 
Attempts were made to diminish the regular Army's responsibility for police, 
by encouraging the development of militia and yeomanry forces. The militia 
proved too unreliable to be used, as they had a tendency to join in the riot, 
but the yeomanry were retained as 'they provided the authorities with their 
one efficient and trustworthy police force. During the industrial disturbances 
they were the principal auxiliaries to the regular Army' 56 Even with the 
54Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 119. 
55Report of the Quarter-Master General in 1768, quoted in Hayter, p. 23. 
56Harnmond and Hammond, The Town Labourer, p. 88. They also make the point that 'Aristotle and 
Bacon both remarked the suitability of the cavalry to oligarchy, and when the volunteers were 
disbanded ... the yeomanry were retained.'. See also the discussion of the militia in L.G.Boyd, The 
Role of the Military in Civil Disorders in England and Wales, 1780-1811, PhD Thesis, University of 
Tennessee, 1977, p. 126-130, and F.O.Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order in Regency 
England, being an account of the Luddite and other disorders in England during the years 1811-1817 
and of the attitude and activity of the authorities [1934], Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 
255-257. 
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assistance of the yeomamy, and with ill-fated attempts to establish a 
volunteer force that was also unreliable, the Army could not meet the 
demands of the magistrates without increasing in size. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, the Army had increased considerably in size, and in 1812 
more than 12,000 troops were stationed in the area between Leicester and 
York alone. 
This use of the Army was precarious as it relied on the authority of a 
magistrate to direct the Army to intervene; in many cases the magistrates 
were either not present when the Army came up against the assembly they 
were to disband, or the area in general was so badly served with magistrates 
that none could be called upon to direct the military. Radzinowicz notes that 
in the well-known case of the Gordon Riots in 1780, there were no magistrates 
present to direct the troops, and the military took no action until the Privy 
Council intervened to issue a general order. This order gave the military the 
power 'to Act without waiting for directions from the Civil Magistrates, and 
to use force for dispersing the illegal and tumultuous assemblies of the 
people'.57 
The practice of using the military as an adjunct to the magistrates in the 
maintenance of order was continued well into the nineteenth century; troops 
were still used during Chartist agitation even though a formalised police 
force had been in existence then for some ten years. The establishment of a 
specialised institution of preventative police and the gradual diminution in 
the Army's use to keep the peace are not the complimentary processes their 
temporal proximity suggests. The decision to establish a force specifically to 
detect and prevent crimes was part of programme aimed at establishing a 
preventative mechanism that was more effective than the tradition of a shared 
responsibility for watch and ward that had existed for over a century. The 
Metropolitan Police were to deal with the high levels of crime in London 
which could not be prevented by the reluctant citizens taking their turns at 
57Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 143. 
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nightwatchman duty, and were not being addressed by the Army who were 
only used in cases of large-scale groups assembling and after crimes had been 
committed or were in process. The new institution of the Metropolitan Police 
was prompted by a view that England had 'outgrown her police institutions' 
and that 'the cheapest and safest course will be found in the introduction of a 
new mode of protection'.58 The Army belonged to that old order of police 
which was no longer adequate to the tasks of maintaining order in the city of 
London. This shift away from the Army was not representative of any 
squeamishness about the use of the Army against the disorderly, but rather 
that they were inadequate to the new regime of preventative police. 
At the same time as this gap in the capacities of the old institutions of police 
appeared, senior military officers expressed concern at the frequency with 
which the military was resorted to by the magistrates, and the extent to which 
this made the government reliant on an inherently unstable base. The Duke 
of Wellington, Commander in Chief of the Army, thought it dangerous to 
leave the maintenance of order to the Army, and recommended that since 
soldiers were 'taken from the ranks, and of the class of the people, and liable 
to be influenced by the views and sentiments of the people ... the Government 
ought ... to form either a police in London or a military corps, which would be 
of a different description from the regular military force, or both', because, as 
Radzinowicz remarks, 'any mutiny of the regular soldiers would then be of 
little or no importance'.59 This new, more specific definition of police was not 
introduced in order to re-establish the proper role of the Army, but to create a 
body which could deal in a new way with the problems posed by criminal 
activity in London and, at the same time·, limit the potential damage that the 
Army, as an unstable population, could have on the exercise of government . 
Before any substantial shift in the responsibility for the policing of the 
population was to occur, the Army undertook a campaign of barrack building 
58Peel, quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 159. 
59w ellington, quoted in Radzinowicz, vol. 4, 1968, p. 156. 
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in direct response to the increase in its policing responsibilities, particularly 
in the industrial areas of England. The problems posed by the intersection of 
the governmental strategies of impressment and police manifest themselves 
most clearly in the decision to undertake a substantial barrack-building 
program, beginning in the 1790s. Until this large-scale program was 
undertaken, the greater part of the Army in England and Scotland (but not 
Ireland, where barracks had been used since the early 1700s) were billeted in 
public houses licensed to sell alcohol. This practice was continued 
throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century, even 
though there were regular complaints from commanders that publicans 
closed their doors as the Army approached in order to avoid the obligation to 
billet troops, and complaints from publicans that the Army always drank and 
ate more than they paid for, or that they never paid at all. Despite these 
complaints, and the difficulties posed to discipline, health and morality by 
the combination of soldiers and alcohol, the practice was maintained because 
proposals to develop separate quarters for the troops were always defeated in 
Parliament by the invoking of Blackstone's view that the Army 'should live 
intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland 
fortresses should be allowed'. 60 A more pragmatic view was advanced by 
William Pulteney in 1741, who acknowledged that 
a Standing Army in quarters will always be more troublesome to the 
people then a Standing Army in barracks; but for this very reason I 
shall always be for keeping our Army in quarters, that the people 
may be sensible of the fetters which are preparing for them .. .I am for 
keeping our Army in their view, by having the soldiers quartered 
among them. If the soldiers were all kept in barracks the people 
would be insensible of their numbers, and might not perhaps think of 
reducing them by law ... 61 
These 'principles' gave way to a different set of concerns late in the century, 
when: 
The circumstances of the country, coupled with the general state of 
affairs, rendered it advisable to provide barracks ... A spirit had 
60Quoted in Clode,MilitaryForces of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 224. 
61 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 234. 
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appeared in some of the manufacturing towns which made it 
necessary that troops should be kept near them .. .It would also 
operate as a preventive of the seduction of the Army62 
The architecture of the barrack appeared at this intersection of concerns to 
provide both a means of intimidating the local inhabitants and of disciplining 
the troops, and a vigorous building programme was undertaken so that 'by 
1815 a hundred and fifty-five barracks had been built to contain 17,000 
cavalry and 138,000 infantry. Troops were distributed all over the country, 
and the north and Midlands and the manufacturing region came to resemble 
a country under military occupation'. 63 
The barrack building programme of the 1790s is explained by some historians 
as a direct response to the threat of a French invasion, demonstrated by the 
concentration of barracks in the southern part of England, and the foreign 
circumstances at the time. 64 Fear of invasion may have influenced barrack 
placement, but not the decision to accommodate the Army in this particular 
manner. The building of special purpose quarters was justified by arguing 
the barracks were 
a measure very favourable to discipline; for though the soldiers were 
at stated hours obliged to retire to their quarters, yet when they were 
quartered in a public house, this regulation could not be 
enforced ... But this could not occur in barracks, which were equally 
conducive to the health and morals of the troops lodged in them. 65 
The first Barrack-Master General later justified the Government's programme 
on the basis of 'the great advantage arising from the mode of establishing 
barracks throughout the kingdom having become evident'. 66 
62Parliamentary History, vol. 30 (1792-1974) col 495. 
63Hammond and Hammond, The Town Labourer, p. 85. 
64This is most thoughtfully argued by Boyd, chapter 6, who argues that the distribution of barracks 
was primarily designed to respond to the threat of a French invasion. See also Skelley who states that 
'With the outbreak of the French revolutionary wars extensive barrack construction was undertaken' ( 
Skelley, p. 28, see also Spiers, p. 58). 
65Parliamentary History, vol. 30 (1792-1794),col.479. 
66Report of Commission of Military Inquiry, Parliamentary Papers, 1806, vol. VI, Paper no. 46. 
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It is not a simple matter to determine how it was that the advantages of 
barracks had become self-evident. Barracks were in use in England in some 
of the larger towns, but_ as accommodation they were uniformly deficient. 67 
From as early as early as 1707 a letter written to the King spoke of 'the 
garrison of Portsmouth, where, by reason of ... the sickness of the place, the 
want of firing, and the badness of the barracks, the regiment was reduced by 
death and desertion to about one-half of their number'. 68 In 1774 a report on 
the barracks at Limerick found them 'condemned near Twenty Years, the 
Stairs, floors, windows and Doors very bad'. 69 In Ireland, barracks were built 
and maintained by the Barrack Board and the Board of Works. These bodies 
were the subject of four parliamentary committees during the eighteenth 
century, all of which found them wanting. This may be why an Act passed in 
the 1760s gave the Barrack Commissioners the power to sell barracks that had 
'gone into ruin and decay' .70 Against this image of disrepair, the advocates of 
barracks were unlikely to argue that, as accommodation, the advantages of 
barracks were evident, and yet the critics of barracks seemed disinclined to 
use this catalogue of failure as a means of arguing against barracks. Indeed, 
concerns about barracks as accommodation were muted until after the 
Crimean War, when a number of investigations into the health of the Army 
revealed how unhealthy most of the barrack accommodation was. 71 In 1837 
the United Services Journal argued that' At present the jails and bride vells are 
far beyond [barracks]; and they rank only with asylums for the insane or 
some of the new poor-houses', and other commentators compared barracks 
unfavourably to slave ships. 72 At the time the decision was taken to establish 
barracks, comfort and cleanliness were not an important element in 
cal cul a ting their advantages. 
67 See Boulding, p. 40-41. 
68Quoted in Cl ode, Military Forces of the Crown, vol. 1. p. 222. 
69Quoted in Boulding, p. 55. 
70See R.B.McDowell, Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution 1760-1801, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 102; Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 227. 
71 SeeSpiers, p. 57. 
72Quoted in Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, p. 60. 
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The register in which the advantages of barracks were manifest was in terms 
of their ability to overcome the principal difficulties arising from the Army's 
role as an adjunct of police; again, Ireland provided a longstanding example. 
In keeping with this police role, by 1740 most large towns in Ireland had a 
barracks, the building of which was often encouraged by the local 
landowners; as a result, small barracks were 'placed in various parts of the 
kingdom at the solicitation or by the interests of gentlemen whose estates 
were to be benefited by soldiers being resident upon them'. Their use by 
landowners to maintain order meant that they were usually small, and built 
'without regard to a military arrangement of the troops'. 73 The use of 
barracks in the various districts in which the Army exercised its control 
doubtless added to its ability to overawe the local population, but the Army's 
policing role meant that it was often widely dispersed and the barracks it 
used were of varying sizes, some only large enough to accommodate a 
company.74 Nevertheless, in the major towns, the barracks were substantial, 
and the barracks in Dublin accommodated the largest peacetime 
concentration of regular regiments in the British Isles. A tour of duty in 
Dublin provided the opportunity for corps to regain proficiency they may 
have lost while engaged in peace-keeping activities around the country: 
When in 1777 the 11th, 30th and 32nd Foot arrived from typical 
dispersed quarters to begin a tour on the Dublin duty, the 
commanding officers of these corps 'represented to the Commander 
in Chief, that as the Companies of their respective regiments had been 
widely distributed into County Cantonments', they would require 
from a month to six weeks 'to establish their regiments in uniformity 
of discipline' before they could possibly be inspected.75 
Advocates of barracks for England needed to be careful in citing the Irish 
example, as their opponents could argue that the use of barracks made little 
appreciable difference to the notoriously poor discipline of the Irish Army, 
73Lieutenant-General Fitzwilliam, Remarks on Barracks, 1768, quoted in J.L.McCracken, 'The 
Political Structure,1714-60', in Vaughan,W.E. and Moody, T.W. (eds) A New History of 
Ireland: eighteenth century Ireland 1691-1800, volume IV, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 
57-83, p. 83. 
74McCracken, p. 83. 
75Houlding, p. 55-56. 
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which the then Commander-in-Chief Abercromby immortalised by charging 
that it was, in 1795, 'in a state of licentiousness which must render it 
formidable to everyone but the enemy'.76 This was understood at the time to 
be explained in part by the onerous police duties for which the Army was 
responsible, for towards the end of the century, it was recognised that in 
some parts of Ireland 'the soldiery is the only magistracy in real authority'. 77 
It was also fuelled by a belief that within the Army, especially the militia 
units, were numbers of disaffected soldiers who were secretly supportive of 
the Defenders and the United Irishmen. 
The way in which this disaffection and 'general licentiousness' was dealt with 
gives us some indication of why the advocates of barracks might have seen 
them as effective, even in the face of the apparent chaos of 1797 in Ireland. 
Barracks were effective as a visible manifestation of power; in a pamphlet 
distributed to soldiers in 1792, the United Irishmen described barracks as 'the 
very symbol of a Bastille'.78 Not just symbolic, barracks were central to the 
disciplinary task of regulating the activities of loyal troops, and to the 
conduct of courts martial, floggings and executions of those found guilty of 
sedition and fomenting mutiny. Also, threats posed by the possible 
recruitment of soldiers to seditious groups were met by the military 
authorities reinforcing 'traditional' means of dealing with indiscipline, 
including 'a flurry of orders insisting that troops wear proper dress, avoid 
taverns, and remain in barracks after retreat'. 79 These methods went some 
way towards dissipating the threat of widespread insurrection (as did the 
practice of sending disaffected troops to the West Indies), and Bartlett adds 
that 'as for indiscipline, there were no easy answers; but even here a modest 
start was made from the greater concentration of troops in large garrisons'. 80 
76Houlding, p. 56. 
77Thomas Bartlett,. 'Indiscipline and disaffection in the armed forces in Ireland in the 1790s', 
in Patrick Corish, (ed) Radicals, Rebels and Establishments, Belfast, Appletree Press, 1985, pp. 
115-34 p. 119. 
78Bartlett, p. 123. 
79 1 Bart ett, p. 126. 
80 Bartlett, p. 131. 
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The use of barracks in Ireland, and their limited use in England and Scotland 
gives an incomplete picture of why they seemed so appropriate to the 
difficulties of the Army in the late 1700s. They rather imperfectly provided 
the troops with accommodation and they symbolised the instrument of 
internal order, even as that was beginning to transfer to the more carefully 
targeted institution of the Metropolitan Police. Despite the imperfections, 
and limited contribution the Army would in future make to police, barracks 
endured because their institutional form was to promise the possibility of 
(re)forming the Army as well as accommodating it. In this way barracks 
could control the Army's own unruly population as well as that of the 
industrial towns. Sharing much the same population, barracks had a place 
beside workhouses, prisons and asylums in the late eighteenth century, 
when, as Donnelly reminds us 
for all these areas of social policy the design and management of 
'institutions' or 'residential establishments' were immmediate 
concerns; and for future planning the 'institutional question' was 
becoming ever more significant ... not simply in matters of ventilation 
and drainage, but also in 'moral architecture', and in the use of 
institutions for the reform of character.81 
The Basis of Nineteenth Century Reform 
The Army's future association with the institutional reform of character 
proceeded upon its incorporation in the strategies of eighteenth century 
government. The barracks, which developed at the intersection of the two 
uses of the Army as receptacle and instrument of force, would be the focal 
site for the development of the 'modern' Army. The effects of the Army's 
81Michael Donnelly, Managing the Mind: a study in medical psychology in early nineteenth century 
Britain, London: Tavistock, 1983, p. 20-21. Unfortunately, perhaps the best known of the architects 
for moral reform, Jeremy Bentham does not appear to have thought about the military uses of the 
Panopticon, although Strachan notes that Dr Henry Marshall 'suggested the use of a panopticon to 
oversee patients in military hospitals in order to discover those feigning illness':. Strachan, H. 'The 
Early Victorian Army and the nineteenth century revolution in government', English Historical 
Review, volume XCV, no. CCCLXXVII, October 1980, pp.782-809 , p. 791. 
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incorporation in the strategies of police formed the conditions for the 
emergence of the new forms of organisation that would be more consistent 
with the governmental strategies of the nineteenth century: the need for a 
different basis of recruiting, more effective forms of punishment, the 
institution of incentives to retain volunteers where impressed men could 
formerly be compelled. With these new objectives for the government of the 
military population, the retention and improvement of barracks as a site of 
moral reform, education, the development of esprit de corps and intensive 
physical training was assured. 
In part the reform program of the mid-nineteenth century was driven by the 
failures of barracks to live up to the promise they had initially held. In 1855 
the Barrack Accommodation Committee found that barracks 'have been 
generally inadequate both for the comfort and convenience of the soldiers, 
and for the creation of a higher tone of social habits amongst them ... '82• The 
earlier concerns of providing a means of segregating the soldier from the 
civilian population meant that many barracks were built without adequate 
ventilation and sanitation, and provided only the most basic accommodation 
in overcrowded rooms that had to serve as sleeping, eating and recreational 
spaces. Increasingly, the simple provision of adequate rations and a roof over 
the heads of the soldiers was not enough; the barracks needed to be 
contributing to the moral reformation of those who lived within them. 
Numerous reports on barracks throughout the latter half of the nineteenth 
century stressed the importance of improving both the accommodation of the 
soldier and the extent to which the barracks provided recreational and 
educational facilities. 83 
After the Crimean War, reformers led by Florence Nightingale and Sidney 
Herbert focussed their attention on the poor condition of most of the barracks 
in England. While the concern for the British Regular had begun with the 
3? 9 -skelley,p.2. 
33 Skelley, p. 163. 
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disastrous conditions endured by the Army during the Crimean War,, 
reformers were able to continue the campaign to improve the collective health 
of the rank and file after the war because barracks provided the perfect 
vehicle for the collection of statistics on health and mortality,, the monitoring 
of the habits of the soldier and the opportunity for instituting reforms. 
Initially improvements were focussed on increasing the ventilation and 
cleanliness of barracks,, and on determining the amount of cubic space to 
which the soldier should be entitled.84 Many of the buildings housing troops 
were old and difficult to adapt to meet the new standards. In addition,, there 
was considerable reluctance to spend the necessarily large sums of money 
that would be required to make significant improvements. Even by the end 
of the nineteenth century,, the Army Sanitary Committee estimated that 
millions of pounds needed to be spent to improve the condition of barracks,, 
which had been neglected throughout the century.85 
Barracks were intended to provide an opportunity to monitor the on and off-
duty activities of the soldier,, and to provide him with a controlled 
environment in which to enjoy his limited leisure time. With the barracks 
came the canteen,, which sold beer and spirits to the soldiers,, and was for 
some time the only place for soldiers to go when off-duty. The existence of 
these canteens,, and the extent to which they encouraged men to drink was 
strongly criticised by the growing temperance movements of the mid-
nineteenth century. While one of the initial arguments for the erection of 
barracks had been the desire to remove soldiers from the temptations of the 
public house in which they were billeted,, the barracks were seen by many to 
be perpetuating similar dangers. Reformers sought to offer other diversions 
for the soldier; amongst these were the encouragement of various sports 
(though rarely with funding for necessary equipment) and the introduction,, 
from 1841,, of regimental libraries. 86 In the larger garrisons a number of 
84Spiers, pp. 56-58. 
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86Spiers, p. 66; Skelley, p. 163. 
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'Soldiers' Institutes', often including the provision of a chapel for private 
worship, were funded by large evangelical and philanthropic organisations to 
provide quiet alternatives for soldiers. 87 
Conclusion 
Though the criticisms of barracks had begun almost as soon as the major 
barrack-building programmes of the early nineteenth century had been 
completed, and continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century, there 
was never any suggestion that soldiers should return to being billeted upon 
the local population as they had been in the eighteenth century.88 As we shall 
see later, barrack-like accommodation in colonial Australia was abandoned 
for non-military populations in the mid-nineteenth century as it appeared to 
several Committees of Investigation to be a brake upon the reform and 
economic independence of its residents. Similarly, in Britain, ¢1anges to the 
Poor Laws in 1834 were designed to limit the use made of workhouses by 
able-bodied adult men and their dependants. 89 As Dean has argued, the 
objective in the changes to the Poor Laws was to create the conditions 
whereby adult males would be discouraged from living the dissolute and 
unproductive life of single men and encouraged to become wage labourers 
and heads of households; in turn, this first tactic of creating wage-labour as a 
patriarchal household would be built upon to introduce a range of 
interventions designed to increase the personal responsibility of the 
individual members within the family unit for the moral and physical care of 
themselves and their children.90 However, a similar set of tactics for 
87Spiers, p. 66; Olive Anderson, 'The growth of Christian militarism in mid-Victorian Britian', 
English Historical Review, vol. 86, 1971, pp. 46-72. 
88 See, for example, the discussion of the disadvantages of using inns and public houses for militia 
troops when they were called up, in the Report from the Select Committee appointed to inquire into 
the Operation of the present system for the Billetting of Troops, Parliamentary Papers, 1857-58, vol. 
X, Paper no. 3 63, p. iv: 'Your Committee are also of the opinion that the practice of billetting troops 
for lengthened periods is disadvantageous in a military point of view. The dispersion of militia 
soldiers especially, amongst public houses in all parts of a town, is adverse to that system of discipline 
and control which it is the very object of the embodiment or assembling of such a force to establish'. 89See Dean, Constitution of Poverty. 
90Dean, Constitution of Poverty, p. 219. 
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improving the health, well-being and efficiency of the military population 
was not possible. 
Barracks were to remain the main form of housing for men in the Army, and 
until well into the second-half of the nineteenth century military 
administrators restricted the number of men in each regiment who were 
allowed to marry. There were practical reasons for this, largely based on the 
costs associated with the frequent movement of regiments, particularly when 
these movements included serving long periods in garrisons around the 
world. As a consequence, the reformatory possibilities of encouraging men to 
marry, set up independent households and become responsible for their 
wives and children, which was a commonplace of reform in the wider 
community, was not well-recognised within the military. Perhaps because of 
this, the largely unmarried male population living in barracks were 
distinguishable from the newly made 'working classes' of married men and 
their families, and still appropriately served by the more regulatory 
environment of the barrack.91 In which case, ameliorating and improving 
barrack life was a preferable course to having the unmarried men of the 
Army living again in inns and public houses. 
Barracks had come somewhat accidentally to serve as the most appropriate, 
practical way both of governing the rank and file in the nineteenth century, 
and of developing a distinctive form of life. In a similar, and complementary 
manner, as we shall see in the next chapter, the British officer corps of the 
91Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century there was considerable interest in the future 
employability of soldiers. In some instances soldiers were considered to be well suited to tasks such as 
railway signalmen, because they had learned to be patient. In other cases the regimetned life in 
barracks was considered a disadvantage. See for example, Report of the Select Committee to Inquire 
into Practicability of employing Soldiers, Sailors and Marines in Civil Departments of the Public 
Service, Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. XIV, Paper no. 356, Evidence Q 2452, 'The real drawback 
is that the soldier is not taught, as a rule, to depend upon himself; he becomes, so to say, part of a big 
machine. Now, a policeman goes down the street, and he is really a sort of walking 
lawyer. .. something occurs, he has to act...That is not the sort of training the soldier gets; he gets, of 
course, habits of discipline and order, and cleanliness, and all that, which are very good in 
themselves; but he loses to a certain extent what I may call his personal identity, which is just what 
you want in a policeman'. 
,., 
59 
nineteenth century was to develop into a self-regulatory body with a much 
increased responsibility for, and focus on regimental and wardroom life. 
CHAPTER THREE 
'Cavaliers in uniform' 
The formation of professional officer corps in the nineteenth century 
Introduction 
The transformation of the officer corps of European, British and American 
military forces in the nineteenth century is seen as a crucial condition for the 
development of the 'professional' military forces of the twentieth century. 
For Samuel Huntington, the beginning of this transformation dates from 1808, 
when the Prussian Army declared that selection of officers would 
thenceforward be based on education and professional knowledge. 1 Over the 
course of the nineteenth century, other countries followed the Prussian 
example in reforming their officer corps, introducing a wider basis for 
recruitment, merit selection for promotion and an emphasis on technical 
expertise. Huntington argues that professionalisation was most successful 
where it developed as a compromise between the competing ideals of liberals 
and the aristocracy, leading to a 'recognition of an independent officer corps 
free of partisan or class allegiance and organised in accordance with interests 
and principles of its own'. 2 The steps necessary to the formation of a 
professional officer corps included the development of a professional 
education, both for entry and subsequent career development, the 
introduction of a general staff function, and the 'appearance of professional 
competence and esprit among the officers'. 3 
Huntington argues that the professionalisation of the British Army followed 
that of military forces such as the French and Prussian, but took considerably 
longer. He attributes this slower professionalisation to the fact that the need 
1Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: theory and politics of civil-military relations, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 30. 
2Huntington, p. 34. 
3Huntington, p. 53. 
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to 'seize upon professionalism as a device of social compromise was lacking'.4 
Aristocratic ideals were still strong in the officer corps of the nineteenth 
century, particularly before the abolition, in 1871, of the practice of 
purchasing commissions as a means of entry and promotion. Such ideals, for 
Huntington, limited the development of a professional expertise in the British 
officer corps until the twentieth century.5 While many of the detailed studies 
of the British officer corps of the nineteenth century would argue against the 
central importance of the purchase system to the reform of the officer corps, 
most would support the general picture of reform and gradual 
professionalisation that Huntington draws6• 
Huntington's thesis of the transformation of the officer corps of the nineteenth 
century and the development of a profession centred on the 'management of 
violence' is the starting point of much military sociology - which is often 
engaged in refining or redefining the thesis - and has found a place in recent 
Australian official considerations of the military too.7 Huntington argued that 
the eighteenth century officer corps embodied an 'aristocratic' ideal which 
shaped the officer corps' way of thinking and acting. Under these 
circumstances, what Huntington would describe as the military profession is 
'non-existent' and the officer corps is 'designed for the needs of the 
aristocracy rather than for the efficient performance of the military function' 8• 
With changes to the educational requirements for officers, the abolition of the 
practice of purchasing commissions, and the general 'liberalisation' of 
nineteenth century society, Huntington argues, professionalisation gradually 
occurs. 
4Huntington, pp. 34-5. 
5Huntington, p. 53. 
6See, for example, Anthony Bruce, The Purchase System in the British Anny 1660-1871, London: 
Royal Historical Society, 1980; Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Anny in Victorian Society, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977; Edward M. Spiers, The Anny and Society 1815-1914, London: 
Longman, 1980; Hew Strachan, Wellington's Legacy: the refonn of the British Army, 1830-1854, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
7See Report to the Minister for Defence, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in 
Australia's Defence, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990, pp. 200-212, 
and the discussion in Chapter five of this thesis. 
8Huntington, p. 28. 
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Huntington's thesis is that professionalism flourished in circumstances where 
the competition between liberal ideals and aristocratic ideals was so strong 
that they worked to cancel each other out as an influence on the military, and 
the profession was left to develop on its own towards something new: the 
'institutions ... were neither aristocratic or democratic; they were military'. 9 
The military profession develops a distinct sphere of competence for the 
State-sanctioned, legitimate 'management of violence'. This unique 
,,: responsibility has the effect of separating the military professional from the \ 
I 
I 
11: 
rest of society: 
In the eighteenth century army the rank and file formed an outcast 
group, isolated and distrusted, with no roots in, or connections with, 
the rest of society. The officers, on the other hand, had definite status 
in society by virtue of their aristocratic position. In the reversal of 
roles which took place in the nineteenth century, the enlisted men 
became a cross section of the national population - citizens at heart -
and the officers became a separate professional group living in a 
world of their own with few ties to outside society10 
In the previous chapter we traced the way in which the reforms directed at 
the rank and file in the nineteenth century had the consequence of focussing 
the soldiers increasingly towards their army life, within the barrack and the 
regiment. We shall see in the next chapter the way in which this focus on a 
military life served increasingly to distinguish the regular soldier from his 
citizen-soldier counterpart, not so much because of his ideals, but rather 
because of his trained discipline. In this chapter, we find ourselves similarly 
at odds with the Huntington thesis. While the reforms to the British officer 
corps of the nineteenth century increased the professional capacities of 
officers and dismantled the barriers to a wider field of recruitment, these 
reforms were not achieved in the vacuum created by competing ideals, with 
all the suggestion this has of eradicating an aristocratic style of life. Indeed, 
the British experience was perhaps closer to the Prussian, but not in the way 
9Huntington, p. 35. 
10Huntington, p. 39. 
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that Huntington portrayed it. Rather, as Hans Rosenberg's study of the 
emergence of the modem state bureaucracy in Prussia has shown 
"Democratic principles in a monarchical government", in the officers' 
corps, fostered a process of internal democratisation which, in fact, 
resulted in the tightening up of aristocratic esprit de corps ... The 
nobility, for a long time to come the all-dominant group of officers, 
was not slow in turning these corporate rights to good account by 
preserving the social structure and mentality of the professional 
military class as an exclusive caste of cavaliers in uniform11 
It is in this latter sense that we find that reforms of the nineteenth century 
military in Britain also worked to stabilise and enhance an 'aristocratic' ethos 
of military office. Firstly, this preservation of Britain's 'military aristocracy' 
was assisted by the reforms of the nineteenth century, particularly around the 
issues of appointment of officers, education and discipline, which confirmed 
the extent to which this aristocratic ethos provided the necessary 'tools for 
living' in this newly developing environment. Secondly, this military 
aristocracy was gradually, through these reforms, to develop a particular 
habitus of its own: the regiment (and the wardroom) which increasingly 
provided the guidance and training in the profession of arms that had 
previously been learnt as an adjunct to the less specialised social category of 
the gentleman. In the course of the nineteenth century, the 
professionalisation of the military occurred gradually, as a series of 
governmental responses to enable the officer corps to better govern 
themselves. In contrast to Huntington, I want to suggest that the military 
profession, in Britain at least, did not develop in a vacuum left between 
liberalism and the aristocracy, but rather that it was formed as a liberal 
response to the uneven and inefficient manner in which defence forces were 
formed as an adjunct to the social regulation of police. 
In the previous chapter I have argued that the formation of military forces in 
the eighteenth century was illuminated by examining the connection between 
11 Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: the Prussian experience 1660-1 815, 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 216-217. 
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the Navy and Army and the regulation of society that was commonly 
referred to as 'police'. Police was a general term used to designate a form of 
pastoral government which sought to govern to maintain a pre-established 
social equilibrium. The rank and file of Navy and the Army served both as a 
convenient receptacle for those who disturbed this equilibrium, and the 
military forces as a whole assisted local government officials to maintain the 
peace, particularly in unstable areas such as the newly developing industrial 
cities. It was as a consequence of these two roles, I have suggested, that the 
establishment of barracks became, after a century of resistance, a necessary 
and inevitable framework for reforming the rank and file in the nineteenth 
century. 
In the eighteenth century the officer corps, like the rank and file, was not 
easily separable from this more general pastoral government'- Sons of the 
nobility and the gentry entered into the officer corps for periods of time, their 
qualification for entry and promotion, and their interest in the political 
neutrality of the army and (to a lesser extent the Navy) guaranteed by their 
ability to purchase their commissions. Their capacity to be officers was based 
on their social rank and their general education as gentlemen. Over the 
course of the nineteenth century this more general, soci.ally-derived set of 
qualifications for officers came increasingly under scrutiny. The problem was 
that the desired qualities of the officer could not be systematically developed 
if left to do so on their own. Over time, the officer corps itself was invested 
with the capacity to generate, develop and stabilise the necessary 
qualifications of the officer. This occurred not in the absence of liberal and 
aristocratic ideals but rather in the accommodation of both. 
The consequential military ethos preserved by these reforms is more robust, 
and less 'psychological' than Huntington's concept of the 'ideals' that 
twentieth century professional officers hold. The persistence of this 
'aristocratic ethos' as part of the professionalisation of the military officer, and 
its tenacity as a practical guide to living in a military environment, is 
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particularly important to twentieth century considerations of the government 
of the military. As we shall see in chapters five and six, it is with this 'ethos' 
that governments are most concerned, and yet for which they have the least 
a de qua te policy tools. · 
The Military Aristocracy 
There have been a number of studies of the composition of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century British officer corps, generally with the intention of 
demonstrating that officers were drawn from a wider variety of backgrounds 
than the popular image of the 'officer and gentleman' would suppose.12 
However, as Harries-Jenkins has argued, despite the relatively small number 
of men of' aristocratic' or titled background in the Army, most came from 
families who owned smaller or larger amounts of land. 13 This relationship of 
the Army with the 'landed interest' served to secure a high degree of what we 
might call cultural homogeneity, which was regarded as enabling both the 
good government of the army as a whole, by distinguishing officers from 
their men, and the good government of the officer corps itself, by enhancing 
the sense of esprit de corps. This homogeneity manifested itself in various 
norms of conduct which were crucial to the government of the Army. In 
official reports and personal memoirs, the conduct of officers is a key 
consideration in any discussion of the government of the military. For 
example, in defending the practice of flogging in the Army in the early 
nineteenth century, the Commander in Chief, the Duke of Wellington, 
supported the continuation of flogging because it was consistent with the 
appropriate conduct of the British officer: 
we ought to consider a little the nature of our officer, and compare 
him to the Prussian officer. Our officer is a gentleman. We require 
that he should be one, and above all to conduct himself as 
such ... Indeed we carry this principle of the gentleman, and the 
12Harries-Jenkins; P.E. Razzell, ' Social origins of officers in the Indian and British Home Army', 
British Journal of Sociology, vol. 14, no. 3, 1963, pp. 248-60. 
13Harries-Jenkins, p.45. 
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absence of intercourse with those under his command so far that , in 
my opinion, the duties of a subaltern officer, as they are performed in 
a foreign army, are not done at all in the cavalry, or in the British 
infantry of the line. 14 
Official investigations into various aspects of military administration 
throughout the nineteenth century illuminate the importance of gentlemanly 
conduct on the part of officers; very often this conduct was conspicuous by its 
absence. Men promoted from the ranks were not considered suitable as 
officers because their conduct was such that 'they are not persons who can be 
borne in the society of the officers of the Army; they are men of different 
manners altogether' .15 In the view of the Commission investigating Military 
Punishments in 1833, the proposal that commissions be given to senior non-
commissioned officers Wc!S rejected on the basis that it would 'entirely alter 
and deteriorate the class of officers' by introducing men would did not have 
the same training and habits as other officers drawn from the same 'station 
and education'. The introduction of non-commissioned officers would both 
imperil the maintenance of discipline, since they would have difficulty 
maintaining the distinction 'very strictly drawn between the officer and the 
soldier', and potentially destroy the regimental esprit de corps, since 'all our 
officers are on an equal footing in point of society, and it is highly important 
for the maintenance of a proper feeling and of what is called esprit de corps'. 16 
The capacity to conduct oneself as a gentleman was not strictly linked to 
wealth, though the more fashionable regiments, which were the epitome of 
aristocratic style, required that their officers had access to considerable sums 
of money to maintain a certain lifestyle. A Select Committee reporting on the 
expenses incurred by officers in 1903 confirmed that officers could not 
generally be expected to live on their salaries, estimating that at the time of 
14Field Marshall Sir Arthur Wellington, 'Memorandum on the proposed Plan for altering the 
discipline of the Army, 22 April, 1829', English Historical Documents, vol. XI, 1783-1832, London, 
1959, p. 808. 
15Report of the Royal Commission for Inquiring into the system of Military Punishments in the Army, 
British Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. XXII, Paper no. 59, Evidence, Q5853. 16 Report of the Royal Commission for Inquiring into the system of Military Punishments in the 
Army' p. xxi. 
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their inquiries a cavalry officer needed a private income of at least 600 
pounds 17• But wealth alone was not the test of the gentleman officer; there 
were in fact a number of aristocratic gentlemen whose breeding was 
impeccable but their family impecunious. These officers felt their access to 
commissions in the better regiments threatened by the sons of wealthy 
businessmen who could afford the purchase prices of commissions and the 
cost of belonging to the officers' mess. In such cases these wealthy but 
unsuitable young officers were derided for their lack of manners. In his 
memoirs Field Marshall Sir Garnet Wolseley speaks of a cavalry regiment at 
the time of the Crimean War which was disparagingly known as the 'Trades 
Union' for it was largely made up of officers who were the sons of rich 
merchants. 18 Wolseley then belonged to the 90th Light Infantry Battalion, 
which 'was in every respect a home for gentlemen, and in that respect much 
above the great bulk of Line regiments ... [the officers] thought themselves 
socially superior to the ordinary regiments of the Line, which were always 
spoken of as "Grabbies"' .19 In a number of notable cases men from the ranks 
or the Militia, who gained a commission particularly after their service in the 
Crimean War, were hounded out by their 'brother officers', as Wolseley tells 
us: 
... the evenings at our mess [at Aldershot Camp in the 1850s] often 
ended in an attack upon the quarters of one or other of four lately 
joined subalterns who had practically no pretensions to the rank of 
gentlemen. They had been foisted upon us from the Militia during 
the war, as any Militia officer who could then induce a certain 
number of his men to volunteer for the line was given a commission . 
These could be easily obtained upon payment. These four Ensigns 
were absolutely useless as officers, and we soon got rid of them. 20 
17Report of the Commission appointed by the Secretary of State to enquire into the nature of expenses 
incurred by officers of the army, Parliamentary Papers, 1903, vol. X, Paper no. 1421; see also the 
discussion in Spiers, p.25. 
18Field Marshall Sir Gamet Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life, Westminster: A. Constable, 1903, 
vol. 1, p. 83. Interestingly, Wolseley was himself the impoverished son of a military officer, and 
could not afford many of the extracurricular expenses, such as keeping a horse for hunting, so that 
'Dublin was then a dreary quarter for a man like me, who could not afford to hunt, and whose 
wounded leg prevented him from dancing': Wolseley, vol. 1, p. 81. 19wolseley, vol. l, pp. 84-85. 
2°wolseley, vol. 1, p. 226. 
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Like the Prussian officer system which Rosenberg has argued preserved a 
caste mentality in the face of 'democratisation', the British equivalent of the 
nineteenth century retained a strong sense of appropriate conduct for officers, 
even as it became increasingly possible for men who did not have a close 
connection to the 'landed interest' to join the ranks of officers. Th us a 
nineteenth century critic of officer recruitment could argue in 1858 that: 'The 
term aristocratic, as applied to the constitution of the army, is meant to 
express that system of exclusiveness, which whether founded upon the test of 
birth, caste or of money, creates a powerful barrier between the governors 
and the governed'. 21 
The characteristics of this 'military aristocracy' are illuminated for us through 
the various movements for reform aimed at Naval and Army officers during 
the nineteenth century. We can look, in particular, to the campaign to 
integrate engineer officers in the Navy with the' gentlemen officers' known as 
executive officers, which extended over the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This reformatory campaign is instructive because of the success of 
the arguments against the integration of engineers with the executive, which 
turned precisely on the conduct of the engineers both in relation to their 
subordinates and in relation to their ward-room peers. In part, the nineteenth 
century campaigns were an echo of the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
problem of achieving an accommodation between the gentlemen officers - the 
men who determined the destinations of ships and negotiated with foreign 
dignitaries upon arrival, and the 'tarpaulins' - the men who had the technical 
skills to sail and navigate the ships and to govern the sailors. As Norbert 
Elias reminds us, 
Pepys's often quoted remark to the effect that among naval officers 
the seamen were not gentlemen and the gentlemen not seamen ... was 
the pointed expression of one of the gravest practical problems 
confronting naval administrators and naval officers throughout the 
early history of the naval profession. Gentlemen could not learn the 
21E.B. De Fonblanque, Treatise on the Administration and Organisation of the British Army , 1858, 
quoted in Harries-Jenkins, p. 45. 
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art and craft of the seaman without feeling that they had lowered 
themselves in the eyes of the world. Experienced seamen, on the 
other hand, who had learned their trade in the only way in which it 
could be learned, starting early in life as seamen's apprentices, were 
2? not regarded as gentlemen. -
By the nineteenth century the executive officers had developed a degree of 
technical knowledge of the sea, though they still disliked having to navigate 
their ships, preferring to leave this to the masters and masters' assistants. 
There was little in terms of technical expertise that now separated the 
executive officer from the other officers of the Navy, so the arguments against 
the integration of executive and engineering officers turned precisely on the 
capacities of the engineer to undertake the command responsibilities of the 
executive officer and to exercise the appropriate behaviour for the executive 
officers' ward-room. In the various Admiralty and Parliamentary 
investigations into the status of engineers in the nineteenth century the 
existence, utility and permanence of the executive officer ethos is the standard 
up to which engineers must eventually be brought. 
The defective background of the engineering students compromised the 
government of the Navy in two respects. In the first place, engineers did not 
have the social skills to share the executive officers' ward-room. Witnesses to 
an Admiralty Committee on the position of engineers reporting in 1877 
11· argued that engineers 'are not admitted into the society, on shore, that other 
officers are; and although their mess, I consider, is on an equality with the 
gun-room mess [for junior executive officers], yet you cannot, until they raise 
themselves, introduce them into the society that you would wish, or 
introduce them into the gun-room or ward-room messes in the service'. 23 The 
Report of the Committee agreed, noting: 
11: 
22Norbert Elias, 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 1, 
1950,pp.291-309,p.294. 
23Report of an Admiralty Committee to consider the best means of securing the highest mechanical 
skill and scientific knowledge in the management of the various engines of Her Majesty's Ships of 
War, and supply of Engineer Officers and Engine Room Artificers for Her Majesty's Navy (hereafter 
Admiralty Committee Report), Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. XXI, Paper no. 1647, Evidence, 
Q1402. 
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a defect of much importance .. .It is that, notwithstanding the high 
education to be given, and the position in which the Engineer Officers 
will be placed on board Ship as commissioned Officers, a large 
portion of the candidates for entry as Engineer Students are sons of 
artificers of various grades in the dockyards ... or of others belonging 
to the same class of society ... As it is undoubtedly desirable that 
Officers should be highly educated to perform the duties of Naval 
Engineers and hold the rank of Commissioned Officers, it is equally 
desirable that they should be in all respects fitted to take their place 
with Officers of corresponding rank in wardroom or gunroom 
messes. This evidently cannot be the case with the majority of 
Students lately entered.24 
In the second place, it was frequently argued that engineer officers could not 
( cultivate and maintain the necessary detachment and distance from those 
1 1 
they were to command. Given that engineers very often came from the same 
f amities and schools as the men they were to command, it was felt they were 
unable to preserve the necessary distinction between themselves and these 
men. Witnesses to the Admiralty Committee noted that 'their connections 
will always drag them down. They may at times come in contact with some 
of their own relations on board ship who are in a very inferior position. It is 
utterly impossible for a boy to raise a member of his family to his position; 
therefore the boy must be dragged down to the position of that member of his 
family'. 25 
Earlier in the century, the same concerns had been expressed about the 
advantages of allowing a greater number of non-commissioned officers in the 
Army to take commissions. Witnesses spoke of the problems attendant upon 
this scheme in the same terms as they did in the Navy. Earl Grey put it this 
way in 1857: 
In the army, as in all other professions and pursuits in life, it seems to 
me that nature itself has made a distinction between those who have 
the leisure which only a certain amount of wealth can give to gain an 
education and qualifications which are necessary for officers, and 
which are not wanted for private soldiers or in other ranks of life, for 
L~ose who work with their hands ... the education and habits of men 
24Admiralty Committee Report, p. 1. 
25 Admiralty Committee Report, Evidence, Q2320. 
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brought up to bodily labour are not such as to qualify them to direct 
the labour of others. I think that that remark is equally applicable to 
the army as to all other professions and occupations in life. 26 
Non-commissioned officers were almost never of the same background as 
their fellow officers; they had a much more limited education, and as a 
consequence of their necessary concentration on the minutiae of regimental 
life they were considered poor company in the officers' mess, as they could 
speak of 'nothing beyond military drill and discipline' .27 Moreover these 
men, though they had a thorough knowledge of the 'ways and artifices' of the 
men, were not considered to make good officers, because the men had a 
tendency to be overly familiar with them and to regard these officers with 
derision. 28 Even those who supported a limited opportunity for promotion 
from the ranks, like Sir Charles Trevelyan, were of the view that 'No non-
commissioned officer would, of course, be promoted who had not proved 
himself fit by his conduct and mann~rs, as well as by his education and 
intelligence, to hold Her Majesty's commission'. 29 
The Reform of the Officer Corps 
In the nineteenth century, as we have seen, conduct was a crucial element of 
governmental calculation. Gentlemanly conduct, as Norbert Elias notes, was 
'the distinguishing mark of men from the upper and some portions of the 
middle class' .30 Schooling in gentlemanly conduct was through social 
emulation, enhanced by attendance at particular schools. The guarantee of 
such conduct was generally wealth, particularly wealth generated by land 
ownership, and the practice of purchasing commissions in the army was a 
means of ensuring particular standards of conduct would be maintained. In 
26Commission appointed to inquire into the system of purchase and sale of Commissions in the Army 
(hereafter Purchase Commission), Parliamentary Papers, 1857, vol. XVIII, Paper no. 2267, Evidence, 
Q.3963. 
27Report of Commissioners Inquiring into Military Punishments, Parliamentary Papers , 1836, vol. 
XXII. Evidence Q5094. 
28Report of Commissioners Inquiring into Military Punishments, Evidence Q 5097. 29Purchase Commission, Evidence Q 4603. 
30Elias, 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession' , p. 294. 
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its simplest terms, the purchase system allowed officers to gain transfers and . 
promotions within and between regiments by selling the commissioned rank 
they held, often to the most senior officer in the rank below in the same 
regiment, and by contributing some or all of the cost of 'buying out' another 
officer with a more attractive or more senior commission.31 Throughout the 
nineteenth century the purchase system was criticised by its opponents as 
preserving the monopoly of the aristocracy and allowing men who were unfit 
to hold senior ranks to do so by virtue of their wealth. Its supporters argued 
that it not only acted as an effective means of selecting appropriate officers, 
'the Queen's commission, even to an ensign, was a passport to the best society 
- intellectual or social', but also that it enabled a steady movement of officers 
through the ranks so that men were not too old when they finally reached 
positions of command. 32 
The purchase system came under increasing scrutiny during the nineteenth 
century, and was abolished in 1871. While the system had been criticised for 
some two hundred years as inimical to military efficiency, its abolition was in 
fact brought about because it was impossible for military authorities to 
control illegal profiteering in the sale of commissions without abolishing the 
system of purchase of commissions al together. 33 For many historians of the 
military, and sociologists of the twentieth century military like Huntington, 
the abolition of purchase was a key feature in professionalisation of the 
British officer corps. Even the purchase system's most careful historian has 
argued that 'In the long run, of course, it was doomed: radical changes in the 
art of war, and the dissolution of the old social order ... produced demands for 
greater professionalism and wider social representation which could not be 
reconciled with its continued existence' .34 In the Huntingtonian thesis, the 
abolition of purchase stands as a key moment in the demise of the aristocratic 
31 See the somewhat more complex explanation, and the complicated rules and traditions associated 
with the operations of the purchase system in Bruce, pp. 4-5. 
32Bruce, p. 129. 
33Bruce, p. 124. 
34B ruce, p. 171. 
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hold on the officer corps, and the aristocracy's focus on the generalised 
qualities of the gentleman.35 
What I wish to suggest here is that the demise of the practice of purchasing 
commissions did not necessarily bring the dissolution of the old social order. 
As we noted in the example of the reform of the Prussian military, in which 
officers were appointed to their commissions, the absence of proprietary 
rights to commissions did not dissolve the aristocratic esprit de corps. In the 
British Army too, the abolition of purchase did not undermine the continuing 
concern for particular patterns of conduct. On the contrary, reforms to the 
officer corps both before and after the abolition of purchase worked to 
enhance the capacity of the 'military aristocracy' to determine the conduct of 
j: its officers, irrespective of the means by which they had attained 
comrmss1ons. 
The process of enhancing the British military's internal capacity for 
inculcating, stabilising and reinforcing the key features of gentlemanly 
conduct was begun well before the abolition of purchase. In a series of 
reforms of the officer corps which spanned the nineteenth century, the 
military forces were increasingly invested with the capacities to train, educate 
and govern their officers themselves, where they had previously relied on 
wealth and social standing to produce the necessary qualities in officers. 
These reforms were intended to introduce a systematic, and thus efficient, 
means of securing appropriately trained military officers in the face of the 
more dispersed, and less reliable practice of having the officer corps, and its 
relationship to the rank and file, reflect the training young gentlemen 
received to prepare them for their socially-determined responsibilities. This 
is a corollary of the role played by the Navy and Army in relation to the rank 
and file that we discussed in the previous chapter. In this pastoral rationality 
of government which characterised social administration in the eighteenth 
century, as a generalisation, the officer corps absorbed the younger sons of 
35H . 47 untington, p. . 
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the nobility and gentry in much the way the rank and file absorbed the idle, 
vagrant and dispossessed. In the case of the rank and file, as we have seen, 
this role for the army in particular produced a number of problems which 
resulted in the greater isolation and specialisation of the rank and file. As we 
shall see in this chapter, the failure of social structures outside the military to 
produce the necessary qualities in the officer corps led to the efforts on the 
part of various governments to enhance the capacity of the Navy and Army to 
secure the necessary conduct on the part of their officers. 
These reforms to the officer corps can be seen as consistent with a more 
generalised concern by governments in the nineteenth century to make the 
exercise of government, and its agencies, more efficient and less implicated in 
the perpetuation of patronage and a fixed ordering of society. In the 
.,j nineteenth century, reform is fuelled by arguments on the need for limits on 
government. These limits are premised on the capacity of individuals in the 
1•· 
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society to govern themselves. However, government has an ongoing 
responsibility to enable and inculcate such capacities. A liberal mode of 
government finds itself establishing the means of enabling the self-regulation 
of individuals.36 So too this governmental rationality seeks to transform state 
agencies, to achieve a 'governmentalisation of the state' in which agencies 
such as the military cease to mirror the static characteristics of pastoralism 
and become themselves self-regulatory. In turn, rather than relying on a pre-
existing set of trainings and governmental patterns being imported into the 
military by the nobility and gentry, the officer corps of the British Navy and 
Army are reformed to facilitate and develop the norms of conduct and 
technical capacities they require. 
This process of transforming the officer corps is consistent with other changes 
in the nineteenth century state agencies; a good example of these changes was 
embodied in the 'reformative program' of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 
1854. In response to the problems of patronage and consequential 
36
Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power:from Hobbes to Foucault, London: Blackwell, p. 126. 
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inefficiency identified by the Report, a number of steps for remedying the 
problems were outlined. One of these was to recognise the 'importance of 
establishing a proper distinction between intellectual and mechanical 
labour' .37 This distinction was to free those civil servants destined for 
f superior situations from the drudgery of mechanical clerical tasks which had 
worked to 'exercise a depressing influence' upon them. Different classes of 
examination were to be introduced, with those for the higher class required to 
undertake competitive examinations 'on a level with the highest description 
of education in this country'.38 Another was to centralise the responsibility for 
.I 
l,, 
111 
i 
I 
i 
,n l 
•1 
t 
·i1; 
-i·· 
conducting examinations, so that a standard was set throughout the Civil 
Service. This was particularly useful for avoiding the concerns over 
patronage, and for effecting the introduction of a 'lower class of 
appointments' which would produce a body of clerical staff who could be 
moved between offices as workloads demanded. A necessary.-consequence of 
these steps in the reform process was that it was clear that the Civil Service 
should train up young men to the duties they would have to perform, rather 
than take on men of mature age who may have learnt their skills elsewhere. 
The Commissioners argued that 'in many offices .. .it is found that the superior 
docility of young men renders it much easier to make valuable public 
servants out of them, than those more advanced in life'.39 
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report articulated a reformatory agenda we find 
emulated in army reforms of the same period.40 This set of reforms was 
designed to improve the civil service by improving the civil servants - from 
their initial selection, through internal training in the ethos of office, to a 
regulated and decentralised system of merit promotion. Many of these 
concerns were reflected in the reforms to the Army in particular during the 
37Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service(hereafter Northcote-Trevelyan Report), 
Parliamentary Papers, 1854, vol. XXVII, Paper no. 1713, p. 17. 
38Northcote-Trevelyan Report, p. 6. 
39Northcote-Trevelyan Report, p. 8. 
40Searle, G.R. Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993 , pp.89-125, esp. p. 117-118. 
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nineteenth century, with reforms concentrated on the selection and promotion 
of officers and greater decentralisation of the administration of the army. 
In the reforms of the officer corps of the nineteenth century, a key problem for 
government concerned the selection and promotion of officers. Central to this 
was the argument that it was impossible to test the qualities of an officer by 
examination. While the practice of purchasing commissions as means of 
gaining entry and promotion continued to be legal, reformers looked to 
means to ameliorate the effects of wealth and patronage, as they did in the 
civil service. Those who defended purchase as a means of obtaining 
gentlemen for the officer corps argued that there was no other means of 
gauging the qualities of an officer except of the basis of his background. The 
basic premise was that a great part of being an officer was the right sort of 
bearing, and the capacity to have a good moral effect upon those whom one 
commanded. This was elaborated to suggest that these qualities were most 
apparent on the battlefield, and hard to demonstrate in peacetime, and 
through a written test. The need to pass an examination led to an 
exaggerated emphasis on 'book-learning' and the tendency to cramming, 
instead of learning from life. Moreover, with such a large army, officers did 
not have equal opportunity to study in order to gain promotions, scattered as 
they were across the Empire. Above all, there was a concern that a selection 
process based upon examination would tend to favour the middle classes, 
and not the class from which officers were traditionally drawn.41 
On this last concern, Sir Charles Trevelyan could put minds at rest. While he 
frequently advocated the need to 'unleash the capacities of the middle 
classes', he could assure the military hierarchy that the use of examinations 
would only serve to encourage the sons of the wealthy to take up 
comm1ss1ons: 
t 
JI: 41 See for example, the discussion on Army Education in the House of Commons in 1864, 
ParliamentaryDebates Third Series, vol. 173 , cols. 1803-1841. 
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It is a mistake to suppose that if our army were remodelled on 
professional principles it would no longer furnish suitable 
occupations for young men who are heirs to considerable properties. 
This object would be more completely attained than before. The 
army would be ·a school as well as a playground; and our young men 
of fortune would be the better all their lives for having been 
associated for a time with what really would be a liberal 
profession ... Our aristocratic families are so strongly impressed with 
the necessity of giving their sons the best possible education ... that we 
need be under no alarm about their obtaining their full share in this 
as well as in every other competition.42 
Moreover, given that examinations were only an 'indirect' means of 
determining the moral qualifications of the officer candidates, Trevelyan 
proposed that examination be combined with 'the principle of nomination, 
which is supposed to secure the moral qualities, because it allows of a more 
particular reference to the antecedents of the young men.'43 Nominations for 
,.1 positions was in use in the civil service, and it worked as a mq_st comforting 
assurance to all those who held, like Trevelyan, that examinations could only 
1•· 
11: 
imperfectly guarantee character. As well, it was the system in the Navy, 
which as we have seen, was reiterated as advantageous in the latter years of 
the nineteenth century when seeking to improve the quality of engineer 
officers who had hitherto entered the Navy only by examination.44 Bearing 
out the earlier concerns of those opposing selection by examination in the 
Army, the practice of selecting solely on the basis of examination was 
criticised because it demonstrated that it couldn't obtain for the Navy the right 
sort of applicants, and it was proposed that examination be tempered by 
nominations to the Board of the Admiralty. 
42Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4668. 
43Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4669. 
44Admiralty Committee Report, Evidence, Ql896-7. See also Evidence Q 620: 'Looking at that list of 
the engineer students who have been entered during the last three years, do think it is satisfactory as 
regards their social position and parentage, bearing in mind the good education they receive and the 
good position in which they are placed in the service? (handing the list to the witness) - I do not 
consider it particularly satisfactory - I have no doubt that if the system were by nomination you would 
get a more satisfactory class, and a class that would work more harmoniously with the rest of the 
service. I think that if the system of competitive examination with nomination were adopted, it would 
conduce greatly to the benefit of the service, and you would have a superior class of men generally in 
it'. 
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At the heart of these reforms, the combination of examination and nomination 
was an extremely important governmental step, for it confirmed that 'moral 
qualities' were essential to the good government of the military. It also 
acknowledged the difficulty of relying only upon examinations as a means of 
testing the qualities of officers. As we have already noted, the various 
commissions examining the education of officers had regularly encouraged 
the testing of younger officers in their grasp of 'regimental duties'. At the 
time the Duke of Wellington reluctantly agreed to the introduction of 
examinations, 'as a preparation for military service', they were to be 
principally a test of the officer's knowledge 'with respect to matters of 
military skill and science', which included the duties of officer commanding 
battalions.45 Throughout the century, however, the existence of such an 
examination was a testament to the failure of the regiment as a training 
·•i ground in military duties, and of examinations in general to determine, 
f 
J establish or improve the education of the officer.46 As such, this failure was 
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productive of endless attempts to develop a capacity for study in officers, a 
method of examination, a continuous consideration of what it was that the 
officer should demonstrate that he knows in order to be commissioned and 
promoted, and an ongoing questioning of the extent to which this knowledge 
should be acquired before or during service, by civil or military institutions. 
Confirming the widely-held view that examinations were an unsatisfactory 
means of testing character, a committee into the education and training of 
army officers set up in the wake of the War in South Africa was concerned to 
find that in practice the examinations that had to be passed were of such a 
low quality, and so limited in their ability to discriminate between candidates 
that they were of no assistance in guaranteeing effective officers. To improve 
the education and training of officers the Committee made a number of 
recommendations, principally designed to enhance the education officer 
45Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 103, 1849, col. 963. 
46See, for example, the Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into the present state of military 
education, and into the training of candidates for commissions in the Army, Parliamentary Papers, 
1881, vol. XXII, Paper no. 4221, pp. 44-45. 
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cadets received at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and the Royal 
Military College Sandhurst, and the training officers received in regiments. 
The Committee was at pains, on the basis of the evidence it had received, to 
emphasise the importance of practical instruction, and the measuring of 
officers by their performance, for it argued that 'no examination, however 
well planned, either of candidates before entry or of officers after joining, can 
of themselves make good officers'. 47 
In this view the Committee appeared only to be reiterating the opinion of 
examinations expressed by military officers throughout the nineteenth 
century. But there were two important respects in which the early twentieth 
century concerns differed from those of the nineteenth century. The first of 
these reflected the Committee's impression that examinations were quickly 
prepared for and quickly forgotten, and that there was no COIJ.I1ection 
between the examinations, and therefore no encouragement for the officer to 
look upon his training as a steady development - the 'regiment as a 
university'. The second concern arose from the Committee's view that the 
examinations did not test the officer's regimental duties, concentrating 
instead upon the execution of battle, so that 'the cadet comes out knowing 
how to manoeuvre three army corps against an enemy, but he does not know 
how to supervise the work of the pay-sergeant?'. 48 
In its concern for the education and training of the officer the Committee tried 
to find a way around the perception that the only place to test the qualities of 
an officer was in the heat of war, and the only way to guarantee appropriate 
training in the conduct of an officer was to rely on the officer's social 
background. These concerns gave new emphasis to the character-£ arming 
and regulatory capacities of military life itself. The Committee encouraged 
the more frequent use of exercises and camps to bring large groups of officers 
4 
'Rep on of Committee appointed to Consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army 
(hereafter Akers-Douglas Committee), 1902, vol. X, Paper no. 982, p. 39. 48Akers-Douglas Committee, Evidence, Q69. 
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together in order for them to learn, in a 'battle-like' atmosphere. In addition 
it emphasised that there needed to be continual assessment of the officer, 
which placed the onus on the training establishments, and the regiments, to 
be able to perform the task that would achieve the benefits Trevelyan hoped 
for when he proposed the combination of examination and nomination. In 
the face of the failure of examinations, the difficulty of selection and the 
inaccuracy of nomination, the Committee sought to develop 'an honest, open 
system of merit' by enhancing the disciplinary role of the early training and 
regimental life of the officer.49 
While examinations played a role in the promotion of more junior officers, 
more senior promotions were made by selection. When a Royal Commission 
on promotion and retirement reported in 1876 it found that since the abolition 
of purchase there was an increasing emphasis on the performance of the 
-officer in the regiment as a basis for determining promotion. Commanding 
officers were required to prepare confidential reports on the more junior 
officers, commenting on 'the conduct, abilities and military qualifications of 
the officers' .50 Under this system, officers came to focus their attention 
increasingly on their performance within the regiment. According to the 
Committee, this system of regimental reporting worked well for 'ascertaining 
the character and qualities of officers, and ... to maintain efficiency and good 
conduct in the Army'.51 Since, as the Committee found, promotion was 'as a 
rule', governed by seniority, it was in the interests of most officers to stay 
within particular regiments awaiting their opportunity for promotion. 
Thus we find in the reforms of the nineteenth century and beyond, a 
recognition of the need for a variety of measures of the qualities of officers, 
and an increasing focus on the regiment as a central tool in the government of 
the officer corps. The crucial 'democratising' step that Huntington and others 
49 Akers-Douglas Committee, p. 39. 
50Report of Royal Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement, Parliamentary Papers , 1876, vol. 
XV, Paper no. 1569, p. xxxiii. 
51Report of Royal Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement, p. xxxiii. 
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point to, of introducing examinations and selection to replace the practice of 
purchasing commissions, was never to be so clear-cut. The 'democratising 
tendencies' of examinations would always be tempered by the perceived 
need to test a range of qualities of the officer, for which examinations would 
always be inadequate. This in turn meant that these additional qualities of 
the officer had to be assessed in the context of his everyday military life, 
drawing the emphasis away from membership of a particular social class to a 
focus on regimental life. 
In his evidence to the Purchase Commission of 1857 Sir Charles Trevelyan 
had argued in favour of adopting a system of merit selection, based on his 
experience with the British Army in India, in which the practice of selection 
was never difficult because 'we know every inch of a man's character'.52 At 
that time, the Purchase Commissioners were of the view that selection on 
-merit was only possible in the Indian system because of the fewer numbers of 
officers and their geographical proximity. It seemed to them that Trevelyan 
wanted to base his system on factors 'which cannot exist in this country, 
namely a perfect knowledge of the mind and habits of every person in the 
• I 53 service . 
There were a number of factors contributing to the limited extent to which the 
Army could 'know' its officers. One factor was the dispersion of regiments, 
the movement of officers between regiments, and the tendency of officers to 
spend relatively little time in contact with their regiments during peacetime. 
!I: Another was the limited enthusiasm and skill for reporting and inspection on 
the part of senior regimental officers. The third, related factor was the 
'inordinately centralised system' of management of the Army that had grown 
up in the face of the dispersal and instability of the regiments. 54 This 
•11 
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52Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4371. 
53Purchase Commission, Evidence, Q4403. 
54But see, for example, those studies of the politics of nineteenth century military reform which say 
that the function of the War Office had developed also as a consequence of the 'Antimilitarism 
[which] was a firm principle of the Liberal Party creed', W.S. Hamer, The British Army: Civil-
Military Relations 1885-1905, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 149. 
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cumbersome management had none of the inspection and 'intendance' 
capacity of European armies, and so had achieved the combination of 
diminishing the responsibility of local commanders while not have the 
machinery to make those decisions centrally. The possibility of setting 
I: standards and comparing all officers against them was impossible, and thus I, 
i1 ;. the various Commanders-in-Chief preferred the system of rejection to 
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selection on merit. 
The cumbersome central machinery had been adequate to the system of 
promotion by purchase. A relatively ineffectual centralised machinery 
enabled officers to exercise a degree of relative autonomy without burdening 
them with the responsibility for regimental administration and the need to 
stay well-versed in the management of the 'interior economy' of their 
regiments. The War Office (Reconstitution) Committee, reporting two years 
after the Boer War, argued that the degree of centralisation had limited the 
ability of officers to practice all the aspects of managing their regiments that 
would be so necessary in war, noting that 'It seems to have been expected 
that officers would be able to emancipate themselves from their peace 
training as soon as they took to the field'. 55 
The solution was to decentralise many of the responsibilities that then lay 
with the War Office and the Commander-in-Chief, in order to foster the 
necessary responsibility and initiative in army officers that had been lacking 
during the Boer War. Great Britain would be divided up into a number of 
military districts, based on the territorial principles first elaborated in 1873, 
and these territorial regiments would become autonomous units, capable of 
readily mobilising for war.56 A key area of decision-making that was to be 
55Report of the War Office (Reconstitution) Committee (hereafter Esher Committee), Parliamentmy 
Papers, vol. VIII, Paper no. 1932, 1904, p. 9. 
56Esher Committee, p. 10. The 'territorial' system, or localisation scheme, was introduced in 1872 as 
a means of encouraging recruitment of the rank and file: 'It is intended to associate every regiment 
and battalion of the Army with some particular district of the country, in order that the ties of kindred 
and locality may bring into the army a better class of men and a greater number that now present 
themselves', Parliamentary Debates, vol. CCIX (22 February 1872), col. 901. 
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decentralised was that of promotion of all officers up to and including the 
rank of Major, proposed by the Committee 'with a view to enhance the 
position and responsibilities of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 
11, and in order to emphasise the territorial principle'.57 Regimental 
,1: responsibility for promotion was to be accompanied by responsibility for the 
myriad decisions about the training and discipline of officers formerly 
adjudicated centrally. With this responsibility, the General Officers would be 
in a position to determine promotion on merit, and to encourage their officers 
to see their regiment as an opportunity to develop and demonstrate the skills 
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and initiative that might win them promotion. The Committee's intentions 
were that such decentralisation would 'encourage the assumption of 
responsibility as far as possible' .58 
1•1 The Rise of the Regiment 
j., 
.1 
/1: 
One of the most important effects of the various reforms of the nineteenth 
century was the increased significance of the regiment in the internal 
government of the Army. Certain regiments of the Army had always been 
fashionable, and officers paid a scale of prices which reflected this popularity. 
However, for officers with the means to purchase promotion, the fas test way 
to secure promotion was to move between regiments, particularly seeking to 
join those engaged in campaigns, and avoid others sent on garrison duties in 
inhospitable climates.59 While the role of the regiment in the training and 
promotion prospects of the officer assumed increased importance with the 
abolition of the purchase of commissions, the various reforms aimed at 
improving the qualities of officers, which pre-dated the abolition of purchase, 
were already increasing the importance of the regiment. As John Keegan 
notes, the various reforms of the mid-nineteenth century had 'quite 
accidentally, made loyalty to the regiment and service within the regiment, 
57Esher Committee, p. 28. 
58Esher Committee, p. 9. 
59See Spiers, pp. 11;18-19. 
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and to no other regiment, the passport to successful career'. 60 With a greater 
role in the training of officers, more autonomy in its internal government, 
and, with the Localisation Act of 1872, a greater identification with a 
particular locality from ·which to recruit, the regimental system was a key 
factor in the shaping of the military profession in the late nineteenth century. 
In the face of the persistent concern we noted earlier of the best means to both 
guarantee technical competence and the 'character' of the officer, the 
devolution of responsibility for recruitment and training to the regiment 
answered well. In relation to the professionalisation of the officer corps of the 
nineteenth century, the role of the regiment is important because it alerts us to 
the continuing importance of combining appropriate technical qualifications 
with an environment in which to learn and practice the conduct of the officer. 
The regiment stabilises the uneven training of the gentleman officer, codifies 
-the conduct expected of him both with regard to his fellow officers and 
towards the rank and file, becoming 
an institution which not only insisted on [the officer's] possession of 
those qualities and virtues but which, in its post-Cardwellian 
transformation, was itself to become a school of perfection, able on 
the one hand to refuse entry to candidates whom it found deficient, 
on the other to require of its members increasingly high standards of 
concern for the soldiers' welfare, personal self-sacrifice, social 
conformity and military efficiency'. 61 
In its acquisition of these responsibilities for the future development of the 
officer corps, the regiment is a good illustration of the nineteenth century 
liberal mode of government's capacity for achieving a compromise between 
the need for a more economical form of government and a continued concern 
for guaranteeing governability. Individual regiments took over the role of 
overseeing the careers of officers, adjudicating their grievances, monitoring 
their suitability for promotion and determining their additional training 
needs in place of the less efficient and effective central machinery which 
60John Keegan, 'Regimental ideology', in G. Best, and A. Wheatcroft, (eds) War, Economy and the 
Military Mind, London and New Jersey, 1976, pp. 3-19, p. 9. 
61Keegan, 'Regimental Ideology', p.9. 
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'stifled initiative'. At the same time, as we have seen in our discussion of the 
gentleman officer, regiments became an increasingly effective way of setting 
and maintaining standards for the conduct of officers. Thus the liberal 
objective of decreasing the level of governmental oversight of the military 
was nevertheless able to secure, in the regiment, an effective means of 
recruiting, training and disciplining officers with the necessary ethos. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to Huntington, I would argue that the military profession in 
Britain, and its modern-day counterpart in Australia, is t_he construct of an 
accommodation between a liberal mode of government and an aristocratic 
ethos which served~~ newly forming profession well as a standard of 
conduct. With the abolition of purchase there was no vacuum in which an 
entirely new sort of military officer was formed. This was in part, as I have 
suggested, because there were a series of reforms which anticipated the 
abolition of purchase which were intended to make improvements to the 
selection, training and conduct of officers which reliance on broader social 
structures could not. These reforms strengthened the regiment as a 
normative institution. It was also, in part, because the characteristics 
associated with the aristocratic ethos only imperfectly guaranteed by 
purchase had proved themselves to be of continuing relevance to the good 
government of the military and were practised and perfected by the regiment 
and in the wardroom. 
The persistence of an aristocratic ethos in the face of the various reforms of 
the officer corps in nineteenth century Britain may simply suggest that the 
Navy and the Army continued to draw their officers from the same social 
group, with the same expectations of conduct, as they always had. The 
official investigations of matters such as the integration of engineers in the 
Navy suggest that there was also a strong concern that such an ethos, though 
aspects of it may change, was crucial to the good government of military 
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forces. It is to accommodate the latter possibility, and its implications for the 
contemporary government of military forces, that the professionalisation of 
the British officer corps of the nineteenth century has been investigated. 
As we shall see from the following analysis of military forces in Australia, the 
changes to military forces in Britain were to set the standards by which, from 
the 1880s, the newly formed Australian colonial forces were to be measured. 
As well, we will return to the idea of a persistent ethos of office in the 
/ assessment of contemporary military forces and their capacity for change 
I 
I discussed in chapters five and six. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
'The rough hand of the soldier' 
The changing role of military forces in Australia 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the changing fortunes of military forces in Australia since 
the late eighteenth century, and the governmental imperatives that have 
shaped both the role of the armed forces in relation to the rest of Australian 
society, and their internal organisation. In contrast to Britain, military forces 
in Australia have been both more and then less conspicuous; from the 1770s 
until the mid 1800s the British Army played a central role in the government 
of the Australian colonies, and the military architecture of barracks was used 
to house a variety of populations. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
the military were displaced as a key agent of social order, leading gradually 
to position where the newly formed Federal governments of the early 
twentieth century felt they could do with only a minimum of permanent 
military personnel to form the nucleus of a citizen-based army. 
There is no particular developmental logic to the relationship of military 
forces to the rest of society in Australia in which a 'natural antagonism' 
underlies the gradual diminution of a military influence upon Australian 
society.1 Rather, just as we have seen in the discussion of the British military 
in the previous chapters, the civil-military relationship, and aspects of the 
internal organisation of the military in Australia are shaped by a range of 
factors. In this chapter we look to key events in the genealogy of the 
contemporary ADF, and the often accidental or secondary objectives of which 
they formed a part. The resulting military apparatus which develops in 
1See Peter Stanley, ✓Soldiers and fellow-countrymen in Colonial Australia' in Australia: Two 
Centuries of War and Peace, eds M. McKeman and M. Browne (eds), Canberra: Australian War 
Memorial, 1988 pp. 65-91. 
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Australia is a hybrid constructed of administrative reform, economic 
necessity, and a long-standing relationship to its British counterpart. In 
tracing the development of the military forces in Australia, this chapter 
discusses the relationship of the military to governmental strategies in a range 
of areas: the management of the convict population, the government of the 
gold fields and the training of school children, and in the development of 
military forces themselves. 
Policing the Convict Population 
Visitors to early New South Wales were struck by its 'military aspect', and 
historians have often written about the extent to which 'Colonial secretaries 
and governors intended that [Sydney] should project "an appearance of 
Military Restraint", as Lord Bathurst wrote in 1815, in order to remind 
~-
convicts, emancipists, and those likely to resent existing authority, of their 
status and the impossibility of changing it'. 2 In the early years of the Colony, 
military personnel occupied a variety of roles within the community, 
including magistrates, commissary officers, police, surveyors, explorers and 
overseers of the convict population. The regiments of the British Army 
stationed in New South Wales were crucial to the maintenance of order, much 
as they would have been had they been stationed in Ireland and parts of 
England. As I discussed in chapter two, the army was integral to a 
governmental strategy of 'police', both as a repository for the criminal 
population and as a force to control it. 
This dual role meant that the army was a consistently unreliable basis from 
which to exercise control. This was no less the case in New South Wales. The 
regimental barracks which 'occupied a commanding position' in Sydney were 
ordered to be repaired by Governor Hunter after they had been allowed to 
2Stanley, 0 Soldiers and Fellow-Countrymen' in Colonial Australia', p. 66. See also R. Therry, 
Reminiscences of Thirty Years' Residence in New South Wales and Victoria: with a supplementary 
chapter on transportation and the ticket of leave system, London: Samson Low, Son and Co., 1863, pp. 
39, 59. 
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fall into disrepair and the soldiers to live where they wished. Hunter wanted 
the barracks repaired in order to keep the New South Wales Corps under 
control: 
The recent conduct of that part of the New South Wales Corps doing 
duty at Sydney having been turbulent beyond example, and a daring 
violation of the public peace of this settlement, as well as dangerous 
to the lives and dwellings of its inhabitants, and as from the scatter' d 
manner in which the soldiers live their general conduct cannot be so 
minutely inspected by their officers as we find from experience is 
requesite [sic], the commanding officer will give directions that as 
soon as the barracks can be repair' d they do in future occupy them, 
instead of sleeping in huts at a distance from them, those buildings 
having been erected for that purpose. By this means will they be 
more immediately under the eye of their officers, who will, it is 
hoped, be able to prevent any such unmilitary conduct in future .3 
The building and repair of barracks was at least as important for controlling 
the military as for keeping the local population in awe. Governor Macquarie 
further recommended that the regiments only be posted to the colony for 
three years; not so much to ensure a regular supply of fresh troops as 'for the 
purpose of guarding against the Military forming Matrimonial, or less proper 
Connections, with the Women of the Country, whereby they lose sight of 
their Military duty and become in a great degree identified with the lowest 
Class of the Inhabitants' .4 The danger was not so much that the military 
would overpower the Colony but that the Colony and its inhabitants would 
render useless the military. 
The establishment and rejuvenation of barracks in the early nineteenth 
century represented a vigorous attempt to impose a police of the colonial 
population. In order to deal with the social problems associated with a 
larger, more mobile population, including that of the army, solutions were 
sought in the establishment of various forms of 'moral architecture', of which 
the barrack was exemplary. It was this governmental strategy of segregation, 
3Government and General Order, 8th February, 1796, Historical Records of New South Wales 
(HRNSW), vol. 3, pp. 17-18. 
4Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 31 July 1813, Historical Records of Australia (HRA), Series 1: 
Governorsi despatches to and from England, vol. 8, p. 4. 
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fuelled by a desire to have knowledge and control over an entire population, 
that led Governor Macquarie to propose the establishment of convict 
barracks. It was also the basis for the Female Factory, since 'such a building 
is not only extremely necessary and desirable, in regard to the comforts of the 
unfortunate persons themselves, but also to enable the executive Authority to 
keep a due control over them, and by that means to lay the Foundation for 
their more Speedy Reformation'.5 Earl Bathurst was to agree to Macquarie's 
proposed building program, for despite the great cost, 
if the object of the Establishment in New South Wales be the Reform 
of the Population, I am aware it must altogether fail, unless means are 
provided for Lodging under proper Superintendance and Control 
those who may be sent there, and for affording them the Advantages 
of Discipline and Instruction. With this view the Barracks for 
Convicts, the Factory and the Churches, which you propose to erect, 
have my entire Approbation. 6 
Rather than an exercise in 'militarisation', the military and convict barracks 
and Female Factory can be seen as a solution to the governmental problems of 
colonial New South Wales; the barracks were erected to deal with the 
uncontrollability of the British soldiers, the limited 'government work' being 
performed by the male convicts, and the purported 'depravity' of the female 
convicts. In the use of such architectural solutions, the government of New 
South Wales was following a widespread strategy: the use of institutional 
sites of care and reform were widespread throughout Britain and Europe 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century.7 
Barracks, factories and churches were erected with the encouragement of Earl 
Bathurst because they enabled, firstly, the separation and enclosure of various 
parts of the population from one another. For example, 'a Stone Wall, ten feet 
5Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 28th April, 1814, HRA, Series 1, vol. 8, p. 153. 
6Earl Bathurst to Governor Macquarie, 24th August, 1818, HRA, Series 1, vol. 9, p. 832. 
7See, for example, Michael Donnelly, Managing the Mind: a study of medical psychology in early 
nineteenth century Britain, London: Tavistock, 1983; Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families: 
welfare versus the state, London: Hutchinson, 1979; Robin Evans, The Fabrication of Virtue, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of 
the prison, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. 
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high, to surround the Entire of the Said Barracks, and enclosing an extensive 
Area for Parade and Exercise Grounds, the Great Object of this wall is to 
restrain as much as possible the Intercourse between the Military and the 
Inhabitants of the Towri'. 8 Secondly, they would enable the enclosed 
population's time and activities to be monitored. The Female Factory at 
Parramatta was 'particularly necessary for keeping those depraved Females 
at Work within Walls, so as in some degree to be a check upon their 
Immoralities and disorde~ly Vicious Habits' .9 The erection of the main 
convict barracks for males in Sydney was in part to 'lay the foundations for 
their Speedy Reformation', but it was also intended to ensure that the 
convicts employed on public works around Sydney worked the whole day 
for the Government, instead of having their afternoons free to work for 
private employers. As John Hirst points out: 'For the first time in the colony's 
history, convicts were to be under constant surveillance, to be locked up at 
night and their 'own time' was to be taken away from them' .10 
Churches, too, ensured that at least part of the convicts' free day Sunday 
could be accounted for by enabling them to attend divine worship. Churches 
were erected or reorganised to allow for inspection of the convict population: 
'the duties of the preacher have been sometimes interrupted for the purpose 
of checking irregularities in the conduct of the convict during divine service. 
But, by placing in the new church the seat of the principal Superintendent in 
the gallery, this evil will be remedied' .11 
These forms of governmental control were established because they went 
some way towards achieving the aspiration of the eighteenth century mode of 
governing that relied on small-scale, local government apparatuses such as 
the parish, the local magistracy, backed by the army, which constituted the 
8Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 28th April, 1814, HRA, Series 1, vol. 8, p. 152. 
9Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 4th April, 1817, HRA, Series 1, vol. 9, p. 353. 
10John Hirst, Convict Society and its Enemies: a history of early New South Wales, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1983, p. 41. 
11See Sir Thomas Brisbane to Earl Bathurst, 28th April, 1823, HRA, Series 1, vol. 11, pp. 75-6. 
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governmental regime of 'police'. Such mechanisms were either absent in 
New South Wales, or ineffective (although Commissioner Bigge 
recommended the establishment of parishes and administrative areas called 
'hundreds' for better policing of the population in his Report of 1821). The 
governmental problem that faced the governors of New South Wales was of a 
large, undifferentiated population which, in the absence of scrutiny, was 
disorderly, inefficient and potentially uncontrollable. Faced with this 
problem, the barracks and Female Factory were intended to separate out the 
populations from one another, allow for the internal inspection of the 
populations, and increase the work efficiency of the convict population. 
In seeking to achieve these outcomes of greater security and greater 
productivity, police relied increasingly on a range of disciplinary techniques. 
As we saw in the previous chapters, these techniques assisted in imposing a 
semblance of order in the face of an increasingly disordered and mobile 
population. These techniques attempted to impose a discipline upon the 
population, initially by segregating, by limiting movement, and by 
employing mechanisms which aspired to enable an entire population to be 
visible and hence manageable. These governmental tactics Foucault describes 
as 'discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the edges of 
society, turned inwards towards negative functions: arresting evil, breaking 
communications, suspending time' 12• 
Associated as they were with stasis, with visibility, and with an externally-
imposed discipline, these techniques authorised by the early governors of 
colonial Australia soon came under criticism for their failure to achieve these 
goals. In order to get a proportion of the convicts to move into the barracks in 
Sydney Governor Macquarie had to induce them with an increase in rations 
and the promise that they could still work in 'their own time' on Saturday 
and Sunday afternoons. The convict barracks and the Factory could not 
accommodate all the 'government' convicts, and as a result their coverage 
12Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 209. 
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was so limited, and their inmate population so fluid, that they did little to 
effect the separation and supervision for which they were intended. More 
than these failures, the convict barracks and Female Factory were producing 
yet more problems. In a Commission of Inquiry into the Colony of New 
South Wales in 1821 the Commissioner, J.T. Bigge, was to caution against the 
dangers created by the barracks: 'The association of so many depraved and 
desperate characters in one place is an evil that is complained of even by the 
convicts themselves' .13 Bigge noted that thefts of clothing among the inmates 
was 'encouraged' by 'the facility with which they cast them over the barrack 
wall to persons who are ready to receive them on the other side'. 14 He felt 
that the confinement of convicts to barracks did little to diminish crime, since 
'on marching them to and from ... [the barracks] either to work or to church, it 
is found very difficult to prevent them, especially the boys, from entering 
houses as they go along, and from snatching at property and secreting it' .15 
/ 
The Female Factory at Parramatta was even less of a success in governmental 
terms. Its function contained a paradox: it was intended for the 'Employment 
and Residence of the Female Convicts ... so as to keep them always within it 
and prevent them having any Intercourse with the People of the Town, until 
such time as they should either be Married, or Assigned as domestic Servants 
to Married persons'. 10 The Factory was both to prevent and promote the 
formation of relationships between the female convicts and the rest of the 
population. It was successful at neither. The Factory generally employed 
more women than it could accommodate, so a number had to find lodgings in 
the town of Parramatta. A considerable number of women assigned to the 
non-convict population were returned by their employers as unsatisfactory, 
pregnant or having allegedly committed crimes. This constant traffic limited 
the capacity of the institution to separate and monitor the female convicts, but 
13Report of Commissioner of Inquiry into state of Colony of New South Wales (hereafter Bigge 
Commission Report), Parliamentary Papers, 1822, vol. XX, Paper no. 448, p. 33. 
14Bigge Commission Report, p. 33. 
15Bigge Commission Report, p. 33. 
16Governor Macquarie to Earl Bathurst, 4th December, 1817, HRA, Series 1. vol. 9., p. 504. 
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any attempts to make improvements then hindered the opportunities for the 
women to marry or form connexions with the local population. The Factory's 
very existence was seen to contribute to the depravity of the general 
population, on the basis that it made marriages, legal or de facto, more 
difficult: 
at some periods of the history of this colony, when a ship arrived in 
the Cove with females, every man, whose industry and labour 
enabled him to provide for a housekeeper, was allowed to select, 
from amongst them, one that met his approbation ... This, no 
doubt. .. was an immoral connexion; abstractedly considered it was 
indefensible. But compare this with the life and course of conduct of 
most of those, who formed those connexions; compare it with the 
total dissoluteness, which might ensue on being turned loose, as must 
have been the case; compare it with what has ensued since that 
practice was abolished and the women shut up in the Factory; and the 
apologies for the system are obvious. Its total discontinuance (when 
we might have seen an improvement on it) has been followed by the 
commission of immoralities to an unknown exten~ and a lamentable 
check has been given to the growth of the Colony. 17 
Initially, these failures were met with an intensification of effort. In response 
to Commissioner Bigge' s Report, Governor Brisbane undertook the greater 
classification, separation and dispersal of the convict population: 
Irregularities have ceased in the police records ... [reforms],when 
accomplished, will be an index to the moral history of the 
Colony ... means will be afforded of pursuing the history, conduct and 
condition of a convict in his various situations in the colony from his 
arrival to his emancipation or death ... classing, feeding and lodging in 
the twelve rooms of Hyde Park Barrack, according to the criminality 
of [the convicts'] offences, has been partially attempted ... and shall 
forthwith be carried into more entire effect. 18 
Changes at the Female Factory were also attempted, along the lines that 
Commissioner Bigge recommended: 'a complete separation should be made 
of the vacant spaces now left on either side of the principal building ... a range 
of workrooms should also be constructed, in the same manner ... and the entire 
17Extract from the issue of the Australian newspaper, dated 7th April, 1825, HRA, Series 1, vol. 
11, p. 597. 
18Sir Thomas Brisbane to Earl Bathurst, 28th April. 1823, HRA, Series 1, vol. 11, pp. 77-78. 
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separation of the female convicts placed in the factory for punishment, from 
those placed there for work and confinement, will thus be effected' .19 
The various means thaf Bigge recommended for the improved classification 
and inspection of the convict population relied for their execution upon the 
existing governmental apparatus of police: magistrates, special constables and 
the military forces of the Colony. While he recommended that 'the future 
assignment of the females to settlers and others, must be left to the joint 
discretion of the resident magistrates at Parramatta and the female 
superintendent of the factory', Bigge conceded that 'the management of the 
female convicts .. .is a duty for which I do not conceive there is any person 
now in New South Wales who is duly qualified ... a superintendent who has 
been familiar with the details of management either in a factory or a gaol, 
should be appointed'. 20 He also proposed that the management of male 
convicts in government work should be undertaken by non-commissioned 
officers and privates from the British army, whose 'habits of discipline and 
regularity, and the knowledge of mechanics that are acquired by men of this 
description, qualify them, in a peculiar manner, for the superintendence and 
management of the compulsory labour of convicts'. 21 For the majority of 
convicts, it was important that they be assigned to 'respectable persons', 
whose treatment of their charges 'must be left to the superintendence of the 
magistrates and officers of police'. 22 
Bigge' s aspirations for an improvement in the moral and economic climate of 
New South Wales were not met by the greater extension of the disciplinary 
mechanisms he proposed. This was in part due to the inadequacy of those 
charged with carrying out the reforms proposed. Thus, when the Select 
19Bigge Commission Report, p. 168 (see also p. 71). 
20Bigge Commission Report, pp. 167-8. 
21 Bigge Commission Report, p. 166. 
22Bigge Commission Report, p. 168. Despite the criticisms of police and magistrates that Bigge 
encountered in the course of his enquiries, his second report on the Judicial establishments of 
New South Wales and Van Deimen's Land does not canvass changes to the recruitment and 
selection of magistrates and police. 
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Committee of the House of Commons on Transportation, or Molesworth 
Committee, came to consider the colonies of New South Wales and Van 
Diemen's Land in 1837, they not only found that the problems Bigge had 
identified continued, but also that those charged with the police of the 
population were themselves adversely affected by such a system.23 In 
particular, the task of guarding chain gangs working on the roads had 
'produced the greatest demoralization among the troops ... [in part] by their 
intercourse with the prison population, which could not be prevented, 
because many of the men found their fathers, brothers and other relations, 
th . / ?4 amo:1gst e convicts . -
The Molesworth Committee was exemplary in its enunciation of the widely-
held view that a penal system based on the extremes of transportation and the 
death penalty was effective neither in deterring crime nor reforming the 
--
criminal. Transportation was expensive and required extreme levels of 
violence to maintain order, particularly among those who committed further 
crimes after being transported. As well, the system of assigning convicts to 
work as labourers and servants for the free settlers in New South Wales was 
considered an arbitrary process, with all the potential evils of slavery, which 
had been abolished in the British Empire since 183325 • 
The Molesworth Committee's views were consistent with a wider agenda of 
penal reform which was already underway in Britain. For some years there 
had been agitation to amend the Criminal Code to reduce the numbers of 
crimes punishable by death, with recommendations that persons convicted of 
committing minor crimes and property offences should serve sentences in 
penitentiaries built in accordance with the separate confinement system 
23Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the System of Transportation 
(hereafter Molesworth Committee Report), Parliamentary Papers, 1837-1838, vol. XXII, Paper no. 
669, pp. ix, xiv, xv. 
24Molesworth Committee Report, p. xiv. 
25John Ritchie, 'Towards ending an unclean thing: the Molesworth Committee and the abolition 
of transportation to New South Wales, 1837-40', Historical Studies, vol. 17, no. 67, October 1976, 
pp. 144-162, p. 154. 
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advocated by reformers like Jeremy Bentham and in use in parts of the 
United States. Thus, while it is unlikely that the criticisms of Molesworth 
Committee were decisive in bringing transportation to an end in 1840, the 
form the criticisms took.were exemplary of the period, and were important to 
the shape of reform in New South Wales after the end of Transportation. 
The Committee's criticisms were focussed on the costly nature of a mode of 
government which both advocated the practice of transportation and aimed 
at the kind of comprehensive management of the convict population such as 
that attempted in the colonies. This preventative police was ambitious in its 
scope, but the instruments of this ambition were so inappropriate to the tasks 
set for them that they engendered more problems than they solved. For 
example, the statutory punishment of death for a large number of crimes led 
jurors to obfuscate the nature of the crimes in order to avoid the inevitable 
sentence of death or transportation for life. Similarly, petitioners to the 
British Parliament were frequently moved to request greater leniency of 
punishment in order to diminish the rate of crime; as a petition of Bankers 
from 214 cities and towns stated in 1830, 'the infliction of death, or even the 
possibility of death, prevents the prosecution, conviction and punishment of 
the criminal and thus endangers the property which it is intended to protect. 26 
Consistent with this theme, the Molesworth Committee argued that in the 
Colony of New South Wales order was maintained through a combination of 
brutality and neglect, making transportation a punishment of very unequal 
outcomes. 
Further, transportation and the practice of assignment were productive of a 
vast range of evils in New South Wales: domestic servants in the towns 
committed burglaries, female convicts corrupted the children of settlers 
under their care, road parties were responsible for widespread 'disorders, 
crimes and demoralisation', soldiers were demoralised and undisciplined 
26Leon Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal Law and its administration from 1750, 5 
volumes, London: Stevens, 1948-86, vol. 1, 1948, p. 730. 
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from guarding chain gangs, settlers and those in charge of government gangs 
were transformed into tyrants. In addition, 'Transportation is not merely 
inefficient in producing the moral reformation of an offender; it is efficient in 
demoralizing those, whom accidental circumstances, more than a really 
vicious nature, have seduced into crime'. 27 In the case of secondary offenders, 
the Report argued that 'A system of punishment, which relies for its efficacy 
solely upon the infliction of pain, without attempting to encourage and 
strengthen the moral feelings of a culprit, only hardens and brutalises him'. 28 
The Committee argued that the system of transportation worked in such a 
way as to produce an even greater criminal population than it reformed, and 
that this population was then unfit to take advantage of the economic 
possibilities of the colony; in this way transportation was 'costly' at three 
stages: as an initial punishment, as secondary punishment and in the 
economic life of the colony. For, in the face of a 'pressing demand for labour, 
and great facilities for acquiring wealth, crimes so numerous and so atrocious 
as those, perpetrated in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, truly 
indicate the depth of their moral depravity' .29 
Earlier attempts to maintain control through the use of barracks and the 
Female Factory were criticised by the Committee. The convict barracks, 
despite attempts by its administrators to increase the supervision and 
visibility of activities within the barracks, were a source of contamination and 
spread of 'unnatural acts', so that these were considered to be 'more common 
in Sydney than in any part of the civilised world' .30 The Female Factory was 
described by witnesses to the Committee as 'a sort of lying in hospital, at the 
public expense ... the same as the Foundling Hospital in France; it does not 
matter who is the father of the child, the government very liberally support 
it'.31 These consequences led the Molesworth Committee to argue that 'there 
27Molesworth Committee Report, p. xxii. 
28Molesworth Committee Report, pp. xxii-xxiii. 
29Ivlolesworth Committee Report, p. xxvii. 
30 Molesworth Committee Report, Evidence, p. 67. 
31Molesworth Committee Report, Evidence, p. 65 (see also p. 46). 
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belongs to the system [of transportation], extrinsically from its strange 
character as a punishment, the yet more curious and monstrous evil of calling 
into existence, and continually extending societies, or the germs of nations 
most thoroughly depraved' .32 In the face of the 'costly' nature of the system 
of punishment in New South Wales, the Molesworth Committee 
recommended the abolition of assignment, the greater regulation of 
government work and the introduction of penitentiary-like practices at the 
penal establishments in Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island. 
In a society largely composed of criminals, the Committee argued, there was 
little opportunity for reformation and everyone was 'contaminated' by the 
brutality such a society engendered. In this calculation, the Army was 
doubly represented: firstly, in carrying out its police functions, individual 
soldiers were demoralised and rendered inefficient by their association with 
criminals, and the efficiency of the regiment, by dispersing forces throughout 
the colony in small number to guard gangs of men, was compromised as the 
men could never be trained together in adequate formations or properly 
supervised by their officers33; secondly, the soldiers of the army had blunt 
and often brutal ways of maintaining order, and were not trained to be 
providing the reformatory guidance advocated by the Committee. 
With the abolition of transportation to New South Wales in 1840 and to Van 
Diemen's Land in 1852, and the cessation of the practice of assignment in 
1841, an important source of the costly 'police' in New South Wales was 
ended. As the British Government encouraged economic migration to the 
colonies, the basis of the society of New South Wales changed, and the 
continued role of the Army in a police of the population came under 
increasing scrutiny. No longer shielded by the exigencies of maintaining 
32Molesworth Committee Report, p. xli. 
33Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 
16-17. 
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order in a convict population, the 'rough justice' of the soldier seemed 
increasingly uneconomical. 
In part, this view was influenced by the changing terms under which 
Imperial troops were garrisoned in the Australian colonies. From 1849 their 
numbers were to be determined in accordance with the need to protect 
Australia from external threat rather than as the maintenance of internal 
order dictated. As well, from the 1840s the colonies had increasingly to 
shoulder the cost of garrisoning troops, and while there were a number of 
'foreign invasion' scares in the 1840s and 1850s which led to demands for 
more troops, colonial governments were concerned to minimise the costs 
associated with defence. 
In part, this calculation of the costliness of the army was consistent with a 
new, liberal mode of government which sought to develop a new means of 
addressing an inherited concern for security and prosperity. One of the 
consequences of this aspiration for a more efficient government was that 
agencies of a more generalised police, like the Army, were discarded in 
favour of governmental agencies with specific functions and specialised 
training: police forces of different kinds, gaol wardens, inspectors and 
surveyors of various kinds. It was this form of governmental calculation 
which established the terms on which the inappropriateness of military forces 
to generalised policing came to be demonstrated conclusively, in a way that 
meant that no such role would again be contemplated for such a force, except 
under exceptional circumstances. This shift can be well- illustrated with 
reference to the problem of government of the New South Wales and 
Victorian Gold Fields in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Governing Colonial Australia 
When gold was discovered in New South Wales in the early 1850s, the 
Colonial Secretary appointed a Commissioner of Crown Lands for the 
I, 
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Goldfields. This Commissioner, J.R. Hardy, and others who were appointed 
as the goldfields expanded, issued licenses, settled claims and adjudicated 
disputes among the mining population. He operated with a limited number 
of police in support, keeping up an active inspection of the various fields by 
issuing licenses and verifying claims on the spot. Hardy resisted directions to 
establish a central office to which miners had to apply for their licenses, and 
he resisted the suggestion that he should appoint special constables from 
amongst the more respectable miners to assist him. Hardy argued that the 
government of the goldfields was: 
an extremely delicate business to manage. I can rely on myself; I have the 
most perfect reliance on the men ... that the government has given me; but I 
could never rely on special constables, however respectable ... the bands of 
unknown and homeless men, who compose the greater part of this population, 
and who readily recognise me and my men in the performance of our duty, 
would laugh at what they call amateur constables.34 
Hardy was suggesting that it wasn't possible to adapt the system of special 
constables, which belonged to a practice of government more appropriate to 
the settled agrarian communities of eighteenth century Britain, where 
'leading and respectable men were clearly identifiable and their social 
superiority over the rest was harnessed in support of the civil power'.35 The 
identifiable sources of social control were the uniformed commissioners and 
police, who moved amongst the population, using the knowledge they 
gained from frequent inspections of the fields to assist in the settling of 
disputes and in informing the mining population of new finds. The size of 
the New South Wales fields were such that the vigilance of the 
Commissioners, backed up by a small force of police, appeared relatively 
effective in maintaining order. In 1852 a Select Committee on the 
Management of the Gold Fields, concerned about the management of the 
diverse and mobile population on the gold fields proposed that a general 
system of registration of everyone residing within the limits of the 
34Quoted in John Hirst, The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy: New South Wales 1848-1884, 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988, pp. 202-203. 
35Hirst, The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy, p. 203. 
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Commissioner's district should be introduced. The Commissioners 
responded that 'no doubt the information that would be derived from it 
would be valuable, but it would be very difficult to enforce such a 
regulation'. 36 • While the Commissioners were wary of recommending only a 
system of management on the goldfields 'which depends for its successful 
operation on the personal influence of the Commissioners', they were more 
reluctant to preside over the elaborate suggestions of the Committee for a 
system of general registration. 
The reluctance of the New South Wales Commissioners to operate an 
unwieldy system of a generalised police of the gold fields population stood in 
marked contrast to the practices of managing the Victorian gold fields. The 
Victorian goldfields were considerably larger than those in New South Wales; 
at its peak in 1858, the population of the various fields totalled 147,000 
people. In the district of Ballarat there were calculated to be as many as 
58,000 persons in 1855.37 Initially, the Victorian fields employed the same 
system of Commissioners supported by police, issuing licenses to miners 
every month. However, the Commissioners left much of the pursuit of 
miners to renew their licenses up to the local police, who were considered to 
be brutal and harassing, both to those who had taken out licenses and to 
those who had not. Opposition by the miners to the payment of the license 
fees increased from 1852 onwards, partly because many could not afford to 
pay and partly because of the way in which the fee was collected. In 1853 a 
Select Committee of the Victorian Legislative Council had found that the 
greatest opposition to government was over the method of collecting the fees 
for gold prospecting licenses, rather than the fees themselves. Moreover, 
many of the witnesses to the Committee were critical of the Commissioners, 
who left their police forces to operate without supervision, and were thus 
36Third Report of the Select Committee on the Management of the Gold Fields, New South Wales 
Legislative Council Votes and Proceedings, 1852, vol. 2, pp. 667,679. 
37Geoffrey Serle, The Golden Age: a history of colonial Victoria 1851-1861, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1968, pp. 388-389. 
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considered 'tyrannical and ineffectual' .38 Opposition was most organised at 
the Ballarat goldfields, culminating in the clash between miners and the 
police and soldiers at the 'Eureka Stockade' in December 1854, during which 
about thirty miners and five soldiers were killed. 
A Royal Commission on the Gold Fields, which met shortly after the events at 
Ballarat, examined the causes of the widespread dissatisfactions of the 
miners. The Commission found that objection to the license fee 
was always represented to the Commission as much less an objection 
to the rate then the mode of its collection; with this view of the 
subject, the Commission entirely accord ... To carry out the law in its 
integrity, to oblige everyone to pay the rate, or at least endeavour 
effectively to do so, required a constant exercise of authority, and a 
continual disturbance of those who had paid, in order to detect those 
who had not. Scenes between the police and miners were of daily 
occurrence, where mutual irritation, abuse and grqss violence would 
39 ensue. 
The license fee was an inefficient means of governing the population and 
raising revenue, causing more problems than it solved. In recommending its 
abolition the Commission noted that 'Laws must not be based solely upon 
abstract principle or right, but be adapted also to human nature', and in the 
light of this view of government, they proposed 
a small charge, ostensibly for the privilege of mining for gold and 
with the object of some revenue being raised .. .It is not intended that 
any active search be instituted by the authorities as to whether a 
miner has or has not taken out this qualification; but without it, he 
has no right to the gold he may acquire, or to claims or digging 
ground he may take up and labour on ... The Miner's Right, as it is 
proposed to term this annual document, would be a means of 
distinguishing the well disposed on the Gold Fields, and of aiding the 
police and authorities40 
38Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Gold Fields, Victorian Legislative Council 
Votes and Proceedings, 1853-4, vol. 3, Paper no. 8, Evidence, p.4. 
39Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, Victorian 
Legislative Council Votes and Proceedings, vol. 2, Paper no. 76, p. xii. 
4°Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, p. xiii. 
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The introduction of the Miner's Right was intended to overcome the 
inefficiencies of the license fee, the heavy burden its collection imposed and 
the levels of antagonism that it produced. The new mechanism of the Miner's 
Right both brought in revenue and was a more efficient exercise of 
governmental power because it was constructed to incorporate the miners' 
interests in its adoption. Thus, in place of a harassing police force the 
government could encourage the self-interest of miners. In addressing the 
problems of the gold fields in this way the Commission is exemplary in its 
concerns with the 'costly' and inefficient administration of the gold fields. In 
this respect the Commission echoes the ear lier concerns of the Select 
Committee on Transportation; it had as its goal the achievement of a new set 
of governmental aims directed at enhancing the individual's capacities for 
self-government at a minimum 'cost' to government. This cost was in part 
calculated by considering the extent to which governmental mechanisms 
engender either opposition (which increases the cost), or the opportunity for 
an increased capacity for self-government (which reduces the cost). 
Thus, when the Commission came to examine the mechanisms used to 
maintain order on the gold fields, it was extremely critical of the police, 
principally in terms of the way in which they were used: 
While ... the police were rendered quite inefficient for the ordinary 
public service, the force itself was withal twice as numerous and 
twice as expensive as would have been necessary under a different 
system ... Instead of the happy accord between the police and the 
ordinary citizen exemplified everywhere but on the Gold Fields, this 
force was chiefly arrayed around the authorities at the Camp, who, as 
they balanced the spirit and numbers of the defiant miners, were apt 
to judge of the police requirements not by the proportion deemed 
necessary to protect the people, but by the force requesite to defeat 
them.41 
The gold field Commissioners had used the police against the local 
population, and had produced more ill-effects than their presence had 
ameliorated. The solution for the Commission was to adjust the balance, to 
41 Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, p. xiii. 
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have the police operating in an environment where the majority of the 
population governed themselves: 
The Commission have already had occasion to allude to the excessive 
array of police upon the Gold Fields. This expensive body, obnoxious 
in its duties, and banded together upon a camp as if in hostilities to 
the people, seems to have been a deep seated cause of popular 
irritation ... a smaller force, adequate to protect but not to defy the 
people, would have materially tended to abate antipathies on both 
sides ... A happy illustration came before [the Commission] at the 
adjacent extensive Gold Fields at Creswick' s Creek. Amidst an 
immense population, estimated at that time to be 20,000 souls, the 
police force consisting of only nineteen persons ... was so small as to be 
scarcely adequate even to the ordinary administration of justice ... the 
authorities, thus destitute of all protection against the people around 
them, and without even the semblance of a camp, seem to have been 
in reality more safe than in the midst of a regiment of bayonets .. .It is 
by observation of such incidents, as well as by general reasoning, that 
the Commission are entirely assured of the conservative elements 
upon the Gold Fields. 42 
When considering the other arm of government on the goldfields, the 
military, the Commission could see no valid reason for its continued role as a 
police force, particularly given the military's symbolic character, what the 
Commission described as a 'defiant arrangement': 
the observations made with regard to the array of police upon these 
districts apply still more strongly and unexceptionally to military 
force ... the great point should be, so as to meet the reasonable wants of 
the people as to prevent such social outbreak, rather than to maintain 
a defiant arrangement for putting it down ... 
The Commission believe that the crisis which was evidently gathering 
would have been differently and more opportunely met had there 
been no military arm to rely on ... The rough hand of the soldier is a 
prompt cure; but it is a cure of the surface only, and it remedies 
nothing more permanently any more than effectually. In so far as 
there have been grievances of a valid character to redress amongst the 
mining population, the presence of the military in this Colony, 
available as they have been to encourage a resistant and 
unsympathetic attitude in the authorities, has been a misfortune and a 
stumbling block. 43 
42Cornmission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, p. xxvi. 43Cornmission Appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Gold Fields of Victoria, pp. xxvi-
xxvn. 
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The 'rough hand of the soldier' had become a stumbling block in the 
management of a population such as that of the Victorian goldfields. Not 
because, or only because, the use of the army seemed a crude measure of 
force for any government, but because such temporary, superficial 
management of the population no longer accorded with governmental 
objectives. The Miner's Right, which harnessed the miners' self interest, and 
was much more 'economical' to enforce, was characteristic of the change in 
governmentality that occurred during the nineteenth century. It was against 
these more effective, more economical measures, that the use of soldiers, with 
all the problems they created, seemed inappropriate. 
Changes in the exercise of government in nineteenth century Australia were 
felt at all levels of government. In 1842, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
wrote to the Governor of New South Wales telling him that 
the report, which you have just now furnished, is not of the description which 
Her Majesty's Government thought it desirable to call for annually from the 
Governor of each of the Colonies. The Report now before me describes 
merely the political and judicial constitution of the colony; whereas it was the 
object of the instruction to produce a review, retrospective and prospective, 
of the state and condition of the Colony ... the Report should contain such 
explanations and comments, which would illustrate the permanent as 
distinguished from the transient and occasional interests of the Colony. 44 
On the gold fields in Victoria the new executive officers: the surveyors, mine 
inspectors and registrars were themselves subjected to the techniques they 
were there to effect; surveyors were not just to be appointed by the Mining 
Boards, but had to pass examinations which would 'be so strict and enlarged 
as to ensure their competency for the offices for which they seek'; registrars of 
claims needed to have their offices overhauled and to institute uniform, 
centralised and carefully kept records of claims, instead of the situation in 
which 'registrars have kept their books in so rough and loose a style, that at 
44Lord Stanley to Sir George Gipps, 5th May 1842, HRA, Series 1, vol. 22, p. 36. 
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times they have experienced great difficulty in making use of them' .45 In the 
mining companies, too, it was not enough to appoint a manager, for 'the 
number of mining companies in the colony, public and private, very largely 
exceeded the number of competent mining managers to be found'.46 Mining 
companies had to utilise the technique of examination to gain full benefit 
from the appointment of a mine manager, for 'there was, in the present state 
of the colony, practically no means by which any company could judge the 
quality of the persons seeking to be employed as managers ... a great boon 
would be conferred on the mining cornrnunity .. .if arrangements were made 
for regular examinations, on the plan of those for the Civil Service, to be held 
in the mining museum'. 47 
For these governmental officers, the challenges of incorporating as well as 
extending the techniques of a new governmentality served to strengthen their 
role. For others like the magistracy, the police and the military, these 
challenges were to be significant in determining both the process of internal 
reform and their role in government. The generalised skills of particularly 
the magistracy and the military were inadequate to a strategy that developed 
and extended specialised knowledges. Magistrates appointed from amongst 
the 'respectable population' came increasingly under scrutiny. In 1858 a New 
South Wales Select Committee on the State of the Magistracy would go so far 
as to acknowledge that 'educational attainment is desirable', but at that time 
thought that 'no test. .. can be exercised, except a man's judgement of the 
character of the candidate from his conversation' .48 By 1871, the Commission 
on. the Gold Fields \,vas of the opinion that 'confidence in the decisions 
pronounced cannot be entertained in the public mind when the persons 
45Report of the Royal Mining Commission of Victoria, Victorian Parliamentary Papers, 1862-63, 
vol. 3, Paper no. 10, pp . 25, 28. 
46Report of the Royal Mining Commission of Victoria, p. 47. 
47Report of the Royal Mining Commission of Victoria, p. 48. 
48Select Committee on the Magistracy, New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 
1858, vol. 2, p. 110 
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adjudicating, however zealous, however patient, however industrious and 
however honest, lack knoivledge'. 49 
. 
Amidst these shifts in governmentality, the place of 'military' techniques and 
personnel is not uniform or easily explicable in terms of a cultural 'antipathy', 
which is temporary submerged and then reemerges with the introduction of 
'democratic' government. Rather, the role of military practices is determined 
by their usefulness in addressing a range of governmental questions: barracks 
were an exemplary form of architecture when the problem of government 
was the separation and segregation of the population; soldiers were 
appropriate to governmental practices which centred on the effects of 
symbolic violence; as these governmental strategies came under scrutiny, as 
they were demonstrated not only to have failed their explicit purpose but to 
have been productive of a range of secondary, unintended and undesirable 
effects. 
Reforming the Military 
Despite the criticisms made of the military forces in the 1850s, a few short 
years later inspectors with the Department of Education in New South Wales 
began to comment on the benefits of drill for the discipline and government 
of schools, and to lament its limited use; 'There are but few schools in which a 
regular system of drill is practised. This is to be regretted, as it is a good 
corrective of slovenly habits, and a powerful agent in promoting the general 
discipline of a school' .50 The irregular practice of drill in school, which 
seemed to consist mostly of lining up and marching, as a way of managing 
students between lessons, continued throughout the 1870s. By the early 1880s 
drill was an examinable subject in the public schools of New South Wales. In 
1881 31, 771 students gained a pass in drill, and by 1890 a total number of 
49Cornmission on the Gold Fields, Report, New South Wales Legi.slative Assembly Votes and 
Proceedings, 1871-72, vol. 2, p. 20. 
50Report of the Council of Education upon the Condition of Public Schools for 1869, New South 
Wales Legi.slative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 1870, vol. 2, p. 44. 
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115,065 students were examined, with 83,144 gaining a pass. The enthusiasm 
for drill lay mainly with the Inspectors, as many of the teachers remained 
untrained for taking drill, and according to the Inspectors 
Teachers do not appear to realise sufficiently the great aid it is to the 
maintenance of discipline to have their pupils trained in the 
playground to habits of united and prompt action. If this is well 
done, there is little difficulty in securing that ready attention and 
concentrated thought in class teaching on which depends the success 
of the lesson.51 
From the early 1880s the teacher training school started to instruct its trainee 
teachers in drill: military drill and gymnastics for the men, and drill and 
callisthenics for the women. The benefit here was felt not only in the schools, 
but also 'the physique and general health of the [student teachers], both male 
and female, were much improved by these exercises and contrasted 
favourably with the health of those who had attended the Training School 
prior to the introduction of Drill' .52 
Drill was not introduced to produce recruits for the colonial defence forces. 
The drill taught to the general body of school students should be 
distinguished from the formation of cadet corps in the schools, which only 
involved relatively small numbers of students, and was largely unsuccessful 
until it was reorganised in 1888. In the early 1890s the Minister for Public 
Education reported that: 
under the scheme of reorganisation ... the public school cadet force has 
made very satisfactory progress ... the actual enrolment at the close of 
1890 was 5,842 ... A healthy interest in the cadet movement has now 
been created throughout the country .. .It is confidently expected that 
the cadet force will become firmly established as a permanent 
National Institution.53 
51 Report of the Council of Education upon the Condition of Public Schools for 1878, New South 
Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 1878-79, vol. 3, p.31. 
52Report of the Minister of Public Instruction upon the Condition of Public Schools (hereafter 
Report ... on Public Schools 1883-84), New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 
1883-84, vol. 7, p.101. 
53Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1890, New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 1891-92, vol. 3, p. 56. 
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This was a small group of students (compared to the number that 
participated in drill) that were to be linked, via a corps of senior cadets, to the 
defence forces of the Colony, 'with a view to the ranks of the latter being 
-
recruited in great measure from the former'. 54 
For the school inspectors, interested as they were in the general government 
of the school, drill was a vehicle for managing school students when they were 
between classes, in the relatively unregulated space of the playground. 
Inspectors were interested in drill in terms of 'its application to school 
movement, with a view to economise time', and its capacity to secure 
'improvement in the degree of quietness, precision and expedition with 
which various class-movements are performed'.55 Nor was the introduction 
of drill an indication of a harsher, more unsophisticated approach to 
discipline; in the same reports where drill was supported, the Chief Inspector 
remarks that 
the government in use in schools is mild. Corporal punishment is in 
general resorted to only in extreme cases and when other means of 
removing disorder have failed ... Year by year the aids for the 
maintenance of good order are becoming better understood and 
applied by teachers, and, in equal degree, harsh forms of government 
are disappearing from our schools.56 
Drill was 'an important aid in the maintenance of good order'; it taught 
children physical co-ordination and self-discipline, and it enabled the parts of 
the school outside the classroom to be ordered and regulated; these two facets 
contributed to the good government of the classroom. Similar results were 
hoped for with the introduction of drill to the boys' reformatory school, the 
Nautical School Ship Vernon in 1878. In his Report of 1879 the 
Superintendent remarked that 
the system of drilling initiated on board last year has proved 
successful in its results; the increased smartness and improved 
54Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1888, New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 1889, vol. 6, p. 20. 
55Report.. .on Public Schools 1883-84, pp. 95, 70. 
56Report...on Public Schools 1883-84, p. 105. 
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bearing of the boys bear testimony to the value of this form of 
training ... a better course of training could hardly be adopted, as it 
gives them a cheerful, intelligent appearance and improves their 
physique, conducing to that desirable result the mens sana in corpore 
sano.57 
By 1890 he could write that 'the great value of a systematic course of drilling 
in all schools, but more especially in those of the nature of [NSS Vernon], in 
being conducive to order, improvement of bearing, and personal neatness, 
with other reasons, are now generally recognised by all competent 
authorities' .58 Such sentiments were also expressed by military authorities. 
Colonel Peter Scratchely, responsible for reorganising the Defence Forces of 
New South Wales in the early 1880s recommended that: 'The boys in public 
and private schools ... be drilled, - not for the purposes of attempting to make 
soldiers out of them, but with the object of teaching them obedience, self-
control and respect for authority' .59 
The distinction drawn here between adopting drill as a mechanism for 
increasing the good order of the school and classroom, and the 'self-control' 
of the population, and the development and training of military forces is an 
extremely important one. In contrast to the enthusiasm for drill amongst 
educational authorities, military commanders stressed its limited role in 
producing efficient soldiers, either in the Permanent or Volunteer forces. This 
was in large part because military authorities were concerned to draw 
attention to the need for camps and focussed periods of training rather than 
measuring the efficiency of local forces against attendance at drills. In the 
absence of these concentrated periods of training, though drill remained an 
important component of military training, its role in producing well-trained 
soldiers, especially through improving the collective capacity of the unit, was 
seen as limited. 
57Nautical School Ship "Vernon1' Annual Report, New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and 
Proceedings, 1879-80, vol. 2, p. 1. 
58Nautical School Ship "Vernon" Annual Report, New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and 
Proceedings, 1881, vol. 41 p. 1. 
59Military Defences Inquiry Commission, New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and 
Proceedings, 1881, vol. 4, Evidence, p.123. 
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A consistent theme of military inspection reports from the 1880s onwards 
stresses the importance of bringing men together to train collectively in 
camps of instruction and exercise. Witnesses to the Military Defences Inquiry 
Commission of 1881 commented that 'fourteen consecutive days should be 
the least amount of training, in short terms, these terms being consecutive, as 
opposed to detached drills', for 'An inf an try man ought to be made a good 
soldier in from nine months to a year. I do not mean only the actual 
knowledge of drill, but the hundred-and-one things that a man picks up by 
being daily under discipline, accustomed to do what he is told, to exercise 
judgement, and at times to be self-dependent'. 60 To be effective, drill must be 
attached to, and reinforced by periods of more intensive training: 
The period of continuous training has especially proved of material 
advantage in facilitating the acquirement of habits of good order, 
regularity and discipline, in affording an opportunity for the practice 
of interior economy, and in bringing the various ranks into real 
military association with each other. This training is assuredly the 
backbone of the system, and should, if possible, be of longer 
duration; yet, when combined with the almost fortnightly trainings 
on half-days, it is, I am inclined to think, as much time as the men can 
be reasonably expected to sacrifice. That the training should be thus 
distributed over the year, instead of confined to one period .. .! look 
upon as of service in keeping up a military spirit as well as 
proficiency in drill. 61 
In tracing the relationship between government and the military, we can see 
how drill might have become a useful auxiliary in the government of the 
school, as a way of developing the physical skills of the children and of 
ordering their behaviour outside the classroom, while in the same period its 
value in the government of the military was increasingly proscribed. 
To an increasing degree, the training of the rank and file of the army tended 
towards enhancing the capacities of the individual soldier. We saw from the 
previous chapters that many of the reforms of the nineteenth century British 
60Military Defences Inquiry Commission, Evidence, pp. 87, 74. 
61Military Defences Inquiry Commission, Schedule A, p. 33. 
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Army during this period, which set the standard against which Australian 
defence forces were judged, at least until after the First World War, were 
centred on the objects of improvements in the 'interior economy' of the 
regiment, improvements in the conduct of large scale exercises, and the 
reform of the officer corps. All of these ref arms were predicated on the 
importance of having the men 'daily under discipline' and enhancing and 
intensifying the collective life of the army. The 'interior economy' of the 
regiment referred to the growing number of aspects of the good management 
of the men of the regiment, focussed around life in the regimental barracks: 
the keeping of accounts, the daily routines of meals, parades, sentry duties 
and 'well-structured and improving' recreational periods. Annual training 
camps were considered to be vital to achieving the necessary familiarity of 
the men to operating in large formations; these camps were also important for 
the training of officers, who frequently lacked experience~ commanding 
large bodies of men and maintaining discipline in times of crowding and 
stress62 • Reforms of the officer corps also included the greater emphasis on 
the importance and centrality of the regiment, increasingly uniting the 
interests of the officer with the interests of his men within the context of 
regimental life. 
Thus within this reformatory framework, in which the object is to increase the 
capacities of the individual soldier and together the output of the military, the 
emphasis was on the beneficial effects of an immersion in 'military life' - a 
term which was itself increasingly amenable to measurement and 
improvement. In this context, attendance at drills was used as a standard 
measure of efficiency from the mid-1860s. However, it operated as a 
minimum requirement; alone it produced forces capable of operating as an 
auxiliary to the paid volunteer forces, producing rifle companies which were 
62These annual camps were all the more desirable for being so infrequently held. See Hew 
Strachan, From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army, 1815-1854, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 108. 
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considered desirable as much for their social as their military contribution; in 
South Australia: 
The force is very popular, and .. .is tending to a very great extent to 
develop a martial spirit of defence, not offence, throughout the whole 
of the Colony. Where men had nothing on earth to do in their leisure 
hours but frequent public-houses they now take their rifle to the 
practice ground. However popular this force may become it should never be 
considered otherwise than as an auxiliary to the paid volunteer force, who 
from their better opportunities of training, from their being associated 
together in larger numbers, and from their alzvays being under the eye of the 
Commandant and experienced officers, anszver the purpose of the regular 
force of the Colony. 63 
The 'auxiliary' status of the part-time forces was not a reflection of their 
enthusiasm, or their social composition. It was determined by these forces' 
capacity to demonstrate efficiency against a range of governmental norms 
which had become increasingly important to the reformation of the 
permanent forces, particularly in Britain, during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
While these reforms highlighted the importance of immersion in an 
increasingly distinct military 'style of life' or military habitus, and the 
importance of continuous, measurable training within that habitus, there was 
a significant change in official thinking about the government of the military, 
particularly after the First World War, which served to obscure these 
enduring features of military life and their importance. Military populations 
come to be seen less as a particular world with distinct practices, and more as 
a temporary aggregation of individuals who could be quickly trained to meet 
the necessities of war. There were several factors which motivated this 
change in thinking about defence forces. One of these was the re-emergence 
of a common political fantasy about the political and social benefits of citizen 
participation in defence, which we will discuss further in the following 
chapter. Another was the widely criticised performance of the British Army 
during the Boer War. The Royal Commission established to examine the 
63Military Defences Inquiry Commission, Evidence, p. 77. Emphasis in original. 
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failures of the British forces criticised the incompetence of a military caste 
system in which the military officers were adept at a military lifestyle but had 
no technical knowledge of warfare. Furthermore, the success of the 
volunteers who joined the Australian Imperial Forces at the beginning of the 
First World War seemed to undermine the importance of military forces 
themselves developing the character and abilities of soldiers and officers, and 
as a corollary, reduced the importance attached to training as a vital 
component of creating efficient forces. The final factor in the shift away from 
nurturing a 'professional' military service with adequate opportunities for 
training was the impossibility of meeting the considerable costs associated 
with maintaining a large permanent defence force. 
Thus, until the end of the Second World War, Australian military forces were 
organised and trained on the basis of a small cadre of per~anent forces 
within the largely part-time Citizen Military Force (CMF).64 These part-time 
forces were made up in part by men undertaking compulsory military 
service, which was introduced in 1911 and repealed in 192965 • Because the 
CMF consisted largely of part-time soldiers, the crucial role of the cadre of 
regular officers within it was largely overlooked. As the then Inspector-
General of the Australian Military Forces, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry 
Chauvel wrote in 1921: 
because of the fact that our citizen army did so extraordinarily well 
during the late war, there is a tendency on the part of the Australian 
Public to discount the value of the professional soldier, and to doubt 
whether he is necessary at all ... people do not realise that the 
framework of the army ... had been gradually built up for years before 
the war by the effort of a small body of professional soldiers66 
Not only was the role of the regulars in the CMF underplayed, the extent to 
which even this small group could be adequately trained to provide the basis 
64Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 138; S.F. Rowell, Full Circle, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1974, p . 185. 
65Thomas W. Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, n.p.: Alternative Publishing Cooperative, 1980; 
Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp. 126-127. 
66Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Papers, 1920-21, vol. 4, p. 17. 
I 
I 
I 
,flt 
: 
i 
116 
for an expansion in war-time was limited. This was particularly the case 
where funding cuts had forced a dramatic reduction in the size of the C11F 
from 1922, and annual training camps were all but abandoned. This was all 
the more concerning for military authorities, who argued that the 
developments in weaponry, the greater use of air attacks, artillery and tanks 
'are extending the scope of military training to an almost unprecedented 
degree, and are making ever more difficult in war the tasks of commander, 
staffs and regimental leaders'. 67 The emphasis on a cadet scheme for boys 
and young men, together with the retention of a very small cadre of regular 
officers, meant that the opportunities for officers of all ranks to train large 
bodies of experienced men and develop the skills necessary for command 
were few. The prevailing assumption was that individually trained soldiers 
would quickly and easily group to make the larger formations necessary to 
fight another war, with only a minimum of structure and l}ierarchy necessary 
to form a fighting unit. In the face of such a 'modular' approach to the 
formation of military forces, the contribution made by regular personnel was 
underplayed, and the concern with having the individual well-entrenched 
into the particular habitus of the military had largely disappeared. 
After the Second World War, the numbers of regular, permanent members of 
the Navy, Army and Air Force was to increase substantially over the previous 
peacetime establishments. As Jeffrey Grey notes, 'in contrast to all previous 
practice, the Citizen Military Forces were to exist for the benefit of, and to 
supplement, the regulars and not the other way round'. 68 However, this 
greater emphasis on the importance of the regular army would take time to 
have its effects, since 'the Army now had to handle a sizeable regular force 
with few of the things associated with the existence of a 'standing army', such 
as adequate barrack accommodation and a reasonable supply of married 
quarters'. 69 Moreover, a further period of National Service was introduced in 
67Report of the Inspector-General, 31 May 1926, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1926-28, vol. 
2, p. 167. 
68Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 196. 
69Rowell, p. 185. 
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1951 to supplement the regular military forces and the Citizen Military 
Forces; the greater number of regular officers and men, and the relatively 
recent wartime experience of the members of the C:rvIF meant that National 
Servicemen were able to be given better training and to be led by more 
experienced officers, but 'the war in Korea and the introduction of National 
Service stretched the resources of the Regular Army to the limit.70 National 
Service was suspended in 1959, and reintroduced as a selective ballot in 1964 
in anticipation of Australia's involvement in Vietnam. Politically the 
reintroduction of conscription was very unpopular, and neither the military 
nor the Department of Labour and National Service supported it. 
Rather than being seen as the principal form of providing defence, 'citizen' 
defence forces were now assessed in terms of their likely impact on the 
performance of regular forces. However, unlike previous forms of 
conscription in which men were conscripted to serve only as adjuncts to the 
regular army or as part of the part-time C:rvIF, those conscripted between 1964 
and 1972 served with regular army units and were treated as regular soldiers, 
including being sent overseas to fight in South Vietnam. In this most recent 
instance of augmenting Australia's military forces, the goal was to produce 
additional full-time forces. By 1974, the 'auxiliary' status of other than fully 
trained, full-time forces was again reiterated and taken as the basis of future 
military manpower planning, acknowledging that however dedicated, citizen 
military forces as they were then called, were unable to meet the same levels 
of training, familiarity with military practices and equipment as regular 
forces. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the terms under which military forces in Australia 
came to be seen as no longer appropriate to the general government of 
Colonial Australia. In tum, the separation of the defence forces from their 
70Rowell, p. 184. 
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role in maintaining order in the early nineteenth century provided the 
impetus, as it did in Britain, for changes to the internal government of these 
military forces. While this began on a very small scale in Australia from the 
1850s onwards, these changes worked, over time, to establish the measures of 
an effective defence force which, contrary to the continuing enthusiasm for 
militia like forces, favoured the development and maintenance of a 
permanent, paid defence force. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, any appeal to a return to the 'golden 
past' in which the Australian community was at one with its defence forces 
needs to take account not only of the difficulty of identifying such a 
community history, but also of the ways in which a series of governmental 
reforms have made community based defence, the greater use of reserves and 
part-time forces measurably utopian. 
11.ll 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Cultural separation or convergence? 
Establishing the relationship between the Defence Force and the 
community 
Introduction 
In this chapter and the chapter that follows, we will look at two 
contemporary efforts to shape the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This 
chapter examines a recent report which has sought to revive a long-standing 
political debate about the relationship between defence forces and the society 
of which they are a part. This report, entitled The Defence Force and the 
Community: A partnership in Australia's defence, argues that greater 
participation by 'the community' in the defence forces will achieve two 
things: one is that it will make the community more closely associated with 
the defence forces and interested in defence questions; the second is that it 
will diminish the 'cultural separation' of the defence forces from the rest of 
the community. 
The report echoes a long history of debates about the political implications of 
a standing army versus militias in Britain. These debates were particularly 
prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and questions of the 
provision of defence forces were an important part of the debates of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, both in terms of the need for citizens to take an active 
part in defence and to avoid the political implications of a separate caste 
being in charge of military force. Since this time, as one historian of the 
'standing army controversy' puts it, the anti-army tracts have contributed to 
an antimilitary attitude which 'became an intellectual tradition, which in 
modified form still exists'. 
1 
1 
Lois G. Schwoerer, 'The Literature of the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1699' , The 
Huntington Library Quarterly, vol. XXVIII, no. 3, May 1965, pp. 187-21, p. 188. 
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The standing army controversy has always been part of the political 
negotiation over the provision of defence forces, in Britain and Australia, 
forming a sort of 'principled backdrop' to the everyday governmental 
concerns which we have set out in the previous three chapters. The legacy of 
this intellectual tradition about the provision of defence forces can be seen in 
The Defence Force and the Community, which we will consider in the light of the 
history of military forces that we have developed in the last three chapters. 
This history suggests to us that the expectation of the report that it can both 
increase the 'community' responsibility for defence, and that it can effect a 
'cultural convergence' between the military and the rest of society is 
unrealistic. This is because it fails to take account of the practical problems 
associated with the formation of the military, both officers and other ranks, 
and the way in which professionalisation has in fact served as an important 
means of effecting the most efficient provision of defence, at the same time as 
displacing most of the concerns about standing armies held by the early pro-
militia supporters. 
In 1990 the then Minister of Defence instigated a 'review of civil-military 
relationships'. The Terms of Reference of this review stated that it was to 
'explore how the Australian community could play a greater role in 
strengthening Australia's security and how more weight could be given to 
the Government's policy of eliminating unnecessary duplication of civil and 
2 
military skills and capabilities'. In its report, the review proposes the 
introduction of what it called a 'Total Force', which has as its centrepiece a 
much expanded reserve or part-time military force. In order to achieve a total 
force, the review argues for a 32% reduction in full-time, regular military 
personnel, a 92% increase in part-time, reserve personnel, and a 43% 
reduction in the number of defence civilians. These changes are intended to 
allow for the proportion of military personnel in 'combat' and 'combat-
2 
Report to the Minister for Defence, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in 
Australia's Defence, (hereafter The Defence Force and the Community), Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1990, p. 539. 
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related' positions to rise from about 46% to 60%, and for the part-time forces, 
to be called a militia, to play a more significant role in the provision of 
defence. The intention was to reduce the number of service personnel 
engaged in predominantly 'civilian' activities, transferring these roles to 
civilian contractors, to free up regular and militia personnel to take up 
3 
combat and combat related positions. The review sets out in considerable 
detail the changed force mixes that it proposes. It also focuses in on what it 
argues is the central stumbling block to bringing about the changes that it 
proposes. 'the root of the whole issue of community involvement in defence 
[is] the self-absorption that has led the defence specialists to forget their 
obligation to explain to the community what they are about, and do it well 
4 
enough to catch the community's interest'. 
The review is centrally focussed on the 'culture' of the ADP, and the way in 
which the professional military forces have become isolated from and out of 
touch with the rest of the society. It is this culture that is the most serious 
impediment to greater civilian involvement in the provision of defence, and 
this culture which must change, because' Australia cannot allow the ADP, 
even if its own inclinations lead it that way, to become concerned more with 
internal cohesion and unique military values than with the health of the roots 
5 
that bind it to and support it from the community'. In the report's view, the 
resulting military culture is the expression or reflection of these unique 
military values, which are out of touch with, and unappealing to, potential 
recruits. 
Greater civilian involvement in Defence becomes elevated to a matter of 
political and social significance. The review states that 'there are important 
societal reasons, relating to the relationship between Australia's military 
institution and the community, for favouring initiatives which strengthen the 
3 
The Defence Force and the Community, chapters 4 and 5. 
4 
The Defence Force and the Community, pp xi-xii. 
5 
The Defence Force and the Community, p 317. 
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interdependence of the defence force and the community and encourage 
6 
convergence of cultural values'. This interdependence is necessary to redress 
the balance between th~ military and its host community which the review 
argues has become unbalanced; on the one hand, the society is weakened by 
its failure to take a greater role in deciding on defence issues and 
participating in military service, and on the other hand, the professional 
military forces have become too dominant by being left to pursue their own 
course for too long. Among the most important of the initiatives proposed by 
the review to address this imbalance is an increase in the number of people 
making a 'part-time' commitment to the ADF through the reserve forces, and 
their greater integration with regular forces. This militia will act as 'an 
7 important bridge between the military and wider society'. 
'Statesmen and Warriors': the advantages of militias 
In its focus on the political and social implications of a defence force which is 
'removed' from the society it is to serve, the review is echoing a long tradition 
of concern about the effects of a professional army on the nation as a whole' s 
capacity for and interest in matters of defence. This concern was a key 
consideration of debates about the provision of defence forces in England, 
and later Great Britain, particularly from the late seventeenth century through 
to the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout this period, highlighted by 
the 'Standing Army Controversy' of the late seventeenth century, political 
theorists argued over the merits of militias and standing armies in terms of 
their contribution to the maintenance of political liberty and as an issue of 
8 
national character. At this time, the questions of how to provide for defence, 
and protect against this military force being used as a political tool, were 
6 
The Defence Force and the Community, pp. 508-509. 
7 
The Defence Force and the Community, p 509. 
8 
See Schwoerer, pp. 187-212; Richard Sher,' Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the Problem 
of National Defense', Journal of Modern History, vol. 61, June 1989, pp. 240-268; and J.R. 
Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: the story of a political issue 1660-1802, 
London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1965. 
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formulated in the light of the revolutionary events of the seventeenth century, 
and with a view to the cost of maintaining standing armies in peacetime. 
For the supporters of militia forces, the arguments they advanced were 
largely based on reviving an idealised model of society in which land-holders 
would give time to military preparations in order to defend their property 
9 
and the form of government that upheld their way of life. The aristocracy 
and gentry, and even the landed middle classes would themselves benefit 
from being required to take responsibility for defence, both because it was a 
manly, responsible thing to do, and because it would reduce the tax burden 
of a standing army (though raising, arming and training a militia unit could 
be expensive). A standing army in the service of the Crown, argued writers 
like Trenchard and Fletcher, could be shown by historical example to lead 
'from monarchies to tyrannies', especially where defence w~as provided by 
10 mercenary forces who would only do the King's bidding. In his highly 
influential tract on the effects of standing armies, Fletcher argued for a return 
to the 'antient' and 'gothick' ordering of society which would both ensure the 
proper balance between the executive and the freeholder, and provide for 
national defence. He argued that this balance had been displaced since about 
1500, when Europe sank into 'an abyss of pleasures', which 'brought a total 
alteration in the way of living, upon which all Government depends ... Men 
imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal 
11 
and military ways of living'. In Fletcher's history, mercenary forces were 
hired instead of using vassals, and this led in turn to members of the 
aristocracy leading these mercenary forces while sitting in Parliament, where 
they could vote funds for the army's maintenance and so perpetuate warfare. 
Fletcher concluded that this 'professionalisation of warfare', in which the 
morally corrupt and weak landholders allowed others to provide for their 
9 
Western, p. 440. 
10 
Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse concerning Militias and Standing Armies, London, 1697, p. 6. 
11 
Fletcher, Discourse concerning Militias, p. 9 
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defence introduced instability, for 'what real security can be had against a 
standing army of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of a nation' .
12 
This particular view of the proper balance of interests became even more 
closely focussed on the moral implications of maintaining militia forces 
during the eighteenth century. On the one hand, the relationship between the 
Parliament and the Crown forged during the seventeenth century, in the Bill 
of Rights and the Mutiny Act of 1689, made the consent of Parliament 
necessary to the raising and maintenance of standing armies in peacetime. 
This had proved to be an enduring limitation on any aspirations of the Crown 
to amass military forces. On the other hand, the heavy demands of warfare in 
the eighteenth century, in which the army needed up to a hundred thousand 
men with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and tactics, led to the view 
that militias could never do more than support a standing army. As Sher 
notes, there was a shift in emphasis from 'an anti-army to a pro-militia 
13 
position'. Rather than argue that militias could fully replace standing 
armies, militia supporters advocated them for home defence, and addressed 
themselves to the debilitating effects on the leading families of the country 
who no longer took an interest in matters of defence. At the end of the 
seventeenth century Fletcher had warned against the dangers of 'Men of 
Quality and Estates having power to send any wretched Servant in their 
place', for these men became 'abject and timorous, by being disused to handle 
14 
arms'. In the mid-eighteenth century, at the end of the Seven Years' War, 
Adam Ferguson would argue in the face of the arguments then developing 
about the advantages of a division of labour, that there needed to be a 
delicate balance between the pursuit of wealth and the responsibility for 
defence, 'because the abilitys of the Statesman & those of the Warrior are 
12 
Fletcher, Discourse concerning Militias, p. 14. 
13 
Sher, p. 243. 
14 
Fletcher, Discourse concerning Militias, pp. 25-26. This theme continued to appear in 
subsequent discussions of the militia. See Western, p. 216. 
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intimately connected. When they are separated the Statesman becomes a 
15 Clerk ... and the soldier a mere Gladiator or executioner'. 
It is this formulation of the militia (and in some variations a citizen-based 
army), as a moral leavening against the tendency of states to prefer the 
service of professional military forces, that has persisted. In the early 
twentieth century debates on the establishment of military forces in the newly 
formed Commonwealth of Australia, the virtues of relying on a militia for the 
provision of the bulk of the defence forces was widely accepted. In his 
Report of an Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of 
Australia in early 1914, Sir Ian Hamilton noted that 'The Commonwealth has 
definitely adopted the militia principle as a means of raising its military 
16 
forces'. The citizen force was to be administered and trained by a small 
cadre of regular officers, with the 'militia principle' implying 'the 
abandonment of all idea of maintaining permanent troops, save in so far as 
they may be considered an indispensable adjunct to the Militia'. 
17 
The benefits of a citizen military force were regularly outlined in 
parliamentary debates in the years leading up to the introduction of 
compulsory military training in 1911. The Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin 
spoke in 1907 of the way in which the Australian military forces 'being a 
18 citizen soldiery, should appeal to our people as no other can' . Not only was 
a citizen force considered to be less expensive than a regular army, but it was 
motivated by patriotism, and did not become separate from the society from 
which it sprang. In these arguments, a citizen military force is better than a 
permanent, professional military force. For Deakin, a citizen force relies 
upon patriotic feeling: 'Our ideal is a defence of the people for the people and 
15 
Adam Ferguson, from a lecture delivered at Edinburgh University, April 9, 1776, quoted in 
Sher, p. 253. 
16 
'Report of an Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia by 
General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O.' (hereafter 'Report of an Inspection ... 1914), 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1914, Vol. 2, p. 7. 
17 
'Report of an Inspection ... 1914', p. 7. 
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19 
by the people'. Citizen soldiers do not pose the same political risk of 
forming a group with particular interests to pursue, nor do they need the 
reward of ceremony or caste privileges, and nor do they regard their military 
service as a form of sinecure. 
In the late twentieth century in Australia, when as we have seen from 
previous chapters, the militia has become an adjunct to the permanent 
military force rather than the other way around, the benefits of militia forces 
are argued principally in terms of their leavening effect upon the 'separate 
caste of warriors'. For The Defence Force and the Community, the arguments it 
sets out for the reinvigoration of part-time militia forces are firmly focussed 
on the moral implications of the provision of defence forces. The militia will 
act as a 'bridge' between the community and the permanent military forces to 
ensure both that the community takes its responsibilities fof defence seriously 
and that the ADF does not become too inward-looking and out-of-touch with 
the society it serves. 
Like the seventeenth and eighteenth century militia supporters, the review 
sets out an historical explanation for the demise of citizen interest and 
involvement in defence, designed to illustrate the quote from Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau which the review uses to showcase its argument: 
As soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the 
citizens, and they would rather serve with their money than with 
their persons, the State is not far from its fall. When it is necessary to 
march out to war, they pay troops and stay at home ... By reasons of 
idleness and money, they end by having soldiers to enslave their 
:?.O 
country and representatives to sell it. 
The review discusses the history of the formation of military forces in 
Australia, focussing in particular on the 'attitudes' of Australians to service in 
the army. It notes the referenda over conscription for active service overseas 
during the First World War, in which conscription was defeated on two 
19 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 13 December 1907, p. 7535-7536. 
20 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, quoted in The Defence Force and the Community, 
p. 4. 
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occasions 'despite substantial popular support for the war', and the 
subsequent 'traumatic divisions in Australian society' engendered by the use 
of conscripts in Vietnam. The review also points to the long periods of 
compulsory military service training throughout the twentieth century and 
notes the 'distaste for conscription for military service abroad has coexisted 
with popular acceptance for compulsory military service training in 
peacetime', which was only suspended because 'the government of the day 
became persuaded it was not cost-effective in relation to the perceived needs 
of the time', and that 'The Army, a reluctant participant, saw the training of 
conscripts as a drain on resources it preferred to use in polishing its 
21 
professional skills'. 
In this history as presented by the review, a fledgling militia spirit has been 
undermined by a combination of the inappropriate use of militia forces in 
conflicts which were not about the direct defence of Australia and the 
'highjacking' of the military debate by the professional military, which had a 
'preference' for using resources for its own development. There are thus two 
solutions to the militia 'crisis' that the review identifies, and they concentrate 
on altering the 'attitudinal problem' associated with the demise of the militia. 
The first is to engage in a public education campaign to improve the 
community's understanding of defence issues and the current basis for 
defence planning, which is focussed on the defence of Australia. The second 
is to have the professional military forces give up their stranglehold on 
defence matters and seek greater involvement from the community. Together 
these two approaches are intended to lead to the greater participation of the 
community in the militia, for the review is of the opinion that 'a better 
informed community ... would be persuaded that more active community 
participation in defence was desirable in the interests of a more secure 
,,,, 
Australia'. -- The review marshals evidence from opinion polling to 
demonstrate both the limited understanding of defence issues among those 
21 
The Defence Force and the Community, p. 5. 
22 
The Defence Force and the Community, p. 8. 
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polled, and the limited interest in the defence forces. The review questions 
whether a general level of community apathy is an 'inevitable part of 
parliamentary democracy', and argues for the importance of changing the 
extent to which people are informed about defence matters, for it sees this as 
a crucial step in achieving a more integrated defence force in which a militia 
plays a significant part. Placing great emphasis on the governmental benefits 
of an informed community, the review states that the objective should be to 
'achieve a level of community understanding that provides the nation with a 
23 
better basis for its future protection'. 
The review is presented here with a characteristic problem, that it shares with 
those who advocated militias in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 
how to generate this 'interest' in defence matters and translate it into effective 
participation in defence? Adam Ferguson recognised that 'a militia 
established by "compulsory statute" might "leave an impression of servitude 
and consequently some degree of repugnance'", and he piously hoped, like 
other writers at the time who emphasised the need to rekindle the spirit of 
civic virtue, that 'there are many well informed liberal & high minded in the 
upper Ranks who will be pleased to set an Example, of so much advantage to 
24 
their Country' . As we have noted, the review argues for an improved public 
information campaign which would better explain Australia's strategic 
posture and the main aspects of a defence strategy, which incorporates a 
significant role for a militia force. Thus a better informed community would 
be more inclined to consider defence issues, and to consider participation in 
the defence forces themselves. 
But the difficulty for the pro-militia position, as it expressed in this review, 
and in the seventeenth and eighteenth century tracts, is that beyond 
encouraging the idea of participation, the review has few means at its disposal 
for guaranteeing that a specified number of people will come forward for 
23 
The Defence Force and the Community, p. 22, emphasis added. 
24 
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part-time service. There are the suggestions which are aimed at making 
participation easier, such as legislative changes governing the activation of 
militia forces in time of conflict and encouraging better support by employers 
for employees who are in the militia. The review is also supportive of the 
school cadet schemes which have operated in Australia for the past hundred 
years, as they appear to be a good source of personnel for both regular and 
25 
reserve forces. In its support the review suggested that cadets would form 
'part of the overall community awareness processes ... [the review] believes 
26 form an essential foundation for a successful militia'. This is reminiscent of 
the proposals by Ferguson who in 1802 argued that: 
I agree with the Persians of old who are said to have taught all their 
Children to shoot the Bow as well as to speak Truth. In these indeed 
there was no matter for separate Professions, any more than, in our 
case, there is reason to withhold the Powers of Defence from any one 
who has a Country to defend ... Military & Practical schools [should be 
attached to every university, thus] letters might accompany practice 
& the Library Student be kept in mind of his Manhood & the common 
cause of His King and his Country which may at some interesting 
27 
time require his exertions. 
Given the review's antagonism to the 'caste mentality' of the military 
professional, its support for cadets is curious since cadet units tend to focus to 
a considerable extent on inculcating the traditions and 'esprit de corps' of 
their parent services (and are to be distinguished from drill in schools, which, 
as we have seen in chapter three, was intended to assist the good government 
of the school, as well as improve the physical fitness of the students, rather 
than to develop a military capacity as such). Like most militia supporters, the 
review sets the militia up largely as an antidote to the professional military, 
and in particular sees the militia operating effectively without the 'cultural' 
baggage of military life. Indeed the review argues that many potential part-
25 
The Defence Force and the Community, pp. 355-358. 
26 
The Defence Force and the Community, p. 357. 
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time militia personnel are 'often turned off by the ADF's emphasis on 
28 
customs, traditions and symbols'. 
This antagonism to the 'lifestyle' of the military professional is a long-
standing aspect of support for militia forces, and the review's concern to have 
the regular forces take a less dominant role echoes this. As we see from the 
remarks of Ferguson above, one element of the pro-militia position is to argue 
that defence is not an area that needs a separate profession; those who have 
become professional soldiers have had to shore up their position by erecting 
an elaborate culture. 
In early twentieth century Australia, when the newly formed Commonwealth 
was considering its future defence forces, this juxtaposition between the 
spare, focussed militia and the extravagant professional military forces was 
frequently expressed. In setting out the estimates for expenditure on Defence 
in 1907 Deakin emphasised the distinction between the citizen soldier and a 
professional military force, arguing that 
What we must and do trust to are not titles and rewards, but 
voluntary service given freely ... Ours being a citizen soldiery should 
appeal to our people as no other can. We cast aside meretricious 
display, the glitter of gold lace, or the glamour of a separate caste. 
We replace them by a high response [sic] of confidence in the man 
who is doing his duty when guarding his home as much as when 
bread winning for his family or fathering his children. It is on 
patriotic feeling that we rely; without this it would be idle to propose 
a citizen soldiery; otherwise we would have to buy our defence. 
29 
In part the arguments in favour of a 'spartan' militia service are economic 
ones, for as Deakin noted, the costs of arming and maintaining a military 
force in Australia would be 'crushing' unless a more simplified and largely 
volunteer force was developed. This theme was further pursued by Sir Ian 
Hamilton in his 1914 report on the military forces of the Commonwealth, 
where he elaborated on the implications of Australia's decision to 'adopt the 
28 
The Defence Force and the Community, p. 31. 
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militia principle', in particular emphasising the differences between militias 
and regular armies. For the most part, this meant that the Australian military 
forces should operate with as few of the 'peace traditions' of regular military 
forces as possible, and rely to a much greater extent on the national 
infrastructure to provide the support and technical expertise which would 
30 normally be organic to regular military forces. Further, one of the main 
ways in which Australia was intending to be both effective and economical 
was to begin the training of citizen forces while they were still young. Cadet 
training of young men for a number of years would enable the 'raising of 
powerful armies for home defence with a minimum tax on the priceless time 
31 
of the adult male worker'. 
While the adoption of militia forces in Australia was partly for economic 
considerations, as we can see from Deakin' s remarks, the advocacy of militia 
forces is also partly a broader, political argument. For the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century militia supporters, the issue of the provision of defence 
forces is linked to questions of, on the one hand, the protection of the liberties 
of individuals within the society against the encroachments of the State, and 
on the other hand with the responsibilities of individual citizens to contribute 
to a collective responsibility for defence. Standing armies in the service of the 
Crown were regarded as a considerable danger to individual liberties, and an 
efficient militia was an effective argument against the need for a standing 
army, at least for home defence. Militias were also an embodiment of civic 
responsibility and a vehicle for inculcating such civic-mindedness amongst 
the population. While, as Western asserts, the arguments of the militia 
supporters involved a kind of republicanism based on a backward-looking 
yearning for a previous supposed golden age, the issue of defence, its cost as 
well as its impact upon the liberties of members of society, formed an integral 
part of the early liberal conception of modern society and its government. 
30 
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As we have noted above and elsewhere, aspects of this liberal conception 
pose certain difficulties for thinking about the provision of defence forces. 
For the militia supporters of the eighteenth century, as well as for our 
contemporary review of the Australian community's involvement with the 
ADF, the expectation that individuals within the community will be 
motivated by a sense of civic responsibility to contribute to the defence effort, 
and that this sense of responsibility itself will contribute to the efficiency of 
the military force, is asserted with difficulty. The idealisation of society and 
the capacities of its members in the pro-militia positions we have outlined can 
only be sustained by placing an insupportable burden upon the civic-
mindedness of citizens, and by rejecting the professional military force as an 
unnecessary expense of government. As we shall see, this is a kind of 
theoretical liberal position which is only partly supported by other liberal 
writers like Adam Smith whose articulation of liberalism as a mode of 
government focuses precisely on the difficulty of generating 'soldier like' 
citizens. His insistence on the need for a professional military force for 
efficiency and disciplinary reasons indicates the more 'pragmatic' attempt to 
implement a liberal rationality of government. This pragmatism would 
acknowledge that professional military forces are a crucial part of the 
achievement of a defence force which is not a threat to liberty, so long, of 
course, as 'the sovereign himself is the general, and the principal nobility and 
gentry of the country the chief officers of the army'. 
33 
We have seen in the previous three chapters that the ways in which British 
and Australian military forces have been transformed are the result of 
contingent actions on the part of government attempting to develop a stable, 
commentary beyond defence issues. Certainly, according to Colin Gordon, both Adam 
Ferguson and Adam Smith, of whom we shall speak below, were engaged in elaborating a 
concept of civil society, and the role of government in relation to civil society, which was 
critical to the development of liberal thought. See Colin Gordon, 'Governmental rationality: 
an introduction', in Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies 
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self-regulatory and accountable profession. The transformation of the 
regiment, for example, into the locus of training, promotion, welfare 
provision and sentiment that it now is, is an attestation to the success of this 
governmental campaign, particularly over the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. This 'campaign' - a term which suggests 
more coordination than existed at the time -was necessary in the face of the 
sorts of inefficiencies found in the traditional, and militia-like arrangements 
for defence inherited from the eighteenth century. The 'professionalisation' 
of the military forces was consistent with a liberalism that sought to achieve 
certain governmental effects, that had to try and 'make practical' the 
aspirations for limited government. As a number of writers following 
Foucault have remarked, a liberal rationality of government is quite active in 
promoting and enhancing structures within the society which will allow 
individuals and society as a whole to 'govern themselves'. :As Graham 
Burchell expresses it: 'Liberal principles for rationalising the exercise of 
political power outline a framework for a possible art of government which 
depends upon and facilitates a proliferation of techniques for the disciplinary 
integration of individuals at critical points in the social order'. 
34 
The defence forces that developed during the nineteenth century in Britain, 
and which were subsequently adapted to Australian requirements, were the 
vehicles for achieving this 'disciplinary integration'. One of the first, and 
most enduring steps in this process, as we have seen, was the establishment 
of barracks as the paradigmatic form of housing troops. Barracks enabled the 
further development of a vast range of techniques for disciplining large 
bodies of men as well as for encouraging their individual improverr1ent. We 
have also traced the development of the officer corps into a 'profession' which 
was gradually able to take on the role of training and developing its 
members, in part by building on to an already existing range of techniques 
associated with the inculcation and enhancement of gentlemanly conduct. 
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For this reason, the extent to which these military forces developed into a 
distinct 'caste' with particular values is a reflection in part of a range of 
governmental imperatives introduced where 'society' and the 'community' 
failed. The inevitability of this process, and the lines of its development, has 
been an important part of the argument of the defenders of standing armies, 
from the seventeenth century onwards. 
'Ill officers and ill management': the defects of militias 
For those who defended the standing army in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the concern for liberty was soon put to rest. In his pamphlet 
entitled An Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army, with Consent of Parliament, 
is not Inconsistent with a Free Government, Daniel Defoe argued against the pro-
militia writers' use of history to justify a return to a golden~-age by reminding 
his readers of recent parliamentary history, and the greater liberties that came 
with the establishment of a properly constituted Parliament with control over 
such matters as the provision of defence forces. With the formation of 
Parliament the common people were saved from both the despotism of the 
prince and of the lesser princes or Barons: 
the People obtained privileges of their own, and obliged the King and 
the Barons to accept of an Equilibrium; this we call Parliament. .. and I 
appeal to all men to judge if this Ballance be not a much nobler 
constitution in all its points, than the old Gothick model of 
Government ... [which] was but exchanging one Tyrant for Three 
Hundred, for so many the Barons of England were accounted at 
35 
least. 
It was the burden of providing for defence that had the potential to infringe 
upon peoples' liberties, as Ferguson had noted. Adam Smith took this 
argument further, suggesting that the only way to guarantee an efficient 
militia was through continuous training, which would have to be forced upon 
the population, who wish to be otherwise busy engaging in more productive 
35 
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and prosperous pursuits. While Smith supported the existence of a 'martial 
spirit' amongst the population as a check upon the army, he noted that 'to 
maintain even in tolerable execution the complex regulations of any modern 
militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government, without 
which they are constantly failing into total neglect .:ind disuse'. 
37 
Those writers who supported a standing army did so because there was 
greater opportunity of controlling and fashioning that force than there was 
with a militia. For Defoe, liberty was at much at risk at the hands of a poorly 
trained militia as it was by the existence of a standing army: 'Even our 
Militia, under a bad Government. .. under ill officers and ill management, [are] 
as dangerous as any Souldery whatever, will be as Insolent, and do the 
38 
Drudgery of a Tyrant as effectually'. In these remarks Defoe points us to the 
two key areas of considerable significance for the contestation over the most 
appropriate means of forming military forces, and the main lines along which 
the professionalism of the regular forces would distinguish them from the 
part-time militia. The first of these concerns the training of military forces, 
and the manner in which training serves to discriminate between permanent 
and part-time forces. The second of these issues centres on the recruitment 
and training of officers. In both cases, we can see the manner in which the 
various ref arms around these two issues in the period covered by this study 
have limited the practical appeal of militia forces by introducing a series of 
measures against which the militia would always be found wanting. 
For Adam Smith, militias would always be inferior to standing armies 
because they lacked the opportunity to become proficient in the profession of 
soldiering, and they did not regularly train together to develop the discipline 
necessary to survive the modern battlefield. In place of the hasty recruitment 
and then release of soldiers to meet the immediate needs of war while 
pandering to the antipathy for standing armies, Smith pointed to the benefits 
36
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of the division of labour for the development of military forces as much as for 
the development of industry. Soldiers needed to train for warfare, and the 
discipline necessary for the modern battlefield could only be secured by 
having men make warfare their 'sole or principal occupation'. Moreover, 
men would only learn to obey orders in the confusion of the battlefield if they 
were well habituated to it during peacetime, by living quartered with each 
other and under the regular direction of their officers. For Smith, discipline, 
or 'the habit of ready obedience', was characteristic of the soldiers of standing 
armies, and was to be distinguished from a proficiency in drill, or 'the 
management and use of its arms' that passed for discipline in the militia. 
39 
This form of habituated discipline, and ready obedience was necessary in the 
confusion and terror of the modern battlefield, and had to be learnt. Such 
discipline was not equivalent to the 'self-discipline' of the militia soldier, who 
was free to pursue his own interests most of the time. 
The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a week or 
once a month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage 
their own affairs their own way, without being in any respect 
accountable to him ... can never have the same disposition to ready 
obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day 
directed by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at 
least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is called 
discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always 
be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in 
what is called the manual exercise, or in the management and use of 
40 
its arms 
These remarks of Smith's are a good summary of the problems that would 
continue to dog the militia throughout the following period. At the end of 
the eighteenth century militia regiments could be made to be reasonably 
proficient, but only when they were able to take advantage of periods of 
41 
training, including spending time in camps. These camps afforded the 
opportunity for concentrated training under the command of regular officers, 
and under these circumstances, militia units could become quite competent in 
39 
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various military exercises. However, these militia forces could only maintain 
these levels of proficiency when embodied and in regular training. When, in 
the nineteenth century militia forces were required to support the over-
stretched regular forces, they generally had to be given a period of training 
42 
with regular forces to be made efficient. 
In Australia, as we have seen, from the nineteenth century onwards, though 
the idea of militia forces was very widely supported, the militia was usually 
found wanting. In the 1880s inspection reports of the colonial military forces 
noted that militia regiments were a good idea for providing a recreational 
diversion for young men in rural areas, but that such militia forces were only 
an 'auxiliary' to the paid forces, largely because the regular forces had better 
opportunities for training, for assembling together and for 'always being 
43 ·-under the eye of the Commandant'. In the twentieth cenfury, when the 
Commonwealth had formally adopted a militia based system of defence, it 
was still acknowledged that training, particularly training in camps, was 
crucial to maintaining efficient forces. In his Memorandum on the Defence of 
Australia in 1910 Field Marshall Viscount Kitchener advised that the training 
periods previously set down for military training should be extended, 
particularly the time spent in camps, arguing that without at least six clear 
days of training in camps each year, the men 'lose the incentive to home 
training, the habit of working in units, of moving and living in numbers, and 
44 
of ready obedience to orders'. In his report of 1914, Sir Ian Hamilton took 
the point further, saying that while the militia forces were very keen to study 
the theory of warfare, and to learn all about what they would do in the field, 
they rarely had the opportunity to practice what they had studied, and 'the 
lack of the ounce of practice begins to betray the lightness of the ton of 
42 
Hew Strachan, Wellington's Legacy: the reform of the British Army 1830-1854, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 210. 
43 
Military Defences Inquiry Commission, New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and 
Proceedings, 1881, vol. 4, Evidence, p. 77. 
44 
'Memorandum on Defence of Australia by Field Marshall Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, 
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.' Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1910, vol. 2, p. 
6. 
138 
45 
theory'. There were certain 'immutable principles' associated with militia 
forces, and these were related to the limited opportunities for training: 
Patriotism, keenness, study and careful instruction, strain and 
struggle upon the heels of practical experience and habits of 
discipline, but rarely quite ,~atch them up. For these, in a regular 
army, are the product of years of continuous service, and until a 
Militia has been called out for service and has been for some time in 
the field, it will always, for this reason, lack self-confidence when 
46 
faced by professional soldiers. 
In addition to the problems of training, the other major impediment to the 
efficiency of militia forces was the recruitment and training of officers. For 
both the pro-militia supporters like Fletcher and Ferguson, and those who 
supported standing armies, like Smith and Defoe, there was the view that the 
quality of officers was crucial to the performance of both the militia and the 
standing army. For Fletcher, officers (and ideally all members of the militia) 
had to be drawn from persons of the 'first Rank', for several reasons. The 
first was that the nobility were the best educated, and thus were best able to 
lead others. The second was that the militia was a potentially very powerful 
force which needed appropriate leadership, since 'Power Naturally follows 
the use of the sword. And the sword therefore should be committed to those 
47 
who are most worthy of power'. The third reason was that the militia 
should be led by men of high rank because of the intimate connection 
between the interests of the nobility and the State. For Ferguson, it is this last 
reason that precludes the advantages of the division of labour extending to 
the provision of defence, for 'the Statesman' must be acquainted with all 
aspects of human affairs, including warfare; where they are separated, the 
statesman becomes a 'clerk' and the soldier a 'mere Gladiator'. 
For Adam Smith, the principle of the division of labour should be extended to 
the military, as we have seen, in order to guarantee the necessary efficiency 
45 
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and discipline on the part of the rank and file. At the same time, Smith 
acknowledged the concerns expressed by the militia supporters about the 
'question of liberty', and argued that 
where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal nobility 
and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army, where the 
military force is placed under the command of those who have the 
greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they 
have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army 
48 
can never be dangerous to liberty 
Defoe too looked to 'Men of Quality' to be officers in the army. Such officers 
would secure the political allegiance of the military and diminish the 
likelihood that such an army would again be a threat to Parliament. But 
while such men might be politically appropriate as officers, Defoe did not 
assume they would make good officers without training. He proposed a 
Royal Academy for Military Exercises, acknowledging that_'Soldiers, 
Horsemen, Engineers, Gunners and the like must be bred and taught; men 
are not born with Muskets on their shoulders, nor fortifications in their 
49 Heads; 'tis not natural to shoot Bombs, and undermine towns'. In his view it 
was only when gentlemen undertook training that they would be able to 
replace the better qualified foreigners on whom the King had come to rely. 
However, setting the aristocracy's involvement as so crucial to both the 
functioning of the standing army and the militia only served to highlight the 
difficulty of reaping the purported benefits of aristocratic officers. The 
embodiment of the militia was the subject of numerous Acts during the 
eighteenth century, most of which served on the one hand to highlight the 
inefficiency of the militia regiments and the lack of enthusiasm for serving in 
them, and on the other hand to increase the bureaucratic control to which 
these regiments would be subjected. Though the idea behind the Militia Acts 
was to encourage gentlemen to participate, the reluctance to compel this class 
of persons meant that the militia was full of substitutes. The Seven Years' 
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War of 1756-63 had meant the permanent embodiment of the militia, under 
the same discipline as the standing army, with the result, said one pamphlet, 
that the militia was 'so very widely differing from what either the friends or 
so. 
the enemies ... [of militias] expected to see' The practical effect of attempting 
to legislate civic virtue was exactly what Andrew Fletcher had complained of 
fifty years earlier - a militia composed of the 'lower ranks' of society, which 
was much like a standing army when a war demanded constant service, but 
was hard to discipline and maintain during peacetime. Attempts by 
Parliament to induce greater involvement by men of property included the 
imposition of fines, but those who could afford to simply paid the fines and 
additional money to locate substitutes. The property qualifications for 
commissions were lowered, with the characteristic effect that, in the 
Cambridgeshire Militia in the late 1770s, for example, of the four subalterns 
in the regiment, one 'was an innkeeper, another a breechesJnaker and the 
51 third said that he would be glad to be a nobleman's butler'. 
In his study of the militia in the eighteenth century, Western argues that a 
central part of the inefficiencies associated with the militia of the eighteenth 
century was due to the officers, who were 'insufficient both in numbers and 
52 
professional competence'. In the eighteenth century, through the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth, when attempts were made to improve the militia it 
was most effective to post regular officers into militia regiments. As Western 
notes, non-commissioned officers and junior officers from the army, were 
able to keep the training and other aspects of the regiments' 'interior 
53 
economy' from falling into disarray. In Australia in 1921, the then Inspector 
of the Commonwealth Forces, cautioned the enthusiasm for the apparent 
success of the Australian citizen forces during the First World War, by noting 
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that the Australian army's efficiency was in large measure due to the eff arts 
of the professional officers who provided staff support and leadership: 
people do not realise that the framework of the army ... had been 
gradually built up for years before the war by the effort of a small 
body of professional soldiers; that all the AIF formations were largely 
(entirely in the first instance) staffed by permanent officers and many 
were commanded by them; and that the officers of the citizen forces 
who attained to great distinction during the war were nearly all cases 
of men who had devoted years of hard work and close study to their 
54 
duties. 
As we have seen in the previous three chapters, the training and discipline of 
the rank and file, and the emergence of a professional officer corps has be ,~n a 
central part of the development of military forces during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As we have suggested earlier, this development was 
consistent with concerns to limit the damaging effects, for the provision of 
defence and for the society more widely, of unruly military-forces. The 
contingent, negotiated manner of this development, and the role of 
government in shaping both the rank and file and the officer corps 
undermines the pro-militia antagonism towards the 'profession' as a brake on 
militia support. In addressing the demand for a stable, self-sufficient and 
cost-efficient means of providing defence forces, the 'professionalisa tion' of 
the military has proved a more attractive proposition for a liberal rationality 
of government than 'the militia principle'. Even in Australia, where a citizen 
based army was adopted for the first forty-odd years after Federation, it 
relied upon the nucleus of a regular military force. With the demand for a 
large number of personnel to continue in full-time service after the end of the 
Second World War it was this nucleus of regular personnel that would grow 
to look upon the militia for its augmentation. In this transition, the 
framework of a professional military force, developed over the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was quickly and easily established, without a 
great deal of modification to take account of Australia's long association with 
citizen-based defence. 
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Achieving the 'convergence of cultural values' 
In this discussion of The Defence Force and the Community I have concentrated 
on the way in which the review argues for the need for a part-time military 
force, or militia, on 'cultural' grounds: on the basis that it will be better both 
for Australian society and for the ADF if, through this militia, there is a 
'convergence of cultural values'. In part, as I have suggested, this argument 
is a modern example of the long standing pro-militia positions that we have 
reviewed above, and their concern for the debilitating effects upon society 
where citizens take no interest in defence matters. From this aspect, the 
growth of professional military forces is the outcome of a weakness on the 
part of the society, because the society has lost its interest in matters of 
defence, and 'become abject and timorous'. In the words of::the review, 'a 
community apathetic or ignorant about defence will not seek or even 
55 welcome involvement in defence matters'. It is this apathy or weakness that 
threatens the political liberty of the society. 'The community' does not 
engage in debate on defence matters, and so finds itself hostage to the 
particular interests of the defence forces: 'In the absence of such a public 
understanding the political will to maintain a steady course will always be 
56 vulnerable to shorter-term objectives'. 
We noted earlier the difficulty in determining the means by which 
'community involvement' might be generated in order to avoid these 
dangers. For the eighteenth century writers, the attempts to embody martial 
spirit always ran the risk of being more detrimental to the liberties of citizens 
than a standing army. For our twentieth century review, the problem is that 
'the community' with which the ADF is exhorted to engage is always slightly 
out of reach; for example, while the review encourages the development of an 
enhanced militia as a way in which the ADF can bring the community 'in' to 
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achieve a 'convergence of cultural values', it then speaks of further efforts that 
need to be made in order that: 'The militia must feel that the community 
57 regards it as a valuable public institution that deserves support'. In the 
review the militia both embodies the community and stands outside it, acting 
as a 'bridge' to the community. 
This ambiguous position of the community in relation to its government - in 
this case in relation to the question of the provision of defence forces - is a 
58 common feature of political representations inherited from liberalism. As 
we saw with the discussion of Ferguson, while he argued that defence should 
be provided by members of society rather than be imposed by government 
thr ')ugh the maintenance of a standing army, he also recognised that it is very 
often the case that these members of society had to be provided with both the 
motivation to contribute to defence and the means. Similarly, the argument 
in The Defence Force and the Community is that members of the Australian 
community should be given a greater opportunity to participate in matters of 
defence by diminishing the monopoly of the regular ADF and developing a 
militia. The review also advocates that a widespread public-relations and 
education campaign be undertaken to stimulate an interest in taking up the 
opportunities for greater involvement that it argues for. In both these 
examples, the argument in favour of limiting the role of regular forces is 
based on an assumption of a pre-existing will, a capacity, a desire in the 
community to contribute to its own defence; at the same time this desire and 
capacity has to be generated, encouraged or channelled by the actions of 
government. 
This ambiguity around whether militia forces would arise 'naturally' if 
allowed to or whether they need to be developed as a deliberate tactic of 
government is a variant of a fundamental aspect of liberalism, in which the 
'figure of the community of autonomous persons ... appears ambiguously in 
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liberal discourse as a reality that is the basis for government in some contexts 
59 
and as artefact of government practices in others'. As a theorisation of the 
relationship of commu~ity to its government, liberalism always asserts the 
capacities inherent in the community (such as autonomy) which justify the 
call for limiting the actions of government, especially where these actions 
might diminish the capacities of those individuals which make up the 
community. However, as a mode of government, liberalism employs tactics 
which can both limit the work of 'the State' and guarantee the capacities of 
individuals to play their part. I have suggested that, following Burchell and 
others, the reformation of military forces, particularly in the nineteenth 
century, works as part of these tactics for the 'disciplinary integration' of 
individuals necessary to the protection of liberty and the possibility of limited 
government. However, the theoretical arguments in favour of a militia, such 
as those expressed in the review, cannot see that the problem of generating a 
stable, reliable and efficient defence force is a task for government which in 
part involves the generation of the capacities for contributing to defence, the 
'military values', which the review assumes to be inherent in the community. 
Given the role of government in shaping military forces in order to achieve 
this 'disciplinary integration', positioning the 'community' as the normative 
centre from which the defence forces have strayed creates two problems for 
the pro-militia position expressed in The Defence Force and the Community. The 
first of these is that the military values of which the review is so critical: 'a 
complex panoply of carefully constructed traditions, specialised educational 
institutions with their stylish studies of the successes and failures of military 
history, and a tightly hierarchical organisation created by and for a "group 
apart from laymen"', have developed , as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, as a deliberate tactic of government to produce safe, efficient and 
self-regulatory military forces in the absence of any such capacity developing 
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naturally within the society. In so doing, government established measures 
of effectiveness against which militia forces would always be found wanting. 
The second problem for a pro-militia position that is concerned to bring the 
defence force closer to the community is the difficulty of identifying the 
community with which the defence forces must converge. Liberal 
theorisations of society designate the community as something outside of 
government, made up of autonomous persons upon whose consent 
60 
government exists and acts. For The Defence Force and the Community, the 
failure of successive Governments, and the ADP as an arm of government, to 
involve the community in defence runs the risk of the military being seen as a 
'costly irrelevance', because it cannot cla~ to operate upon the consent of the 
community. The review argues that 'it seems important to strive for a sense 
of partnership between the defence professional and the host community in 
the goal of maintaining national security, which, after all, is one of the most 
61 elemental reasons people have had for banding together as a nation'. In this 
view, as we have discussed earlier, the community precedes government, is 
outside it and government in its various forms depends upon it. We have 
also noted the ambiguity of the term community; that it appears as an artefact 
of government as well. As a mode of government, liberalism depends upon, 
and encourages, the formation and maintenance of a number of different 
communities which, as in the example of the military profession, act as a form 
of disciplinary integration and as a vehicle for the development of 
autonomous persons. These various communities of different sizes, 
memberships, and functions are sometimes defined by discrete values, which 
might or might not converge with those of the military, and sometimes by 
function, and sometimes by geography. These various communities form 
part of a wider social structure that is designated as the community, but as 
Burchell notes, '"The community" has no reality outside of this structure of 
heterogeneous elements operating in a territory defined by shifting sets of 
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62 topological and geographical co-ordinates'. To invoke it as a set of coherent 
values in opposition to an equally difficult to define set of 'military' values is 
an impossible task The Defence Force and the Community can only gesture at. 
Conclusion 
The recommendations contained in The Defence Force and the Community have 
been the subject of considerable activity since the review was released in 
1991. There has been a significant reduction in the number of Department of 
Defence personnel and a number of support functions have been contracted 
out to the private sector or managed by ADP 'in-house' contractors. 
Commercial support for the ADP has been strongly encouraged and the 
review's secondary aim of removing unnecessary duplication of civilian and 
military skills has been relatively successful. The review's principal aim, of 
encouraging greater community participation in matters of defence, is less 
easily accounted for. There has been no significant change to the role and 
numbers of reserve or part-time personnel, though a scheme called the 
'Ready Reserve' was introduced briefly to develop a more highly trained 
reserve based on a year's full-time service followed by four years of part-time 
service, but has been subsequently abandoned as expensive and unsuccessful 
in raising the readiness of reserve forces. As well, the Army has been 
reorganised in order, in part, to make better use of its part-time forces by 
'embedding' them in with units of regular forces and improving their 
supplies of equipment and types of training. 
In this chapter I have tried to suggest why the aspirations for a militia of the 
sort argued for in the review are no more likely to be successful than those 
argued for by the militia supporters of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. This most recent formulation of the pro-militia/ anti-
standing army position cannot see the ways in which the development of 
professional military forces, in Britain and Australia, has been the outcome of 
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a series of governmental tactics designed to overcome the inability of the 
'community' to spontaneously generate a capacity for defence. In this way, 
The Defence Force and the Community, both places too much emphasis on the 
generative ability of an informed community, and takes too little account of 
the factors that have shaped the formation of professional military forces. 
Drawing on the preceding three chapters, I have argued that these formative 
factors are associated with the way in which professionalisation of the 
military has assisted in achieving the 'disciplinary integration' characteristic 
of a liberal rationality of government. I have also indicated the limitations of 
militia forces against the increasingly precise measures of effectiveness 
associated with professional military forces. In part these measures of 
effectiveness address a central tenet of the pro-militia position: the protection 
of liberties. Given the history of the development of military forces, 
supporters for the arguments of The Defence Force and the Community should 
be reminded of Adam Smith's caution that the provision of defence could 
only be by two methods. One is by developing a professional military force 
in which the 'trade of the soldier is a particular trade'. The other is 'by means 
of a very vigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius 
63 and inclinations of the people, [to] enforce the practice of military exercises'. 
63 
Wealth of Nations, p. 401. 
CHAPTER SIX 
'Sailors without dicks' 
The integration of women in the Australian Defence Force 
Introduction 
In the late twentieth century, one of the more important of the governmental 
questions facing the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the integration and 
employment of its women members. In the early nineteen-eighties, the ADF 
sought exemption from the Sex Discrimination Act in order to legally exclude 
women from positions designated as combat or combat related. Women were 
consequently eligible to occupy and train for only 23.5% of the types of 
positions open to men. By the early nineteen-nineties, many of these 
restrictions had been lifted, and women were eligible to apply for more than 
87% of positions. As women moved increasingly into the areas previously 
restricted to men, there was some expectation that there would be difficulty 
in their acceptance, and that this could lead to problems which included 
sexual harassment. 
This chapter considers the way in which sexual harassment in the ADF has 
been addressed as a governmental problem, returning to the report by the 
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade entitled 
Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force: Facing the Future Together, 
which was introduced in chapter one. Having examined aspects of the 
genealogy of the ADF, we are now in a position to return to the way in which 
the report sets out the issues around the incidence of sexual harassment, and 
the remedies that it proposes. This genealogy enables us to address the 
evidence available to the Senate Inquiry in order to consider the picture of the 
military ethos or culture that it provides, and what the Senate Committee 
makes of it. My argument in this chapter is that the Committee 
misunderstands or ignores the ways in which people have learnt to conduct 
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themselves in the specialised environment of the warship. The Committee 
fails to address conduct as a practical problem in its own right, seeing 
military culture rather as the reflection or expression of the attitudes of 
military personnel. Thus the more physical, concrete aspects of that culture 
are only a backdrop to identifying the right cluster of attitudes for service in a 
modern, integrated Navy. The Committee thus concentrates on the means of 
establishing a new ethos in the Navy - a new set of attitudes - in the absence 
of any detailed consideration of the implications of this strategy for the 
existing professional ethos and its associated behaviours and conduct 
designed to equip military personnel for service in a particular h~bitat. 
The problem of sexual harassment in the ADF 
In September 1993, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade was asked to examine the nature and incidence of sexual 
harassment generally in the ADP, and to inquire specifically into several 
allegations of sexual harassment of a female medical officer and two female 
leading seamen aboard the Destroyer Escort I-IlviAS SW AN, during a 
deployment to South East Asia in 1992. The sexual harassment of the medical 
doctor, Dr Wheat, involved verbal harassment, and unwelcome touching by 
one officer. Dr Wheat also alleged that one of the male officers had sexually 
assaulted her. This latter allegation was the subject of a court-martial, at 
which the charge was dismissed. The women sailors, Leading Seamen 
Connelly and Flannery, were subject to derogatory remarks made about them 
by their supervisor. They were frequently referred to not by name but as the 
'S.W.O.D.s - 'sailors without dicks". 1 The terms of reference of the Inquiry 
required the Committee to address the 'incidence of sexual harassment or 
sexual assault in the Royal Australian Navy, and the appropriateness of the 
handling by the Royal Australian Navy of allegations of such harassment or 
1
Royal Australian Navy, Better Working Relationships in the Navy: A submission by the Royal 
Australian Navy to an Inquiry by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade, Canberra, 12 November 1993, p.14. 
1,; 
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assault'. 2 The Committee heard evidence from a wide range of sources, 
including the Royal Australian Navy, Army and Air Force, and from 
individuals who responded to the invitation to make submissions. 
In various submissions to the Inquiry, it was clear that there were a variety of 
forms of sexual harassment experienced by women in all three services. 
Statistics on sexual harassment had only been kept in the ADF since 1989, and 
these showed that while there was a steady number of reported incidents, 
expert witnesses to the Inquiry noted that the reported numbers were 'not as 
high as one might have envisaged they might be, given some studies of all-
male environments' .3 A study of career aspirations of women in the ADF 
undertaken in 1987 had found that 42% of women respondents had 
experienced sexual harassment which included uninvited physical contact 
such as patting, pinching and brushing against them and otl}er behaviours 
such as sexually suggestive comments and uninvited requests for sexual 
contact.4 The level of harassment noted by respondents to the 1987 survey is 
not matched by an equivalent number of reported incidents. This 'under-
reporting' of sexual harassment is consistent with the views of a number of 
submissions to the Inquiry, which described cases of sexual harassment, and 
in one case attempted sexual assault, which were not reported because of the 
expectation that there would be no beneficial outcome for the complainant.5 
The Committee described the image of the Navy which came from these 
submissions as 'an environment charged with hostility towards working 
women, especially women working in the same jobs as men'. 6 
2
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Sexual Harassment in the 
Australian Defence Force: facing the future together (hereafter Sexual Harassment), Canberra: 
Senate Printing Unit, 1994, no page number (page following title page). 
3
Professor L. Bryson, quoted in Sexual Harassment, p. 307. 
4
Study undertaken by Major Kathryn Quinn, quoted in Sexual Harassment, p. 300-301. 
5
See for example, the remarks of Lieutenant Susan Sly, Sexual Harassment, p. 51. 
6 
Sexual Harassment, p. 52. 
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Given the Committee's terms of reference, the more general problem of 
sexual harassment was examined principally through the evidence available 
from the particular cases which initiated the Inquiry. This placed a heavy 
burden especially on the case of the medical officer, Dr Wheat. This had 
certain advantages, and disadvantages. One advantage was that Dr Wheat 
was so new to 'ship-board life' that her experiences of it were like those of 
any other person who was not a member of the Navy, and thus many of the 
workaday aspects of living in a warship were still remarkable to her, and 
thus, potentially, to the Committee. One considerable disadvantage was that 
Dr Wheat's experiences were not like those of many women who have been 
trained in the Navy and served in a number of different types of ship; this 
had the effect, on the one hand, of limiting the applicability of Dr Wheat's 
experiences, and on the other, of reducing the impact of the sorts of 
harassment noted by other women members of the ADF in their submissions. 
Dr Wheat had joined the ship at relatively short notice after the rest of the 
crew had completed a series of 'work-up' exercises in preparation for a two-
month deployment to South East Asia. Though a Naval Reserve Officer for 
some time, Dr Wheat had never been to sea for any length of time prior to her 
posting to HMAS SW AN. The Committee describes her 'seasickness, her 
inadequate training and preparation for service at sea and what she describes 
as the hostility she felt in the wardroom' as evidence of her unfamiliarity with 
the physical, social and professional demands of 'ship-board life'. 7 This 
unfamiliarity manifest itself in a number of small but significant ways to the 
other officers, including not taking on any additional duties as an officer, 
suggesting that she should be accorded certain privileges as the senior 
medical officer aboard, and appearing as though she was making insufficient 
effort to become part of the wardroom. 8 
7Sexual Harassment, p. 196. 
8 
Sexual Harassment, pp. 192-196. 
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The Committee sought to set the medical officer's allegations of harassment in 
context, by contrasting her experiences with those of others, particularly 
women officers and medical officers. Most of these officers who made 
submissions to the Inquiry described at least initial hostility to their presence. 
Unlike Dr Wheat they were all able to describe techniques they had 
employed to overcome or live through the harassment they experienced. The 
woman medical officer who was posted to HMAS SW AN after Dr Wheat left 
the ship wrote that: 
It took about three weeks before I was fully accepted into the 
wardroom and from then on the officers were quite relaxed in my 
presence. I must admit I was surprised at some of aspects of male 
behaviour when females are not around, eg the play fights, the 
frequent homosexual allusions and the conviction that violence is the 
ultimate answer to any problem, but I found this interesting rather 
than offensive.9 
·-
A male medical officer told the Committee about how he usually encountered 
some harassment directed at him as the medical officer, and that his 
technique, learnt from experience, was to take the perpetrator aside and 'tell 
him to back off' .10 The Committee noted that it was 'impressed by Dr 
Westphalen's determination to overcome the difficulties that he initially ran 
into on the SWAN', and concluded that Dr Westphalen's experience supports 
the view that 'early intervention at the personal level is usually eff lCtive' .11 
The Senate Committee's Strategy 
The numerous examples of harassment presented to the Committee, and the 
various ways in which people reacted to the harassment, combined with the 
detailed knowledge of Dr Wheat's case and those of Leading Seamen 
Connelly and Flannery led the Committee to the view that there were many 
factors which contributed to a situation of harassment; in Dr Wheat's case: 
9 
Sexual Harassment, p. 59. 
10 
Sexual Harassment, p. 201. 
11 
Sexual Harassment, pp. 201-202. 
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'The unacceptable behaviour in the wardroom of the SWAN was clearly 
linked to a complex interplay of factors and personalities'. 12• Important 
among these factors was the attitudes of the various 'personalities' involved. 
In the Committee's view it was attitude that distinguished those who were 
likely to succeed in the challenging environment of the military from those 
who were not, and the Committee's report presented examples of officers 
who had successfully adapted. 13 
In the case of Dr Wheat, the Committee concluded that she had not adapted 
well to her new surroundings in I--IlvfAS SW AN, and that amongst a range of 
contributory factors, an 'important factor in the way the situation developed 
in the SW AN wardroom was Dr Wheat's poor handling of the behaviour she 
did not like' .14 In its examination of the circumstances surrounding Dr 
Wheat's complaints of harassment, the Committee found th~t she did not 
make it clear how she felt about the behaviour in the wardroom, and that she 
sent out 'messages that were misleading, or at the least, unclear' .15 Her 
behaviour was unfavourably contrasted to that of other officers that the 
Committee took evidence from, particularly those who had demonstrated a 
willingness to confront any harassment. Dr Wheat's response is constituted 
as a failure to act, given the Committee's view that 'nipping sexual 
harassment in the bud by confronting it as early in the piece as possible and 
directly at the personal level if at all possible, is the most successful strategy 
in most cases' .16 
The Committee made it clear that in its view an effective approach to 
addressing sexual harassment would be one which concentrated on attitudes. 
Attitudinal change was important because it underlay both unacceptable 
behaviour and, as in the case of Dr Wheat, a capacity to address sexual 
p 
-sexual Harassment, p. 215. 
13
See, for example the discussion of women's experiences Sexual Harassment, pp. 50-60. 
14Sexual Harassment, p. 203. 
15 Sexual Harassment, p. 204. 
16Sexual Harassment, p. 207. 
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harassment when it occurred. The Committee was concerned to draw a sharp 
distinction between attitudinal change and behavioural change, arguing that 
[T]o bring about changes in behaviour it is not enough ... to issue 
edicts, particularly when those edicts try to deal with an area as 
sensitive, complex and personal as sexual harassment, or harassment 
of any kind ... A far more sophisticated approach, involving awareness 
raising and support mechanisms and a variety of conflict resolution 
mechanism[s] must be put in place if genuine attitudinal and 
behavioural change is to be achieved. 17 
In the Navy, awareness raising and support mechanisms had been 
introduced in the wake of the incidents aboard HMAS SW AN. A consultancy 
firm was engaged which specialised in 'an holistic approach to program 
design, development and implementation of cultural change programs' .18 
Based on the advise of this consultancy, the Navy had introduced a program 
called the 'Good Working Relationships' project, with its 'long-term aim ... to 
bring about a cultural change in the [Navy], one aspect of which is a change 
from the norm of an all male workplace to a mixed gender workplace'. 19 The 
Committee endorsed this approach to cultural change, since it was consistent 
with,, and had the tools to effect, a cultural change through addressing 
attitudes. In addition to supporting the need for an extensive awareness-
raising program, and a network of personnel to monitor and assist in cases of 
sexual harassment, the Committee recommended a number of revisions to 
sexual harassment legislation, towards closer definition of sexual harassment 
and greater emphasis on the local resolution of problems as they arise. 
In this recommendation concerning changes to legislation the Committee's 
intention was to reflect greater differentiation in the types of sexual 
harassment and their remedy, given the Committee's view that 'the present 
subjective definition creates too many uncertainties and hence scope for 
175exual Harassment, p. 121 (emphasis added). 
18 18
Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, by 
TriulziCollins Solutions Pty Ltd, Consultants to the ADF - NA VY, p.3. 
19Sexual Harassment, p. 279 .. 
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confusion'. 20 As well, the Committee wanted the legislation to give greater 
recognition to the need for, and advantages of, local and immediate 
resolution of the harassment. This was to be achieved through a combination 
of better education about harassment, and greater support to individuals who 
may wish to have offending behaviour cease without bringing a formal 
complaint. 21 This greater support to individuals is to be achieved by the 
employer - in this case the ADP - taking 'all reasonable steps' to provide 
support, including the provision of a confidential toll-free telephone advisory 
· service for complaints outside the immediate chain of command, better 
complaints procedures and disciplinary sanctions, reporting requirements 
both during and at the end of sea-postings for women, the creation of a 
confidential database to monitor trends and identify repeated perpetrators of 
sexual harassment, and the use of consultants to monitor the success of the 
whole gender-integration programme. 
At the same time as proposing this extensive array of remedies and avenues 
for addressing sexual harassment, the Committee sought to emphasise the 
need for 
genuine understanding and acceptance, if genuine change in attitude 
is to be achieved. Without a genuine change in attitude, an 
environment of constant policing and punishment of offenders is 
unlikely to produce a healthy and productive workplace.22 
The reason that the Committee does not see the extensive range of 
mechanisms it has proposed as producing an environment of constant 
policing is the focus on attitude. The right sort of attitude, on the part of both 
women and men, will mean that, in time, such a disciplinary apparatus will 
rarely be used, and then its proper use will be understood by both the person 
harassing and the person harassed. The emphasis on attitude, on the 
personal capacities of the individuals working in the ADP, is premised on the 
20 Sexual Harassment, p. 26. 
21 Sexual Harassment, p. 31. 
22 Sexual Harassment, p. 25. 
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view that military culture is the expression of, or reflection of the attitudes of 
military personnel. This view is re inf arced by the Cammi ttee' s assessment of 
both the particular cases of sexual harassment it had to address, and the 
evidence of 'more successful' negotiations of the naval culture provided by 
some submissions to the Inquiry. 
In contrast to the negative view of the capacities of the medical officer, the 
Committee constructed a composite picture of the ideal naval person with the 
right sort of attitudes, who will live within the new naval culture. In part this 
composite is formed out of the qualities of those personnel the Committee felt 
had learnt to fit in. The Committee supported the approach taken by the 
Navy in carefully selecting those women who would be 'pioneers' in the 
early days of integrating female personnel aboard ships. In addition to 
awareness-raising and the setting of standards: 'It is also sef!sible, in the 
Committee's view, for the managers in the Navy to take special care in 
selecting appropriate people at this early stage of the integration process'. 23 
Appropriate personnel are generally those with a capacity to tolerate a certain 
degree of 'initial resistance' when they are posted. They also have the 
capacity to quickly and unequivocally address any behaviour they find to be 
unacceptable, and to be alert to and concerned about the possibility that 
others might be being harassed. 24 
Taking account of military culture 
Despite the Committee's recommendations concerning the introduction of 
extensive awareness-raising seminars for all personnel, it is not clear whether 
the Committee anticipates that the sort of people it feels will be well-suited to 
service in the military will be existing personnel whose attitudes are 
developed through the awareness training package or personnel specially 
23Sexual Harassment, p. 58. 
24
See for example the evidence of several officers whom the Committee felt had made a 
good adjustment to life at sea, Sexual Harassment, pp 57-58. 
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recruited. In drawing lessons about what constitutes appropriate and 
effective attitudes and behaviours the Committee appeared to feel that 
'successful' personnel had these qualities despite their previous training and 
any experiences of harassment. In its cataloguing of personnel who have 
been able to integrate themselves successfully in a potentially hostile work 
environment, the Committee glosses over the range of capacities necessary to 
achieve this integration, and it assumes too hurriedly that these capacities 
necessarily follow from having the right attitude. It also ignores the 'costs' 
that might be borne in developing such capacities. For example, the 
Committee had several examples from women officers that they had 
developed a capacity for dealing with sexual harassment during their 
training, particularly at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). The 
Committee gives no consideration to how much this early experience of 
harassment might lead women to expect harassment, or not _?ee it, and 
certainly not report it. This then somewhat undermines the Committee's 
strategy of comparing the experience of Dr Wheat to that of other women 
officers in order to determine the severity of the harassment Dr Wheat alleged 
and the 'reasonableness' of her response to it. This is borne out in the 
Committee's discussion of the views of HMAS SW AN' s wardroom given by 
two women officers who were aboard HMAS SW AN at the same time as Dr 
Wheat. These women were called upon to give their opinion of the 
atmosphere of the wardroom and of Dr Wheat's ability to fit in. One of the 
women officers had told the earlier Navy Board of Inquiry that she did not 
regard the wardroom behaviour as sexual harassment, although she had been 
unhappy about some of the behaviour and had spoken to some of the officers 
about it. The Committee goes on the say that this woman officer: 
had the "advantage" of having experienced the rigours of the Defence 
Force Academy, where, by all accounts the situations confronting 
women in the early years were more challenging and difficult than 
anything that happened in the SWAN wardroom.25 
25Sexual Harassment, p. 206. 
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The Committee did not consider in any great detail the many references to a 
broader 'culture' of harassment raised in a number of submissions, and 
indeed, at a number of points noted that it found itself unable to consider in 
any detail whether there were particular aspects of military service which 
affected the issue of sexual harassment. 26 The Committee did emphatically 
disagree with a submission from the Returned Service's League which said 
that 
war is a brutalising experience, and it follows that training and 
practising for war is also brutalising, to a degree ... to recruit and train 
a military force on the one hand, and then to recoil in horror when its 
members occasionally exhibit unseemly aggressiveness or even 
brutality towards one another, is either deceitful or stupid ... 27 
In support of its rejection of this view, the Committee pointed to evidence 
taken from the ADF which insisted that the military actively discouraged 
recruitment of 'Rambo-types'. 28 However, the Committee also cited 
comments by Dr Westphalen about the various subcultures in the Navy, and 
the opportunities for 'tribal interplay' to get out of hand.29 He and others 
gave anecdotal evidence to support the view that there were particular 'types' 
of people and situations in which aggressive and harassing behaviour was 
more likely to o'ccur.30 
The Committee's limited interest in the role of training, and in the material or 
concrete aspects of the peculiarities of the military culture is consistent with 
the way in which it privileges the importance of attitudinal change over 
changes to behaviour in its strategies for eliminating sexual harassment. 
26Sexual Harassment, pp. 50; 304-7. But note here the footnote to general harassment: ✓rt may 
be argued that in some instances it is not only the treatment of women subordinates but also 
male subordinates that needs attention; and that there should, for example, be less "yelling" 
all around. However, the Committee accepts that in some situations the same "yelling" at 
both males and females may be the key to survival and unquestionably appropriate. The 
difficulty seems to be in agreeing where and when to draw the line'. Sexual Harassment, p. 
30, note 54. 
27Sexual Harassment, p. 306. 
28Sexual Harassment, p. 307. 
29 
Sexual Harassment, p. 200-201. 
30 
Sexual Harassment, p. 55-56. 
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Rather than considering the extent to which some of these traditional 
behaviourally-based techniques may have worked in addressing a problem 
like sexual harassment, the Committee looks to having the ADF adopt a set of 
psychologically-based techniques for developing 'work-life quality' already 
tried and executed in a variety of settings, including large private sector 
organisations. The 'Good Working Relationships' project put together for the 
Navy was developed by a firm of consultants which has had considerable 
experience in both the public and private sector developing affirmative 
action, work-based childcare and anti-discrimination strategies for a number 
of large organisations.31 
The adoption of psychologically-based expertise to address military problems 
has been a frequent tactic of government throughout the twentieth century. 
As Nikolas Rose has demonstrated, psychological expertise ti.as had a long 
and fruitful association with military forces. 32 This has also been the case in 
Australia, though on a smaller scale than in either Great Britain or the United 
States. Psychologists were employed by the Navy, Army and Air Force 
during World War Two to develop and carry out selection testing, and all 
three services continue to employ psychologists to assist not only with 
selection, but also with counselling military personnel and conducting a 
variety of questionnaires on matters affecting morale. 33 As we saw in chapter 
four, since World War One government has taken a somewhat modular 
approach to the formation and maintenance of military forces, assuming that 
individuals would quickly group together to form the larger units necessary 
only in wartime.34 This economical approach to the maintenance of military 
31
See Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade by 
TriulziCollins Solutions Pty Ltd, Consultants to the ADF-NA VY. 
32Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: the shaping of the private self, London: Routledge, 1990. 
33D.E. Rose, 'Psychology in the Armed Forces' Australian Journal of Psychology, vol. 10, no. 1, 
1958, pp. 42-48. A good example of the range of services that psychologists do and could 
provide the ADF is contained in Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 
Personnel Wastage in the Australian Defence Force, Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1988. 
34Bill Gammage, 'The Crucible: the establishment of the Anzac Tradition, 1899-1918', in M. 
McKernan and M. Browne, (eds) Australia: two centuries of war and peace, Canberra: 
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forces was fertile ground for the ameliorative assistance provided by 
psychology in selecting personnel for specific jobs, and in providing a 
therapeutic environment in which to build a bridge back to civilian life. 
Psychology was able to construct a new way of approaching the 
governmental issues associated with managing military populations, through 
the concentration on group relations. As Rose has argued: 
It was not the static traits of a character that were at issue, but the 
ways in which individuals resolved personal conflicts in the context 
of group decisions, directions and cohesiveness. The invention of the 
'group', the conception of 'social' or 'human' relations as key 
determinants of individual conduct, were the most consistent lesson 
of the psychological and psychiatric experience of war35 
However, while the success of psychology's association with so many aspects 
of personnel selection and training during World War Two in particular 
established the governmental possibilities of this form of expertise, and led to 
an increasing variety of situations in which such therapeutic expertise would 
be brought to bear36, it should not be assumed that other means of addressing 
the 'conduct of conduct' did not continue within military forces. The role of 
psychologists has largely been a therapeutic one; such expertise does not 
appear to have had a marked influence on the formation and conduct of the 
military 'style of life'. 
The approach to the possible problem of sexual harassment within the ADF, 
for example, has been to address it within the register of acceptable 
behaviours, akin to the problems of fraternisation or insubordination. 
Guidelines on sexual harassment promulgated to all members of the ADF 
have concentrated on the effects of unacceptable behaviour for operational 
effectiveness; sexual harassment is an example of unacceptable behaviour 
which 'undermines a member's ability to contribute to the mutual 
Australian War Memorial, 1988, pp. 147-166; and Grey, A Military History of Australia, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
35Rose, Governing the Soul, p. 48. 
36Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, 'On therapeutic authority: psychoanalytical expertise under 
advanced liberalism', History of the Human Sciences pp. 29-64, 
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dependence and collective discipline of the group; or contrary to or 
inconsistent with, the standards of professional and personal conduct 
required to achieve sucI:- operational effectiveness'.37 Moreover, while 
recruitment advertisements for the ADF, and particularly the Army Reserve, 
emphasise the extent to which service will make one a better person, this sits 
alongside an emphasis on what the Navy calls Character Training, conducted 
under the auspices of the Chaplaincy. In this training, 'character is 
understood to be the whole of what one is as a person, as evidenced by 
consistent behaviour'; the training includes the inculcation of behaviours that 
are consistent with the 'specific needs of Navy society and convention', as 
well as the development of automatic responses that 'do not require the 
application of reason', training in skills, techniques and habits, and education 
to develop understanding.38 
As we have noted already, the Committee was inclined to discount the 
governmental possibilities of strategies aimed at behavioural change without 
a change in attitude. Indeed, it gave considerably more weight to examining 
the attitudes of military personnel than it did to looking to the trained 
behaviours and forms of professional ethical comportment with which it was 
presented. In so doing, the Committee was unable to tum its attention to the 
more concrete aspects of military culture, or to grasp the extent to which 
certain behaviours, or conduct, might be the deliberate outcome of a 
professional ethos peculiar to military personnel that equips them for service 
in the conditions of a regiment or in the confines of a warship. Parts of such 
an ethos might easily be dismissed as sexism, and as anachronistic 
enthusiasm for hierarchy; but parts might also prove to have a certain 
salience that could act as a resource, or as a blockage, to the governmental 
aspirations for the elimination of sexual harassment. For these reasons, there 
might be governmental advantages in acknowledging and examining the 
contours of such an ethos, and the material culture which sustains it. 
37
Quoted in Sexual Harassment, p.171-172. 
38Royal Australian Navy, Better Working Relationships in the Navy, p. 70, emphasis added. 
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Outlines of the military culture 
I have suggested earlier that the sociological and psychological emphasis on 
military culture as the expression of the attitudes of professional military 
personnel pays insufficient attention to the material features of the military as 
a particular technology for living: a combination of habits, trainings, and 
physical environments. I have also indicated in earlier chapters that 
governmental engagement with questions of the culture of the military have 
always treated that culture as a practical problem to be addressed. Moreover, 
as previous chapters have shown, the outcomes of various reforms of the 
military forces of Britain and Australia have invariably taken practical form. 
One of the key governmental transformations of the military_ was the 
introduction of barracks as the typical form of housing military personnel 
from the early nineteenth century. While, of course, ships had always 
imposed a certain regimentation on sea-going personnel, it was the idea that 
government could be effected by the physical arrangement of spaces 
occupied by military personnel that was particularly significant. As we have 
seen in chapter two, a whole series of problems associated with the Army of 
the eighteenth century- its levels of training, desertion, susceptibility to 
sympathise with those populations it was intended to pacify, were addressed 
by the introduction or enhancement of barracks throughout Great Britain. 
This architecture was intended to produce certain effects in the subject 
populations. Immediately upon the introduction of barracks, the intention 
was to impose an ordered, accountable lifestyle amongst the rank and file. 
Though hastily built, poorly ventilated barracks were criticised for their 
deleterious effects upon the health of soldiers, it was never suggested that the 
barrack form be abandoned, only improved upon. Over time, barracks 
became the site of improvement in the rank and file and non-commissioned 
officers. Reading rooms, savings banks, regimental chapels, school-rooms 
and recreational facilities were all designed to encourage the individual 
11I 
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soldier to improve himself, in the company of other soldiers, under the 
auspices of commanding officers. The barrack provided the opportunity to 
influence the work and leisure-time conduct of the individual; his behaviours 
in a range of settings were amenable to shaping in a way that had never been 
possible before. 
Barracks, and the regulated spaces of the warship, allowed for the 
development of site-specific behaviours, for emulation and for the 
identification of distinct groupings. The importance of having these site-
specific behaviours has not diminished in 'modern' military forces. In a 
number of submissions to the Inquiry the importance of modifying ships' 
architectures to assist in the integration of women was raised. For example, 
the executive officer of HMAS SYDNEY noted that many minor changes to 
accommodation, shower and toilet facilities were made befor_e women joined 
the ship from mid-1992. Despite preparations for accommodating women, it 
was not possible immediately to avoid having the female Petty Officers living 
in the same Mess as the female sailors. This was considered to be a 
significant deficiency, as it 'slowed acceptance of female Petty Officers by 
their male peers and made the maintenance of the rank structure difficult for 
the female sailors' .39 These contemporary examples echo the eighteenth 
century concern to shape the interaction of military personnel, and in turn the 
way in which particular environments come to be important to the formation 
and maintenance of relationships. These examples also indicate the extent to 
which military culture is more than an assembly of attitudes, and the extent 
to which military culture and its government can be quite a practical matter. 
The example from HMAS SYDNEY highlights another aspect of the military 
ethos or culture that we have already noted in chapter three - the importance 
of establishing certain sorts of relationships between ranks for the 
maintenance of the 'rank structure'. This relationship is characterised by a 
39
Submission by Lieutenant-Commander P.D. Jones to Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p.2. 
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certain formality and distance being maintained between the officer, or non-
commissioned officer, and his or her subordinates. In the nineteenth century 
this 'distance' was an important yardstick by which to measure potential 
officers. As we have seen, in the case of engineer officers who aspired to be 
integrated with the executive officers of the Navy, the Admiralty considered 
engineers unsuitable to hold positions of-command because their 
backgrounds meant that they were unlikely to be able to maintain sufficient 
distance from their friends and family who were likely to be their 
subordinates. In the various Admiralty and Parliamentary investigations into 
military administration in the nineteenth century the ethos of the gentleman 
officer is a crucial part of any governmental calculation for improving the 
Navy and the Army, and operated as the standard up to which any other 
aspiring officer must eventually be brought.40 This ethos demanded the 
maintenance of a social and physical detachment from one's .subordinates in 
order to effect command. This is achieved by the physical distance of the 
officer from his men, in terms of the location and quality of accommodation, 
and by the maintenance of a social distinction in manner, and a training in 
detachment from the affairs of those under his command. In the 
contemporary case of the integration of women, the difficulties of 
accommodating small numbers of women separately from one another has 
the potential to undermine the distinction and limited relations considered 
40See for example the discussions in: Report of Royal Commission for Inquiring into the 
system of Military Punishments in the Army, Parliamentary Papers, 1836, vol. XXII, Paper no. 
59; Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the system of purchase and sale of 
Commissions in the Army, Parliamentary Papers, 1857, vol. XVIII, Paper no. 2267; Report of 
the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the constitution and practice of Courts-
Martial in the Army, and the present system of punishment for military offences (Two 
Reports), Parliamentary Papers, 1868-9, vol. XII, Paper no. 4114; Report of Royal Commission 
on Army Promotion and Retirement, Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. XV, Paper no. 1569; 
Report of an Admiralty Committee on the Position of Masters in the Royal Navy, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1866, XL VII; Report of an Admiralty Committee to consider the best 
means of securing the highest mechanical skill and scientific knowledge in the management 
of the various engines of Her Majesty's Ships of War, and supply of Engineer Officers and 
Engine Room Artificers for Her Majesty's Navy, Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. XXI, Paper 
no. 1647; see also the Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1854, vol. XXVII, Paper no. 1713, and chapter three, for a discussion of 
the manner in which the Civil Service sought to retain the services of the sons of the 
aristocracy while introducing competitive examinations. 
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necessary to maintain the rank structure. Moreover, small numbers of 
women in a ship can also create problems for this culture of distance; in a 
submission to the Inquiry a woman officer serving in a patrol boat discussed 
how much more comfortable she felt when another woman joined the crew, 
even though 'this had the potential to cause problems .. .from the professional 
point of view. The trainee whom I was expected to direct and discipline as 
Navigator was also my closest friend and a source of mutual support' .41 This 
concern reflects the continuing importance of the capacity for detachment that 
is part of the professional ethos of the officer and in certain cases the non-
commissioned officer, and the structures that support it. 
Another component of the ethos which comes to light in the various reports 
of the nineteenth century is the concern for developing the capacity of the 
officer to easily fit into the company of his fellow officers. While various 
Governments sought for some twenty years in the mid-nineteenth century to 
introduce a system of officer recruitment and promotion to replace the 
practice of purchasing commissions in Army regiments, thereby broadening 
the potential pool of officer recruits, regimental officers themselves ensured 
that regiments did not recruit men they did not want. In the nineteenth 
century the capacities which fitted the officer for the company of other 
officers was expected to be guaranteed by the officer's social background. 
From the early twentieth century, when officers were drawn from a more 
diverse background, various initiation practices were used to test the capacity 
of new recruits to meet the expectations and norms of the officer corps. In 
Australia, from very early in the history of the Army's officer training college 
there were frequent examples of the means by which new recruits were tested 
for their conformity to the norms of the college.42 The practice of 'hazing' or 
bastardisation was a physical initiation designed in part to test the physical 
41
Submission by Lieutenant S.J, Sly to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, p. 6-7. 
42
Chris Coulthard-Clark Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-1986, Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1986, pp. 43-44, 123-128, 197-198, 243-244. 
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resources of the initiate and in part his or her capacity not to react, and 
especially not to report on, the activities of his or her fellow officers. It was 
also to test acceptance ~f certain non-rational aspects of military culture. To 
this extent, the initiate's introduction to military culture was intended to 
'lower his or her awareness', rather than raise it. In a more measured and 
officially sanctioned way, recruits to the military are also taught a range of 
practical skills in order to provide them with certain 'arts of living' in 
environments such as the wardroom and the regimental mess. 43 
Government and military culture 
As we noted above, there has been a significant shift in the way in which 
military forces have come to be managed since the beginning of this century. 
One of the consequences of taking a more 'modular' approach to the 
formation of military forces is that it limits the interest shown by government 
in the subject-forming capacities of specific sites, particularly where part of 
that formation might inculcate deliberate subordination and role playing. The 
governmental potential of psychology in the management of military forces 
during and after the Second World War lay in its ability to provide a 
therapeutic environment in which people 'returned to normal' precisely by 
leaving the confines of military subordination and status behind. The 
invention of the group, with its focus on 'human' relations, produced a 
governmental tool that could be formulated over and over again in different 
settings.44 As we can see from the Australian Senate's consideration of the 
problem of sexual harassment, governmental consideration no longer 
includes the kind of detailed assessment of the military ethos found in the 
nineteenth century. 
43 
A good discussion of this, though it relates to British regiments, is given in John Keegan, 
'Regimental Ideology', in G. Best, and A. Wheatcroft, (eds) War, Economy and the Military 
Mind, London and New Jersey, 1976, pp. 3-19. 
44Rose, Government of the Soul; Rose and Miller, 'On therapeutic authority' . 
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No doubt there is much of that ethos that has undergone change - in part 
because there has been a considerable change both in the composition of the 
military, and in the fortunes of a 'gentlemanly ethos' upon which the 
nineteenth century military ethos drew. For example, in the Australian 
military there were explicit attempts in the early years of the twentieth 
century to 'democratise' officer cadet training by paying cadets a small salary 
in order to limit the extent to which the officer corps was a sort of club only 
for those of private means45; and there was much about the way in which the 
British gentleman officer led his men that Australian officers rejected.46 
However, while elements of that ethos may have been refashioned, there is 
no reason to suppose that an ethos of military office has disappeared entirely. 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, in Britain and Prussia there were a 
number off actors at work to increase rather than decrease the capacity of the 
military itself to establish and regulate its ethos. In Britain fr_pm the late 
nineteenth century individual regiments became very jealous of their 
reputations, and sought to develop distinctive styles and vigorous support 
from their officers and men, becoming a much less diffuse, and thus more 
effective source of ethical training than the more generalised ethic of the 
gentleman could ever be.47 
There is much in the Australian Senate report into sexual harassment in the 
ADF that suggests that aspects of the sexual harassment experienced by the 
medical officer could be recast as a kind of formulaic initiation test into the 
ethos of the naval wardroom, and that the sort of 'personal competence' 
demonstrated by various other military witnesses to the Committee in the 
face of harassment were good examples of the sort of detachment necessary to 
such a 'style of living'. In certain respects the Committee's questioning of 
other witnesses to determine whether they had experienced similar 
45P. Heydon, Quiet Decision: a study of George Foster Pearce, Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1965, p.58. 
46lvan D. Chapman, Iven G. Mackay Citizen and Soldier, Melbourne: Melway Publishing Pty 
Ltd, 1975, p. 116. 
47John Keegan, 'Regimental Ideology'. 
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harassment recalls that of the nineteenth century inquiries into the integration 
of engineers in the British Navy: a picture of the 'habitus' begins to emerge. 
Only in the twentieth century case the governmental focus is on the 
adaptability of the individual person, the 'human relations' between 
members of a group 48, and building up a picture of the culture from their 
attitudes. The salience of the ethos, of the 'character' of officers, and the 
particular demands of the military habitus as a governmental concern has 
faded. Thus the focus of the Senate Committee cannot grasp the extent to 
which there is a particular 'habitus', which acts upon the individual bodily, 
habitually, and in which the criteria for successful integration might include 
cultivating a distinct lack of attitude or awareness. 
There are at least two consequences of the Committee's approach which are 
pertinent to its recommendations for the future government ;0f the military. 
The first of these is that aspects of the way in which people conduct 
themselves, and have learned to conduct themselves in environments like 
wardrooms are misunderstood or ignored. The second consequence is that 
the ideal person that the Committee hopes will come to populate the Navy, 
and the Army and Air Force, may be expected to operate in accordance with 
a new ethos which sits uncomfortably with the old. The combined effect of 
these problems has meant that the comprehensive 'work-life quality' 
programme instituted by the Navy, for example, is seen by most as a specific 
set of measures introduced to help address the problem of sexual harassment 
- a problem that only occurs where women are employed, and where those 
women have not developed their own psychological capacities for addressing 
any 'challenges' in the work environment they may meet.49 By themselves, 
48Rose, Governing the Soul, p.48; Miller and Rose, 'On therapeutic authority', p. 60. 
49The evidence for the view that the 'Good Working Relationships' Project is principally 
about sexual harassment is anecdotal - but is consistent with the major focus of the Project to 
date which has been on addressing sexual harassment and the integration of women. The 
view that the problem of sexual harassment will generally only occur when ill-equipped 
women are in the workplace is in part the view that the Committee took of the originating 
case of the medical officer, viz. 'It appears to the Committee that, in relation to the events 
surrounding Dr Wheat's tour of duty on the SWAN ... a different approach by Dr Wheat 
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the Committee's recommendations for changes based on an awareness raising 
campaign are insufficient to overhaul the culture in all its material aspects. 
What the historical examples are intended to suggest, in part, is that there 
might still be governmental advantage in considering the habitus - the habit-
forming environment in which military personnel live and work as 
something more substantial, more engaging; as Elias puts it, as a practical 
problem for government to solve.5° For example, the Committee had 
considerable evidence, from witnesses and from the Navy's own Board of 
Inquiry investigation, that the sort of harassing behaviour exhibited in the 
wardroom was not infrequently characteristic of officers of a certain age and 
seniority. The Committee looked at the evidence of a number of witnesses 
which established a certain pattern to wardroom life not in order to 
investigate that pattern, but rather to use it to throw into relief the experience 
of Dr Wheat. She stood out for her lack of competence in dealing with the 
apparently formulaic harassment experienced by newcomers joining the 
wardroom, while the habitus of which the harassment formed a part was not 
highlighted by the Committee.51 As a consequence, the equally habituated 
manner in which 'successful' Navy personnel dealt with harassment was 
taken as evidence of their 'attitude to life in the services that is both fostered 
and expected by the services'52, though it might equally be argued that the 
success lay in not having an attitude, but rather the sort of detachment and 
ability to mix with one's fellow officers that comes with suspending 
judgement and engaging in highly ritualised and non-personal conduct for 
the greater good of ward-room harmony. Success, in this habitus, might be 
the result of having certain social skills which can be exercised without 
necessarily having to address a 'deeper layer' of attitudes. 
would also have made an important difference': Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, Sexual Harassment, pp. 214-5. 
50Elias, 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 1, 
1950, pp. 291-309, p. 294. 
51Sexual Harassment, pp. 192-206. 
52Sexual Harassment, p. 206. 
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Similarly, not addressing the form and substance of an existing military ethos 
is likely to place limits ?TI a key part of the Committee's reform strategy in 
which those with a raised awareness of the problem of sexual harassment will 
exercise a pastoral responsibility for others who might be at risk of 
harassment. For example, in mounting its case against the severity of the 
harassment experienced by Dr Wheat, the Committee was critical of her 
failure to take a greater interest in the other women sailors aboard HMAS 
SW AN at the time: 
It is, in the Committee's view, important to note that, despite her 
subsequent allegations about the unacceptable behaviour she herself 
was subjeced to, Dr Wheat at no stage sought to inquire whether the 
female sailors may have been experiencing similar difficulties. It 
seems to the Committee reasonable for [the Captain] to have expected 
that, following his request that Dr Wheat should mal5e herself 
available to the female sailors, she would actively seek to establish if 
they, too, were experiencing any difficulties, and let him know if 
there were any difficulties not being resolved adequately at the 
Divisional level. 53 
The Committee was in part intending to suggest that Dr Wheat's failure to 
take an interest in the other women aboard threw into question the severity of 
the haraf :;ment she was experiencing. It was also anticipating the culture that 
should or would be in place if the avvareness of sexual harassment was 
heightened. That is, that 'well adjusted, aware' women and men would bring 
a particular form of expertise that can flatten out the established hierarchies, 
casting their gaze around the ship and taking a personal interest in their 
fellow crew members. Thus the expectation that Dr Wheat should have gone 
around the established monitoring mechanisms aboard I-IlvfAS SW AN to take 
an active part in checking on the female members of the crew. Given the 
evidence the Committee took from other medical personnel, it suggests that 
the expectation is that women will make a greater effort, a 'personal 
commitment' to use informal as well as formal channels to monitor any 
53Sexual Harassment, p. 161. 
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possible harassment. To stick to formal, and therefore to 'reactive' channels is 
to demonstrate a certain degree of defectiveness, as though there is a certain 
part of the personality that is underdeveloped. 
As we noted above, there is clearly a difficulty with this expectation of 
developing close pers<?nal ties with other women in terms of the degree to 
which this then threatens to undermine the womens' professional 
relationships. The sort of reforms that the Committee is advocating create a 
particular burden for women, who are charged, with their 'empathetic' 
skills,to be the principal vehicles in the monitoring and pastoral aspects of the 
ref or ·-~ strategy. In bearing this pastoral responsibility, individuals are being 
asked to work against the disciplinary habitus of the ADF, which requires 
officers to learn to place limits upon the interest they take in their personal 
circumstances and in the affairs of their peers and subordinates, and to use 
well-recognised systems of communication within the organisation for the 
resolution of personal and professional difficulties. Many women officers 
may find it difficult to take on these new tasks, and the new ways of 
conducting themselves in relation to peers and subordinates if these new 
ways will work to undermine aspects of the ethos they share with other 
officers and which guide them in the greater part of their everyday 
interactions with each other and with their subordinates. 
Conclusion 
The package of reforms that the Senate Committee seeks to put into place to 
address the problem of sexual harassment in the ADF is exemplary of the sort 
of therapeutic approach to governmental problems analysed by Nikolas Rose 
and Peter Miller and others. In the Committee's enthusiasm for 'genuine 
attitudinal change' we can see the ways in which it expects that a new culture 
based on better attitudes 'make the new opportunities work for both men and 
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women'.54 In its enthusiasm for the possibilities of this form of cultural 
change the Committee is advocating an approach which, as Rose and Miller 
put it, the 'relations that link one individual to another in the workplace ... are 
thus perceived as if with new eyes. The very bonds that link individuals 
together undergo a metamorphosis'.55 At least, this is the governmental 
expectation. 
I have suggested that this expectation may be met only partially, because the 
way in which the governmental problem of sexual harassment is formulated 
gives insufficient attention to the possibilities that there is a distinctive ethos 
governing conduct in the military which may act as a practical limitation to 
the metamorphosis the Senate Committee is seeking to engender. With the 
'new eyes' with which the Committee looks at the problem of sexual 
harassment, and the integration of women into ti1i.e ADF mor_e generally, the 
habitual behaviours which may equip women (and men) to negotiate their 
acceptance into a wardroom (but which may leave aside addressing whether 
everyone really wants them there) will be inadequate. 
I have suggested that if the Committee had been able to give some 
countenance to the form and substance of the military habitus, it might have 
found that military culture needs to be considered in the context of the 
demands of ship-board life: to be seen providing particular 'arts of living' in a 
specialised environment. These specialised skills, habits and practices can be 
glimpsed in the submissions to the Inquiry; some can be inferred from the 
earlier governmental considerations of military culture. As I have suggested, 
many of these nineteenth and early twentieth century practices have no doubt 
undergone transformation, or eradication. But the evidence available to the 
Senate Committee suggests that it is reasonable to assume that a distinctive 
military ethos is not gone altogether. If this is the case, then the 'holistic 
cultural change' program advocated by the Committee may not be as all-
54Sexual Harassment, p. ix. 
55Miller and Rose, 'On therapeutic authority', p. 59. 
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encompassing as its name suggests. Awareness-raising may be only one part 
of a program that needs to address the practical implications of living and 
working together in confined spaces with a wide variety of people, and 
operating with a distinct chain of command. Addressing all these aspects 
will be necessary in considerations of the integration of women, much the 
way it was for the attempts to integrate engineer officers in the nineteenth 
century. Taking account of military culture, the integration of women and 
the elimination of harassment could be the kind of practical governmental 
problem of which eighteenth and nineteenth century administrators were all 
too aware. 
11; 
CONCLUSION 
'The sharp end' 
Government and military forces in the late twentieth century 
In this thesis I have sought to address two issues of current concern for the 
Australian Defence Force in a novel and constructive way. In doing so, I have 
set out certain key episodes in the history of the British and Australian 
military forces which are germane to the analysis of these contemporary 
issues. The overall picture I have sought to convey is one in which the civil-
military relationship is not the line at which two distinct entities meet and 
exchange, but rather a much larger problem-space within which that part 
which constitutes the military is made and remade, in large part through the 
actions of the civil government. 
It is a crude distortion of the genealogy of the modern military, perhaps, to 
focus on the extent to which it is the creature of administrative fiat. It is also 
shaped by the demands of warfare, technology, and as we have seen, the 
practical, day-to-day concerns of the operational environment. Military 
forces have been well-served by histories that have focussed on the 
imperatives of warfare and technology. Also, as I have suggested, the main 
sociological approaches to the military have focussed on the way in which the 
military's responsibility for 'the management of violence' has shaped the 
profession and given it its distinctive ethos and relationship to the rest of 
society. By contrast, I have wanted to concentrate on the role of government, 
and British and Australian military forces in relation to government because 
this seems to allow for a more complex, and yet more fluid and contingent 
picture of the military, and civil-military relations, to be drawn. 
I have suggested that changing modes of governmental rationality have 
tackled problems raised by military forces in different ways to build a 
flexible, adaptive and hybrid institution that does not have one logic, or 
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organising principle. It does have certain distinctive features which need to 
be taken account of, as I have suggested in chapters five and six; but this 
taking account should consider the opportunities for further adaptation and 
change. 
This focus on flexibility and adaptability will be important in the next few 
years for the ADF, which has just undergone what the current Minister for 
Defence describes as the 'most comprehensive review of defence for twenty 
years'. The Defence Efficiency Review (released in March 1997) has sought to 
change the culture of the management of Australia's defence by proposing a 
number of efficiencies which are intended to allow a substantial redirection of 
defence funding from administration to the 'sharp end' of combat 
capabilities. These efficiencies are intended to introduce a more stream-lined 
approach to force development an ,_~ administration of the A[)F, and 
encourage the Navy, Army and Air Force to plan and work together more 
complete! yin training for combat. 
Military personnel in each of the three services will be required both to 
become more integrated with their civilian counterparts in the preparation of 
policy and planning, and to become more integrated each with the other in 
operations. These various demands have the potential to require a 
considerable dexterity on the part of individuals who will move between the 
different parts of the Defence Organisation in the course of their careers. In 
particular, these differing circumstances have the potential to require military 
personnel to be at one time more closely identified with their 'war-fighting' 
role and their particular service, and at another time to exercise a degree of 
objectivity and corporate focus that separates them from the immediate 
concerns and sectional interests of their parent service. 
The Efficiency Review notes the remark by President Truman at the end of 
the Second World War that 'I have the feeling that if the Army and Navy had 
fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other the war would have 
i 
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ended much earlier'1 as evidence for the need to encourage a lessening of the 
'tribalism' that leads to inefficiency. Over time, it is suggested that 
consideration be given to a much greater use of shared facilities, joint 
training, particularly of cadet officers and staff, and possibly the development 
of 'super bases' which house members of all three services together. 
However, it stands as a given in official reports like the Efficiency Review 
that there are distinct cultures within each of the three services, and an 
intense rivalry that is exacerbated by competing for scarce resources. But 
despite the apparent, long-standing problems these differences engender, the 
Review stops short of suggesting the amalgamation of the Navy, Army and 
Air Force along the lines of the Canadian Armed Forces as a solution to the 
inefficiency caused by such rivalry, stating that there are 'no benefits from 
merging [the Navy, Army and Air Force] commensurate with the costs of 
blurring this specialisation in the long-term and the massive disruption that 
would inevitably occur in the shorter term'. 2 This suggests then that the 
rivalries and differences are to be managed, even taken advantage of in 
certain circumstances. How then, in the name of efficiency and strategic 
advantage, is this cultural management to take place? 
This thesis has intended to suggest that the answers to these questions, as a 
basis for setting new policy directions for more efficient and effective joint 
operations, should involve looking again at what is so readily taken for 
granted about military culture. I have approached this issue historically, 
tracing a series of sometimes minor, often apparently disconnected episodes 
in the formation of modern military forces, which have nevertheless had 
significant impact on the present shape and future possibilities of the ADF. 
The intention was to provide a 'history of the present', which Mitchell Dean 
describes as the 'use of historical resources to reflect upon the contingency, 
singularity, interconnections, and potentialities of the diverse trajectories of 
1Report of the Defence Efficiency Review, Future Directions for the Management of Australia's 
Defence, Canberra: Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, 1977, p. 8. 
2Report of the Defence Efficiency Review, p. 8. 
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those elements which compose present social arrangements and 
experience ... Such a history is geared toward the critical use of history to make 
intelligible the possibilities in the present and so can yield to neither 
universalist concepts of rationality and subjectivity nor metanarratives of 
progress, reason, or emancipation' .3 I have sought to assemble a variety of 
elements which have shaped British military forces, and through them the 
ADF, such as the adoption of barrack-like accommodation, the adaptation of 
the gentlemanly ethos of the nineteenth century officer, the terms of the 
separation of military and civil spheres of responsibility, the development of 
various measures of efficiency and the enhancement of the regiment. 
In particular, I have wanted to suggest that the steady progress of 
professionalisation as it is posited by sociologists such as Huntington, and 
taken up in reports like The Defence Force and the Community, is not as uniform, 
as unilinear nor as complete as its theorisation outlines. As a corollary, the 
civil-military relationship born of this professionalisation is not as clearly 
drawn either. In the Huntingtonian thesis, professional military forces can 
either operate in splendid isolation or be diluted by civil society. When the 
three arms of the profession are required to work more closely with one 
another it is expected that this will necessitate a weakening of the core values 
of each, as the Efficiency Review implies. The view of military culture here is 
of something that is thoroughly defining - to adapt to a new environment 
means giving up the existing culture, because it is so holistic in its 
implications that individuals shaped by that culture, by the professional 
military ethos, cannot simultaneously operate by any other ethos. Yet the 
three services will have to work more closely with each other, and with 
civilians, in order that the whole Defence organisation will more effectively 
deliver combat capability. This then sets up the apparent contradiction of 
requiring, on the one hand, that military personnel set aside their ethos in the 
interests of establishing a more efficient organisation, and on the other that 
3Dean, M. Critical and effective histories: Foucault's methods and historical sociology, 1994, 
London: Routledge, p.21. 
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military personnel be given greater opportunity to practice their military art, 
and retain their intraservice differences to avoid the 'cost of blurring 
specialisation', as the Review puts it. 
This is a contradictory position only if a holistic or deterministic view is taken 
of military culture, along the lines established by Huntington.4 I have 
suggested through the course of this thesis rather that there is no need to 
anticipate the clash of cultures in quite this way. Throughout the periods I 
have examined, there is ample evidence of the adeptness with which military 
forces have been adaptive to new circumstances, usually in the face of 
expectations that either military values or 'society's' values would wholly 
give way to the other; in eighteenth century Britain the barrack building 
programme was projected by its critics to lead to the military overthrow of 
civilian government; in nineteenth century Britain the professionalisation of 
the officer corps was considered by many contemporary commentators, and 
subsequent historians, to be the demise of the aristocratic, gentleman officer; 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Australia the 
antagonism to professional military forces suggested that there would never 
be a need again in Australia for anything more than a small cadre of 
permanent officers to train and administer a large and active part-time 
militia. 
In each of these circumstances the anticipated cultural overthrow did not 
occur. Instead, to elaborate on the argument of chapters two, three and four, 
governmental questions addressed to military culture served to specify 
aspects of this culture, in part to determine when and where they were 
4See for example the final vision of the civil-military relationship Samuel Huntington draws 
at the end of The Soldier and the State: theory and politics of civil-military relations, Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p.466: 'Yet today America can learn more from West 
Point than West Point from America. Upon the soldiers, the defenders of order, rests a 
heavy responsibility. The greatest service they can render is to remain true to themselves, to 
serve with silence and courage in the military way. If they abjure the military spirit, they 
destroy themselves first and their nation ultimately. If the civilians permit the soldiers to 
adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may even eventually find 
redemption and security in making that standard their own'. 
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appropriate and when and where they were not. The genealogy of this 
government of military culture demonstrates the series of accommodations 
that help to make sense of why following the Canadian example of 
amalgamation of the Navy, Army and Air Force is no more likely to occur 
than another 'extreme' of contracting out even the combat services provided 
by the ADF. For on the one hand, we have seen how military forces have 
migrated toward greater accountability, with the concomitant mechanisms for 
measuring efficiency, from the early 1800s onwards. On the other, we have 
seen how a variety of gc,,ernmental strategies have strengthened, or made 
more possible, the distinctiveness between the individual services, and 
between military forces and civilians. The two tendencies for accountability 
and efficiency, and for distincti-v"eness pull against each other, precluding the 
modern ADF from being drawn too far toward either. 
As this thesis also demonstrates, the development of modern military forces, 
in which military personnel have to be both 'more corporate' and more 
focussed on the 'sharp end', will be managed through a series of practical 
steps. Most importantly, to overcome the 'tribalism' that the Efficiency 
Review considers to be so divisive and inefficient, while at the same time 
retaining the 'combat cultures' of the three services, requires not only new 
attitudes on the part of military and civilian officers, but physical relocations 
and team building exercises. As well, it will require the development of a 
capacity on the part particularly of military personnel to 'modularise' their 
ethical comportment as they move between the more corporate, less 
structured and hierarchical central administrative parts of the new Defence 
Organisation and their parent service. We have seen how this should be 
possible because military personnel already exercise a high degree of site-
specific behaviours that equip them for living in close quarters and operating 
within a command structure. It should also be possible if we can 
acknowledge that the more 'bureaucratic' environment of an integrated 
headquarters also requires similarly modular ethical capacities. The policy 
adviser must also be able to exercise a kind of detachment in the course of 
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I 
I 
I ,, 
,ii 
ii! 
1 
I• , 
180 
arriving at the best means of addressing competing options, including 
weighing up the political, administrative and sectional interests that are likely 
to be at play.5 
Pointing to some of the existing strengths of the Defence organisation, 
particularly those that have been illuminated by this genealogical approach, 
is not intended to suggest that this more recent reformation of military forces 
will be straightforward. Indeed, initial indications suggest that generating 
the 'cultural change' advocated by the Review will be far more difficult than 
generating the financial savings estimated. What this examination of the 
history of such attempts at reform shows, is that the Defence Organisation, 
and the ADF in particular, will find ways of adapting to the changes required 
of it, somewhere within the boundaries historically formed by earlier 
governmental reforms. 
5
See Minsor , J. 'Ethics in the Service of the State' , in Hindess, B and Dean, M. (eds) Governing 
Australia, (forthcoming 1997). 
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